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l)MARKET EFFICIENCY AND LIQUIDITY
The wealth of nations is determined by the efficient usage of real assets, such as its land,
machinery, and knowledge. Financial assets merely represent claims on these real assets.
Nevertheless, financial markets serve many important roles: they allow to optimize the
reward to risk ratio, to shift consumption over time, can contain important information of
aggregate investor beliefs, and can help to shift scarce resources to its optimal usage.
But the efficacy of all of these roles depends on prices of financial assets reflecting the
true value of these assets and how well the market facilitates trading these assets. In other
words, the efficacy of these roles depend on the financial market being efficient and liquid.
Finance academics documented large time- and cross-sectional variation in market
liquidity, but at the same time, in general, treated market efficiency as a static concept. This
seems at odds, because both efficiency and liquidity are intimately related. Arguably markets
are not efficient per se, but require trading against potential inefficiencies by informed
investors, who’s success depends on the ease at which they can trade (market liquidity) and
on their available capital (funding liquidity).
The main theme of this thesis is to investigate the interaction between market effi -
ciency and liquidity. In particular to document time- and cross-sectional variation in market
efficiency, and whether individual stock efficiency co-moves with aggregate market effi -
ciency; to investigate why inefficiencies arise and how trading against these ineffi ciencies
affects market liquidity; and to provide a new measure for the probability of inform ed
trading.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The wealth of nations is determined by the efﬁcient usage of real assets, such as land, machin-
ery, and natural resources. Financial assets, such as stocks and bonds, merely represent claims
on these real assets.
Nevertheless, ﬁnancial markets serve many important roles: they allow investors to opti-
mize their reward to risk ratio, households to shift consumption over time, aggregate investor
beliefs, and help to shift scarce resources to their optimal use (e.g., see Levine, 2005).
Through all these roles ﬁnancial markets can improve the efﬁcient usage of real assets
and thereby have an effect on the real economy and improve economic growth. For example,
if investors believe that a certain company has large investment opportunities, investors will
buy the stock leading to an increase in the share price. This increase in the share price will
make it easier for the company to raise further capital which it then can use to pursue these
investments. Through this channel, ﬁnancial markets play an important role in allocating
scarce capital across companies.
But the efﬁcacy of all of these roles crucially depends on prices of ﬁnancial assets reﬂect-
ing the true value of these assets and how well the market facilitates trading these assets. In
other words, the efﬁcacy of these roles depends on the ﬁnancial market being informationally
efﬁcient and liquid. The main theme of this thesis is to investigate the interaction between
market efﬁciency and liquidity.
Market efﬁciency
According to Fama (1970), an informational efﬁcient market is “a market in which prices
always ‘fully reﬂect‘ available information” (p. 383). An efﬁcient market “provide(s) accurate
signals for resource allocation” (Fama and Miller, 1972, p. 335).
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In his seminal classiﬁcation, Fama (1970) distinguishes market efﬁciency based on the
type of information that is reﬂected in prices. In particular, Fama distinguishes between
semi-strong-form efﬁciency, in which prices reﬂect all public information, and strong-form
efﬁciency, in which prices reﬂect all public, as well as all private information.
There is evidence that markets are not strong form efﬁcient (e.g., see Jaffe, 1974), but a
debate whether markets are semi-strong-form efﬁcient. This debate is reﬂected in the work
by Fama and Shiller (e.g., Fama, 1970, 1991; Shiller, 1981) who both shared the 2013 Nobel
Prize in Economic Sciences with Hansen.
One of the difﬁculties in determining whether prices are efﬁcient is that they need to be
risk-adjusted. For example, Banz (1981) provides evidence that shares of small companies
generally outperform those of big companies, but this does not necessarily mean that markets
are inefﬁcient. Investors need to properly risk-adjust the returns: holding shares of small
companies, in general, may well be more risky than holding stocks of large companies, and
therefore returns of small companies would be expected to be higher. This issue is often
referred to as the joint-hypothesis problem (e.g., see Fama, 1991).
Trying to avoid this joint-hypothesis problem, recent empirical studies focus on deviations
from the law of one price, that similar assets have similar prices, as a more direct measure
for market inefﬁciencies (e.g., Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2002; Lamont and Thaler,
2003; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2007; De Jong, Rosenthal, and van Dijk, 2009;
Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010b). But again, observing deviations from the law of one price is not
necessarily evidence of market inefﬁciencies. For example, Fama (1991) states that “a market
is efﬁcient, if prices reﬂect information to the point where the marginal beneﬁts of acting ... do
not exceed the marginal costs” (p. 1575, quoting Jensen, 1978). Following this interpretation,
the market might have been inefﬁcient when the deviation of the law of one price arose, but
might well be perfectly efﬁcient afterwards, if the costs of acting exceed the beneﬁts. Yet,
calling such a market efﬁcient seems less than ideal, because trading costs do not necessarily
lead to inefﬁciencies (Kyle, 1985) and because regardless of why the mispricing persists such
a market can not efﬁciently serve its deeper roles.
Nevertheless, any study about market efﬁciency is also a study about trading frictions such
as trading costs and market illiquidity.
Market liquidity
Illiquidity as a trading friction can not only explain why deviations from the law of one
price persist, but also plays an important role in how ﬁnancial markets affect the real economy.
The liquidity of a market is often deﬁned by the ease at which it allows trading, in particular
8_Erim Rösch stand.job
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liquid markets allow immediate trading of large volumes at low costs.
Wurgler (2000) provides empirical evidence that developed ﬁnancial markets allow better
allocation of capital. Because better developed ﬁnancial markets are in general more liquid,
prices are more informative about company-speciﬁc investment opportunities. More informa-
tive prices allow investors to better distinguish between good and bad investments. Wurgler
(2000) concludes that the “most liquid ﬁnancial markets in the world are also the ones that
allocate capital most efﬁciently” (p. 190).
Liquid markets not only improve the efﬁciency of capital allocation but also directly re-
duce the cost of capital companies face. In their seminal study, Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
ﬁnd a positive relation between the illiquidity of a share and its expected return. In other
words, investors discount the current share price to compensate for its illiquidity. This illiq-
uidity premium hence increases the cost for companies to get equity funding and might result
in fewer investments and hence lower economic growth. Following their seminal study, sev-
eral other researchers provided evidence that liquidity is priced as a characteristic (Brennan
and Subrahmanyam, 1996) as well as a source of systemic risk (Chordia, Roll, and Subrah-
manyam, 2000; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006).
Market liquidity and market efﬁciency
There are many ﬁnance academics that documented large time- and cross-sectional varia-
tion in trading frictions impeding trading by informed investors [such as market illiquidity in
Benston and Hagerman (1974); Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)], but at the same
time treated market efﬁciency as a static concept (recent exceptions include Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam, 2008; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2011; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012; Hu, Pan, and Wang, 2013; Pasquariello, 2014). This seems
at odds, because both efﬁciency and liquidity are intimately related: Arguably markets are
not efﬁcient per se, but require trading against potential inefﬁciencies by informed investors,
whose success depends on the ease at which they can trade (market liquidity) and on their
available capital (funding liquidity) (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2008).
To better understand the possible interaction between market efﬁciency and liquidity it
is important to understand why markets can neither be perfectly efﬁcient nor liquid. Prices
cannot always reﬂect all possible information, as in such a market informed traders would
“make no (private) return from their (privately) costly activity” (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980,
p. 393) and hence would pursue other activities, leaving prices less informative. Similarly,
markets cannot be perfectly liquid.
Investors that want to sell an asset ﬁrst need to ﬁnd an investor, who is willing to buy.
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Because this matching process is not always easily achieved, intermediaries, so called liq-
uidity providers, step in and provide immediacy by buying the asset from the ﬁrst investor
and holding the asset in their inventory till the second investor arrives in the market. Classic
market-microstructure models provide three reasons why markets are less than perfectly liq-
uid. First, liquidity providers face ﬁxed costs and demand compensation for providing their
service. Second, risk-averse liquidity providers face inventory risk, that the asset they buy
decreases in value till they are able to sell it again (Stoll, 1978). Third, liquidity providers
face adverse selection risk, the probability of trading against informed investors (Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985).
In other words, while the trading of informed investors is crucial for prices to be infor-
mational efﬁcient, at the same time, informed investors can also decrease liquidity, because
liquidity providers face larger adverse selection risk.
To understand the potential interaction between market efﬁciency and liquidity it is cru-
cial to understand how inefﬁciencies arise. If, for example, inefﬁciencies arise as a result of
demand pressure, informed investors trade against market demand and thereby decrease in-
ventory holding costs for liquidity providers, which improves liquidity (Gromb and Vayanos,
2010). But if inefﬁciencies arise as a result of differences in information then trading by in-
formed traders is “toxic” (Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham, 2013), increases adverse selection
risk, and lowers liquidity.
In the remainder of this introduction, I will provide a short introduction into the three
different chapters of my thesis.
Chapter 2: An empirical analysis of co-movement in market efﬁciency 1
In my second chapter, we start with exploring the idea that the degree of ﬁnancial mar-
ket efﬁciency not only varies over time, but also across stocks, and analyze co-movement in
the time-varying efﬁciency of individual stocks. Using ﬁve stock-level measures of price efﬁ-
ciency, we ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant co-movement in efﬁciency. The degree of co-movement
in efﬁciency is greater for more liquid stocks and varies considerably over time. In vector au-
toregressions, we show that shocks to funding liquidity (the TED spread), hedge fund ﬂows,
and a proxy for algorithmic trading signiﬁcantly affect the degree of co-movement in efﬁ-
ciency. Overall, our results imply that stock price efﬁciency has a component that is prone
to systematic improvement and deterioration, and that events and policies that impact funding
1 This chapter is based on Ro¨sch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015) “An Empirical Analysis of Co-
Movement in Market Efﬁciency” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062926. For this chapter I developed
several of the hypotheses and empirical tests, carried out all of the data collection and screening as well as all of
the empirical analyses, and did some of the writing.
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liquidity can affect the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency.
Co-movement in efﬁciency give rise to the notion of efﬁciency risk that is in part sys-
tematic and may be priced in the cross-section (as empirically found by Pasquariello (2014)).
It also suggests that informed investors trade against inefﬁciencies across the whole market,
rather than focus on speciﬁc segments.
Chapter 3: The impact of arbitrage on market liquidity 2
In my third chapter, I focus on deviations from the law of one price as a measure of market
inefﬁciency. I am especially interested to investigate whether arbitrageurs provide liquidity
and thereby would not only improve the efﬁciency of the market but also its liquidity. Similar
arguments why markets are not perfectly efﬁcient (such as a lack of available capital), can
explain why deviations of the law-of-one price persist. But much less is known why deviations
from the law-of-one price arise. The reasons why these deviations arise is important, because
theory predicts that the impact of trading against these deviations on liquidity depends on why
these deviations arise. Theory predicts that arbitrage improves ﬁnancial market liquidity when
arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of temporary demand shocks and worsens liquidity
when arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of differences in information. In this paper, I
study the impact of arbitrage in Depositary Receipts (DRs) on market liquidity, using tick-
by-tick data from the U.S. and ﬁve different home markets from 1996 to 2013. My analysis
suggests that around 70% of the arbitrage opportunities in DRs arise as a result of demand
shocks. Consistent with theory, I then show that an increase in arbitrage activity is associated
with a reduction in market order imbalance and an improvement in liquidity. My results are
robust to different proxies for arbitrage activity, different methodologies, and to instrumental
variable tests. Overall, these ﬁndings indicate that arbitrageurs tend to trade against market
order imbalance and thus enhance market integration and liquidity.
Chapter 4: Cross-sectional identiﬁcation of informed trading 3
In the fourth chapter, we present a new approach to measure the probability of informed
trading. We propose to measure informed trading in individual securities based on a portfolio
optimization model for investors facing information and liquidity shocks. These shocks induce
speculative and liquidity-motivated order ﬂow, taking into account the price impact of trading.
The model allows us to back out the amount of informed trading from a security’s aggregate
2 This chapter is based on Ro¨sch (2014) “The Impact of Arbitrage on Market Liquidity” available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295437.
3 This chapter is based on Bongaerts, Ro¨sch, and van Dijk (2014) “Cross-Sectional Identiﬁcation of Informed
Trading” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532128. For this chapter I developed part of the theoretical anal-
ysis and most of the hypotheses and empirical tests, carried out a substantial part of the data collection and
screening as well as all empirical analyses, and did some of the writing.
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order ﬂow, based on the cross-section of price impact parameters (λ) and order imbalances
(OIB). Furthermore, we obtain a very simple expression for a security’s aggregate private
information shock: its λ × OIB, in excess of the same term for a benchmark security that
is insulated from informed trading. We validate our private information measure (based on
daily data for all S&P 1500 stocks over 2001-2010) by showing that it is strongly related to
contemporaneous returns, and that return reversals are signiﬁcantly weaker following stock-
days with high private information estimates.
Taken together the results of these studies indicate that ﬁnancial market efﬁciency (Chap-
ter 2), arbitrage activity (Chapter 3), and informed trading (Chapter 4) varies over time. In
Chapter 2 we provide evidence indicating that shocks to funding liquidity and arbitrage activ-
ity have a signiﬁcant effect on the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency. These results indicate
a time-varying component in the degree of pricing efﬁciency of individual stocks, partly driven
by changes in funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity. On the other hand, re-
sults in Chapter 3 indicate that arbitrage activity not only improves market efﬁciency, but can
also improve market liquidity by shifting excess trading demands across markets.
These results shed additional light on possible consequences of frictions impeding arbi-
trage, such as short-selling bans or transaction taxes. To curb excessive trading eleven Euro-
pean member states plan to introduce a transaction tax. The tax will likely have an adverse
effect on arbitrage activity which might increase co-movement in individual stock efﬁciency
and deteriorate market efﬁciency and liquidity.
Several open questions remain. Of particular interests are asset pricing tests, whether the
co-movement in efﬁciency leads to a priced risk factor and whether our proxy for informed
trading from Chapter 4 is priced.
Further, the effect of arbitrage activity on market liquidity seems to deserve more atten-
tion. For example, arbitrageurs seem to dampen the effect of liquidity shocks in the depositary
receipt market and thereby might also decrease liquidity risk for depositary receipts. It also
seems worthwhile to investigate the effect of arbitrage activity in other markets, such as in
the options markets. Several recent studies (e.g., Lin, Lu, and Driessen, 2013) provide evi-
dence that informed traders prefer the option market, and hence arbitrage opportunities might
arise more often because of informational differences. In this case arbitrage might harm the
liquidity of the underlying stock.
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Analysis of Co-Movement
in Market Efﬁciency∗
2.1 Introduction
For most of its life, the ﬁnance profession has treated ﬁnancial market efﬁciency as a static
concept. The seminal taxonomy in Fama (1970) of weak-, semi-strong, and strong-form ef-
ﬁciency inspires debate on which of these best describes ﬁnancial markets, but this debate
has paid little heed to the possibility that the degree of market efﬁciency varies through time.
Yet, there are sound reasons to expect such time variations. Market efﬁciency is enforced in
part by way of arbitrage, the efﬁcacy of which is inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial frictions (such as
limited capital, transaction costs, short-sales constraints, and idiosyncratic risk) whose sever-
ity varies considerably over time. Indeed, recent studies show that the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial
markets is dynamic in nature and that it varies through time with ﬁnancial market liquidity and
constraints on arbitrage capital (see, e.g., Boehmer and Kelley (2009); Mitchell and Pulvino
(2012); Hu et al. (2013); Pasquariello (2014)).
∗ This chapter is based on Ro¨sch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2015) “An Empirical Analysis of Co-
Movement in Market Efﬁciency” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062926. We thank Yakov Amihud,
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man, Raghu Rau, Matti Suominen, Kumar Venkataraman, Avi Wohl, Hong Yan, and participants at the 2012
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Conference (Warwick Business School), the 2013 Campus for Finance conference (WHU Otto Beisheim School
of Management), the 2013 EFA meetings (Cambridge), and at seminars at Deakin University, Erasmus Univer-
sity, Goethe University Frankfurt, Indiana University, UCLA Anderson, University of Cambridge, University of
Manchester, and University of South Carolina for valuable comments. This work was carried out on the National
e-infrastructure with the support of SURF Foundation. We thank SURFsara, and in particular Lykle Voort, for
technical support on computing and storage, and OneMarketData for the use of their OneTick software. Van Dijk
gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and
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Similarly, the efﬁciency of price formation is likely to vary across individual securities,
since there is considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity in various attributes that affect the ef-
ﬁcacy of arbitrage. For example, Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Nagel (2005) document
considerable cross-sectional variation in stock-level illiquidity and short-sales constraints, re-
spectively.
The idea that efﬁciency varies both over time and across stocks raises the question to what
extent time-variation in market efﬁciency co-moves across individual stocks. And, if there
is evidence of signiﬁcant co-movement in efﬁciency, what are the fundamental forces (such
as funding liquidity or other factors that affect the efﬁcacy of arbitrage) that drive it? These
questions are relevant since investors, exchange ofﬁcials, and policy-makers should care about
whether the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets is prone to ﬂuctuation in a systematic way, and
about what factors inﬂuence the degree of such common variation.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper, we do the following. We ﬁrst com-
pute daily market efﬁciency estimates for individual stocks based on ﬁve measures: intraday
return predictability based on past order ﬂow (Boehmer and Wu, 2007), variance ratios (Lo
and MacKinlay, 1989; Bessembinder, 2003), the variance of intraday returns (Bessembinder,
2003), intraday Hasbrouck (1993) pricing errors, and put-call parity deviations in the corre-
sponding options markets (Finucane, 1991; Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010) using all NYSE
stocks over an extended sample period of ﬁfteen years (based on data on 14.3 billion transac-
tions in total).
We then construct market-wide measures of efﬁciency from these stock-level measures
and, each month for each stock, estimate the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency as the
R2’s from regressions of the daily stock-level measures on the market-wide measures. These
analyses show that time-variation in market efﬁciency has a material common component
across stocks, which indicates that market efﬁciency is prone to improvement and deterioration
in a systematic way. We also ﬁnd that the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency is considerably
greater for liquid stocks than for illiquid stocks, and that it exhibits substantial time-variation.1
Our next goal is to analyze the economic forces that drive time-variation in the degree
of co-movement in market efﬁciency. In particular, we are interested in whether variation
in funding liquidity and other determinants of the efﬁcacy of arbitrage affects the degree of
co-movement in efﬁciency. We hypothesize that changes in funding liquidity and the overall
intensity of arbitrage activity affect the price efﬁciency of many stocks at the same time,
1We make sure that our estimates of co-movement in stock-level efﬁciency are not simply a different mani-
festation of co-movement in stock-level liquidity by orthogonalizing stock-level efﬁciency with respect to stock-
level liquidity before running the regressions to estimate co-movement in efﬁciency.
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thereby elevating the degree of co-movement in stock-level efﬁciency.
We ﬁrst create an aggregate measure of market-wide co-movement in efﬁciency as fol-
lows. For each of the ﬁve efﬁciency measures, we construct a monthly, market-wide measure
of the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency as the equally-weighted average of the monthly
R2’s from the co-movement regressions of individual stocks. We then extract the ﬁrst principal
component from the ﬁve resulting monthly, market-wide co-movement in efﬁciency measures
and use it as the main variable of interest in vector autoregressions (VARs). As other endoge-
nous variables, we include changes in the TED spread (a common indicator of funding liq-
uidity), hedge fund ﬂows (a proxy for changes in the amount of capital available for arbitrage
activity), and the total number of quote updates divided by aggregate dollar trading volume (a
proxy for algorithmic trading, inspired by Boehmer et al. (2014)). Since market efﬁciency is
linked to market liquidity, we are careful to also include the degree of co-movement in market
liquidity as an endogenous variable and to allow it to affect co-movement in efﬁciency in all
of our VARs.
We ﬁnd that shocks to funding liquidity and to variables that proxy for the intensity of
arbitrage activity have a signiﬁcant impact on the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency. In
particular, shocks to the TED spread and to hedge fund ﬂows positively affect the degree of
co-movement in efﬁciency in the subsequent month, while a shock to algorithmic trading has
a positive contemporaneous effect on efﬁciency co-movement. These effects are over and
beyond the impact of shocks to these variables on co-movement in liquidity and are stronger
for illiquid stocks than for liquid stocks. These results indicate that funding liquidity and the
intensity of arbitrage activity are important forces that help us understand time-variation in the
degree of co-movement in efﬁciency.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to study (the determinants of) co-
movement in the time-varying pricing efﬁciency of individual stocks. We view our analysis
of co-movement in market efﬁciency as relevant for at least three reasons. First, we show that
market efﬁciency, rather than being a static concept, exhibits signiﬁcant time-variation and
co-moves across individual stocks. This result is important for academic research, since most
theoretical models in ﬁnance rely on efﬁcient ﬁnancial market prices. Studying co-movement
in market efﬁciency enhances our understanding of the extent to which the data are consistent
with these models, and of whether deviations from the assumption of efﬁcient pricing exhibit
systematic variation across individual securities.
Second, we go beyond the well-known link between funding liquidity and market liq-
uidity and demonstrate a further connection between funding liquidity and the degree of co-
movement in the efﬁciency of price formation. The latter result suggests that policy attempts
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to increase funding liquidity may not only have a direct impact on trading costs, but also
systematically affect the efﬁciency of stock market prices.
Third, our results provide a natural underpinning of Pasquariello (2014) ﬁnding that a
measure of “ﬁnancial market dislocations” (constructed as an average of violations of arbitrage
parities in stock, foreign exchange, and money markets) is a priced factor in the cross-section
of stock returns. Our analysis indicates that the degree of price efﬁciency of individual stocks
is uncertain, and that this uncertainty cannot be fully diversiﬁed away across individual stocks,
which suggests that “efﬁciency risk” is in part systematic and may be priced in the cross-
section.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the estimation of the efﬁ-
ciency measures for individual stocks. Section 2.3 presents the sample and the estimates of the
efﬁciency measures. In Section 2.4, we document co-movement in these measures across indi-
vidual stocks and across portfolios of stocks. Section 2.5 analyzes determinants of time-series
variation in the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Efﬁciency measures
Our analysis is based on ﬁve measures of price efﬁciency that we estimate each day for each
stock: intraday return predictability based on past order ﬂow, variance ratios, the variance
of intraday returns, Hasbrouck (1993) pricing errors, and put-call parity deviations. In this
section, we explain in detail how we estimate each of these measures.
2.2.1 Intraday return predictability
Our ﬁrst efﬁciency measure is based on the intraday predictability of individual stock returns
from past order ﬂow. Several papers, including Hasbrouck and Ho (1987), Chan and Fong
(2000), Chordia et al. (2005), and Boehmer and Wu (2007) explore and provide evidence of
such return predictability, which we use as an inverse indicator of market efﬁciency. Chordia
et al. (2005) argue that such predictability arises from a temporary disequilibrium because
of dealers’ inability to accommodate autocorrelated order imbalances. Their evidence sug-
gests that trading by astute arbitrageurs removes all return predictability over intervals of ﬁve
minutes or more, but some predictability remains at shorter horizons.
In line with these prior studies, we estimate the intraday return predictability of each
individual stock for each day in the sample based on regressions of stock returns over short
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intervals within the day on order imbalance (dollar volume of buyer- minus seller-initiated
trades) in the previous interval. Chordia et al. (2005) show that prices cease to be predictable
from order ﬂow in 30 minutes or less in 1996, and in around ﬁve minutes in 2002. Since our
sample period lasts till 2010, we have to use intervals shorter than ﬁve minutes to still capture
meaningful predictability in the later part of the sample period. In light of this consideration,
we estimate predictability based on intraday returns and order imbalances measured over one-
minute intervals (with a robustness check based on two-minute intervals).
We estimate the extent of short-horizon return predictability from order ﬂow for each
stock i and day d in the sample as the R2 from the following regression, using intraday data
aggregated over one-minute intervals:
Ri,d,t = ai,d + bi,dOIBi,d,t−1 + i,d,t, (2.1)
where Ri,d,t is the return of stock i in one-minute interval t on day d based on the mid-quote
associated with the last trade to the mid-quote of the ﬁrst trade in the interval (we use mid-
quote returns to avoid the bid-ask bounce), and OIBi,d,t−1 is the order imbalance for the same
stock and day in the previous interval t−1, computed as the difference between the total dollar
volume of trades initiated by buyers and sellers (OIB$). A lowerR2 from the regression in Eq.
(2.1) indicates greater efﬁciency. We refer to the efﬁciency measure based on this regression
speciﬁcation as the OIB predictability measure.
To assess the robustness of our results to changes in the speciﬁcation of the predictability
regressions, we also estimate four alternative return predictability measures, each named af-
ter the single feature that distinguishes it from the OIB predictability measure. The allquotes
measure is based on returns computed using all quotes within each interval rather than only
using quotes associated with trades; the 2minutes measure is based on two-minute instead of
one-minute intervals; and the oib# measure is based on order imbalance expressed in number
of trades rather than dollars. We also present and discuss the results using the R2 from re-
gressions of one-minute returns on their one-minute lagged counterparts, instead of past order
ﬂows, and label this the autocorrelation measure. We discard stock-days with fewer than 20
observations for each of these measures. In our analyses of co-movement in market efﬁciency,
we use a general Predictability measure that is constructed as the ﬁrst principal component
across the ﬁve alternative return predictability measures (more details are provided below).
2.2.2 Variance ratios
The second efﬁciency measure we consider is a daily variance ratio that examines how closely
the price of individual stocks adheres to a random walk benchmark, in line with, among oth-
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ers, Bessembinder (2003). The stock-level Variance ratio measure is deﬁned as |1 − 30 ×
V ar(1min)/V ar(30min)|, where V ar(1min) is the return variance estimated from one-
minute mid-quote returns within a day and V ar(30min) is the return variance estimated from
30-minute mid-quote returns within a day. Variance ratios are computed from mid-quote re-
turns and do not utilize traded prices, mitigating the problem of non-synchronous trading.
Since estimates of daily variance ratios of individual stocks can be noisy (Andersen et al.,
2001), we follow Lo and MacKinlay (1989) (see their equation (5)) and Charles and Darne´
(2009) and estimate daily variance ratios based on overlapping intraday returns. Since ex-
pected returns over such short intervals are very close to zero, we set expected returns to zero
in the computation of the variances. We discard stock-days with fewer than 20 non-zero one-
minute returns. The variance ratio tends to unity as serial dependence in asset returns tends
to zero as per Bessembinder (2003); therefore, it measures how closely the price adheres to a
random walk.
2.2.3 Variance of intraday returns
Motivated by Bessembinder (2003), we include the variance of intraday returns as a third
measure for the quality of price formation of individual stocks. Bessembinder argues that
intraday return volatility is an important inverse indicator of price formation quality. We
estimate the intraday return volatility of individual stocks each day as the variance of one-
minute mid-quote returns and refer to this variable as the Variance measure. We discard
stock-days with fewer than 20 non-zero one-minute returns for this measure.
2.2.4 Hasbrouck pricing errors
As a fourth efﬁciency measure, we estimate Hasbrouck (1993) pricing errors based on intraday
trades and quotes. Hasbrouck proposes a method to decompose stock prices into random walk
and stationary components. He refers to the stationary component (the difference between the
efﬁcient price and the actual price) as the pricing error, which he argues is a natural measure
for price efﬁciency. We follow Hasbrouck and estimate vector autoregression (VAR) models
to estimate these components. As in Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we estimate a ﬁve-lag
VAR model based on intraday data for each stock-day with at least one hundred trades. The
endogenous variables of the model are: (i) the logarithmic price return, from quote midpoints
associated with trades,2 (ii) a trade sign indicator, (iii) the signed volume (that is, the sign of
2Using mid-quote returns avoids the bid-ask bounce, but using returns from actual trade prices does not alter
the main results.
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the trade times the number of shares traded), and (iv) the sign of the trade times the square root
of the number of shares traded. We sign all trades with trade prices above the prevailing quote
midpoint as buyer-initiated, and seller-initiated if they are below the quote midpoint. If the
trade occurred at the prevailing quote midpoint we set the sign of the trade to zero (following
Hasbrouck, 1993). As in Hasbrouck (1993), we also set all lagged variables at the beginning
of each day to zero. We obtain the pricing error of each trade in a stock on a given day from
the vector moving average representation of the VAR system (Beveridge and Nelson, 1981)
using Eq. (13) in Hasbrouck (1993). We take the maximum of the absolute pricing errors of
the trades in a stock on a given day as an inverse measure of the informational efﬁciency for
that stock on that day and label it the Hasbrouck measure. Since daily, stock-level estimates
of the maximum intraday pricing error exhibit several large outliers, we use the logarithmic
transformation of Hasbrouck to mitigate their inﬂuence.3
2.2.5 Put-call parity deviations
Our ﬁfth proxy for the price efﬁciency of individual stocks is a law of one price measure
derived from options markets. The use of this measure enhances our understanding of co-
movement in market efﬁciency by extending the notion of efﬁciency to derivatives markets for
individual stocks. This Put-call parity measure is estimated using the OptionMetrics database
as the absolute difference between the implied volatilities of a call and a put option of the
same series (i.e., pairs of options on the same underlying stock with the same strike price
and the same expiration date).4 We use end-of-day quotes from all option series with positive
implied volatilities that expire in two weeks to one year and that have a strike-to-spot ratio
between 0.95 and 1.05. We impose these conditions to ensure that our estimates of put-call
parity deviations are based on near-the-money and relatively short maturity options, which are
typically the most liquid options (following Pan (2002)). When more than one option pair
satisﬁes these conditions for a given stock-day, we take the average of the absolute differences
between the implied volatilities of the call and the put option across all option pairs.
3In unreported tests, we obtain similar results when we follow Boehmer and Kelley (2009) and use the daily
standard deviation (instead of the daily maximum) of the intraday pricing errors as an inverse measure of price
efﬁciency.
4This measure is also used in Cremers andWeinbaum (2010). These authors note that while, strictly speaking,
put-call parity does not hold as an equality for the American options on individual stocks, a lower discrepancy in
implied volatilities from binomial models nonetheless is indicative of more efﬁcient options and stock markets.
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2.3 Sample and efﬁciency estimates
To estimate the ﬁve efﬁciency measures, we obtain data on all trades and quotes as well as their
respective sizes for individual U.S. stocks from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH)
database, which contains global tick-by-tick trade and quote data across asset classes. TRTH
is increasingly used in studies on high-frequency data, see, e.g., Lau et al. (2012); Marshall
et al. (2012); Lai et al. (2014).5 Our data start in March 1996, which is the earliest month
available in the TRTH database. Our sample consists of all NYSE stocks that were traded
at any time during our sample period from March 1996 to December 2010 and that survive
our data screens. We include only NYSE stocks to prevent issues with differences in trading
volume deﬁnitions across NYSE and Nasdaq, see, e.g., Gao and Ritter (2010). We use trades
and (national best bid and offer) quotes on all U.S. exchanges on which these NYSE stocks
are traded. We apply a variety of ﬁlters to the data that are described in Appendix A.1. We are
able to use 14,253,093,209 transactions, signed by the Lee and Ready (1991) method, in our
analyses.6 Our ﬁnal sample includes 2,157 NYSE stocks.
To estimate the predictability regressions in Eq. (2.1), we require at least one signed trade
in both the interval over which we calculate the return as well as the previous interval. This
leads us to drop a non-negligible fraction of the intraday intervals in the early years of the
sample period, but since the year 2000 almost all stocks have at least one trade in almost all
of the intraday intervals. We discard stock-days for which we have fewer than 20 one-minute
intervals with valid data on the stock return within that interval and on the order imbalance
or return in the preceding interval (in total 756,051 stock-day observations), and days for
which TRTH reports a data gap that overlaps with the continuous trading session (in total 56
days). Our data ﬁlters allow us to estimate Eq. (2.1) for on average 1,711 days over the period
1996-2010 across the 2,157 stocks in our sample.
5To verify that our results do not depend on using TRTH instead of NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database,
we compare the results based on TRTH to those based on TAQ for all 2,023 NYSE-listed common stocks that
were traded at any time over the period 1996-2000 and ﬁnd that they are very similar. For example, the pooled
correlations between the input variables for the intraday return predictability regressions (as reported in Table 2.1:
number of trades, trading volume, average one-minute mid-quote returns, average one-minute order imbalance
in number of trades, and average one-minute order imbalance in US$) range from 97.9% to 99.9% for these ﬁve
variables. Further details are available from the authors.
6The Lee/Ready algorithm classiﬁes a trade as buyer- (seller-)initiated if it is closer to the ask (bid) of the pre-
vailing quote. If the trade is exactly at the midpoint of the quote, the trade is classiﬁed as buyer- (seller-)initiated
if the last price change prior to the trade is positive (negative). Of course, there is inevitably some assignment
error, so the resulting order imbalances are imperfect estimates, see, e.g., Aitken and Frino (1996); Ellis et al.
(2000); Theissen (2001) for evidence on the accuracy of the Lee/Ready algorithm for stocks traded on the Aus-
tralian Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, respectively. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000);
Odders-White (2000) indicate that the Lee/Ready algorithm is quite accurate for NYSE stocks, suggesting that
assignment errors should have minimal impact on the results.
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Table 2.1 – Summary statistics of input variables for intraday return predictability regressions
This table reports the cross-sectional (across the 2,157 NYSE stocks in the sample) mean, standard devi-
ation (“SD”), ﬁrst quartile (“25%”), median, and third quartile (“75%”) of the time-series average by stock of
the daily number of trades (#trades), daily trading volume in US$ billions (dollar volume), average one-minute
mid-quote returns within the day in basis points (1-min mid-quote return), average difference between the
total number of trades initated by buyers and sellers (order imbalance in number of trades) over one-minute
intervals (1-min oib#), and the average difference between the total dollar volume of trades initiated by buyers
and sellers (order imbalance in US$) over one-minute intervals (1-min oib$ ). The ﬁrst column indicates the
number of stocks over which the summary statistics are computed. The sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed
common stocks from 1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens (described in the Appendix). Data to compute
all variables are from TRTH.
#Stocks Mean SD 25% Median 75%
#trades 2,157 2,015 4,798 79 432 1,797
dollar volume 2,157 0.025 0.062 0.001 0.006 0.021
1-min mid-quote return 2,157 -0.007 0.255 -0.023 -0.001 0.011
1-min oib# 2,157 0.067 0.138 0.001 0.023 0.094
1-min oib$ 2,157 3,052 7,077 4 520 2,616
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the return and order imbalance variables that
serve as inputs to our predictability regressions. For these variables, the table reports cross-
sectional summary statistics (the mean, standard deviation, as well as the median and the 25th
and 75th percentiles) of the stock-by-stock time-series averages. The average number of trades
per day is around 2,000. The average daily dollar trading volume is 0.025 or US$25m. The
median one-minute mid-quote return is equal to -0.001 basis point, which corresponds to -0.4
basis points per day. There is a slight positive average order imbalance over the one-minute
intervals in our sample.
Table 2.2 presents the results of the daily return predictability regressions estimated based
on intraday data. As described in Section 1.1, the baseline predictability measure (OIB pre-
dictability) is obtained from regressions of one-minute mid-quote returns (computed using
quotes associated with trades) on lagged dollar order imbalance. For robustness, we also esti-
mate four alternative predictability measures: allquotes, 2minutes, oib#, and autocorrelation.
Consistent with prior research, Table 2.2 shows that order imbalance positively predicts
future returns over short intervals. The average coefﬁcient on lagged order imbalance across
the approximately 3,200,000 stock-day regressions ranges from 0.947 for the oib# measure
to 6.169 for the 2minutes measure. The return autocorrelation coefﬁcient is also positive at
0.024. The ﬁrst number in parentheses below the average coefﬁcient (“t-stat avg”) is the aver-
age t-statistic across all stock-day regressions. Although for all measures except perhaps one
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Table 2.2 – Intraday return predictability regressions
This table reports the average results of the return predictability regressions from Eq. (2.1), estimated
daily based on intraday data for each of the NYSE stocks in the sample. Each of the ﬁve columns presents the
results of a different way to estimate the predictability of one-minute (or two-minute) returns from lagged order
imbalance (OIB) or lagged returns: OIB predictability, allquotes, 2minutes, oib#, and autocorrelation. Section
1.1 discusses all ﬁve return predictability measures in detail. The ﬁrst number in each column is the average
slope coefﬁcient across all stock-day predictability regressions. The OIB coefﬁcient is scaled by 109 for the OIB
predictability, allquotes, and 2minutes regressions and by 104 for the oib# regressions. The average t-statistics
(“t-stat avg”) and the average Newey-West (1994) t-statistics (“NW t-stat avg”) are in parentheses below the
coefﬁcients. “% positive” is the percentage of positive coefﬁcients, and “% + signiﬁcant” is the percentage
with t-statistics greater than 1.645 (the 5% critical level in a one-tailed test). Intercepts have been suppressed to
conserve space. The last three rows report the average R2 and adjusted R2 across all regressions and the number
of stock-day predictability regressions. The full sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks from
1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens (described in the Appendix). Data are from TRTH. Data to compute
Put-call parity are from OptionMetrics.
Predictability measure: OIB
predictability
allquotes 2minutes oib# autocorrelation
OIBt−1 4.380 3.792 6.169 0.947
Returnt−1 0.024
t-stat avg (1.254) (0.779) (0.863) (1.852) (0.370)
NW t-stat avg (8.385) (7.042) (7.800) (10.657) (3.614)
% positive 81.61 72.03 74.62 88.71 58.00
% + signiﬁcant 45.75 31.85 35.10 61.67 28.82
R2 2.55 1.72 2.57 3.47 1.83
adj. R2 1.60 0.75 1.45 2.51 0.79
# regressions 3,175,645 3,263,908 3,391,138 3,271,527 3,097,085
(oib#), the simple average t-statistic does not exceed critical values associated with conven-
tional conﬁdence levels, the t-statistics of the individual stock-day regressions can be based
on as few as 20 intraday observations.
The second number in parentheses in each column (“NW t-stat avg”), is the Newey and
West (1994) t-statistic computed based on the time-series of daily coefﬁcient estimates of
individual stocks, which is then averaged across stocks. These t-statistics thus exploit the
power obtained from the time-series of predictability estimates obtained for each stock, while
accounting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure with
automatic lag selection. They are similar in spirit to the t-statistics used in the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) approach, the difference being that the time-series of coefﬁcient estimates is
not obtained from cross-sectional regressions, but from intraday return predictability regres-
sions estimated by stock-day. These average Newey-West t-statistics are highly signiﬁcant for
all ﬁve predictability regressions reported Table 2.2 and indicate that intraday returns exhibit
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signiﬁcant predictability from lagged order imbalance or returns.
A potential concern about the average Newey-West t-statistics is that they could be driven
by outliers, but unreported results show that median Newey-West t-statistics are actually con-
siderably higher. We also test whether the average Newey-West t-statistic is below 1.645 (the
5% critical value of a one-tailed t-test) and reject this hypothesis with p-values below 0.001
for all predictability measures.
Table 2.2 also shows that a large fraction (around 60-90%, depending on the predictability
measure) of the coefﬁcients on lagged order imbalance and on lagged returns in the individ-
ual stock-day predictability regressions are positive, and that 30-60% of these coefﬁcients are
signiﬁcant on an individual basis. The average R2 of the regressions ranges from 1.7% for al-
lquotes to 3.5% for oib#. Although theseR2’s are modest, we note that predicting stock returns
is challenging and that the results are in line with prior work on intraday return predictability
(e.g., Chordia et al. (2005)).7 The degree of predictability varies considerably over time, as
well as in the cross-section. For example, the market-wide (equally-weighted) average OIB
predictability R2 is 6.44% in 1996 but only 1.29% in 2010, and the average OIB predictability
R2 in 1996 ranges from 2.4% for Sun Healthcare Group Inc. to 15.9% for Foodmaker Inc.,
with an interquartile range of 1.69%.
Overall, Table 2.2 provides evidence of signiﬁcant intraday return predictability in our
sample of all NYSE stocks over 1996-2010. The results also indicate that the degree of pre-
dictability is robust across various speciﬁcations of the predictability regressions. To compress
the ﬁve return predictability measures in Table 2.2 into one measure, for each stock we take the
ﬁrst principal component of the daily time-series of the R2’s of the ﬁve different predictability
regressions in Panel A and label it the Predictability measure.
On average, this ﬁrst principal component explains more than 45% of the total variation
in the ﬁve predictability measures for individual stocks. The loadings on the ﬁrst principal
component almost always have the same sign for all ﬁve predictability measures, with the
exception of 91 out of the 2,058 stocks for which we could estimate the predictability regres-
sions. Since for these 91 stocks, the ﬁrst principal component across the ﬁve predictability
measures cannot be unambiguously interpreted as increasing in the degree of predictability,
we discard them from the sample for the remainder of our analyses. The average loading
(across the remaining 1,967 stocks) of the ﬁrst principal component on the underlying pre-
dictability measures is 0.57 for OIB predictability, 0.50 for allquotes, 0.37 for 2minutes, 0.48
7In unreported tests, we also estimate an intraday predictability measure based on regressions that include
lagged order imbalance in dollars and in trades as well as lagged returns simultaneously, and ﬁnd considerably
stronger return predictability based on all three variables.
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for oib#, and 0.21 for autocorrelation.8
Table 2.3 – Summary statistics of stock-level efﬁciency measures
This table reports the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation (“SD”), ﬁrst quartile (“25%”), median,
and third quartile (“75%”) of the time-series average by stock of ﬁve daily stock-level efﬁciency measures:
Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance, Hasbrouck, and Put-call parity. Predictability is the common factor
extracted via principal component analysis by stock of the daily R2’s from the ﬁve intraday return predictability
measures from Panel A. Variance ratio is the daily, absolute difference between one and 30 times the ratio of
the variance estimated from one-minute mid-quote returns to the variance estimated from 30-minute mid-quote
returns. Variance is the daily return variance estimated from one-minute mid-quote returns. Hasbrouck is
the daily maximum of the absolute intraday pricing errors extracted from a decomposition of observed prices
into efﬁcient prices and a stationary component (Hasbrouck, 1993). Put-call parity is the absolute difference
between the implied volatilities of near-the-money call and put options of the same series (i.e., pairs of options
on the same underlying stock with the same strike price and the same expiration date). Section 2.2 discusses all
ﬁve stock-level efﬁciency measures in detail. The ﬁrst column indicates the number of stocks over which the
summary statistics are computed. The full sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks from 1996 to
2010 that survive our data screens (described in the Appendix). Data are from TRTH. Data to compute Put-call
parity are from OptionMetrics.
#Stocks Mean SD 25% Median 75%
Predictability 1,967 3.58 1.97 2.09 2.72 4.84
Variance ratio 2,130 0.87 0.38 0.63 0.76 0.97
Variance 2,130 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03
Hasbrouck 1,769 0.39 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.46
Put-call parity 1,535 2.58 2.04 1.47 2.09 3.07
Table 2.3 presents cross-sectional summary statistics of the stock-by-stock time-series
averages of the ﬁve different efﬁciency measures. This Panel is based on the sample of stocks
for which each efﬁciency measure could be estimated for at least 15 days over the sample
period.
The mean value of the Predictability measure (the ﬁrst principal component of the R2’s of
the ﬁve predictability regressions in Panel A) across the 1,967 stocks in our sample for which
the ﬁrst principal component loaded on the ﬁve predictability measures with the same sign is
equal to 3.58%, with an interquartile range of 2.75%.
The mean and median absolute deviations of the Variance ratio from unity are equal to
0.87 and 0.76, respectively. These numbers are somewhat higher than the mean of 0.53 re-
ported by Boehmer and Kelley (2009) (see their Table 1), but that number is based 1-to-20
8The proportion of total variation explained by the second to ﬁfth components (that is, their respective eigen-
values scaled by the sum of all eigenvalues) is equal to 20%, 16%, 12%, and 6%, respectively. However, for
none of the remaining 1,967 stocks do the ﬁve individual predictability measures exhibit same-sign loadings
on these components, so including these components in the Predictability measure would no longer allow us to
unambiguously interpret it as increasing in the degree of predictability as picked up by the individual measures.
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days variance ratios (instead of 1-to-30 minutes variance ratios as in our paper) and based on a
sample of NYSE stocks that is about half the size of our sample and likely tilted towards large
and liquid stocks that may be more efﬁciently priced.
The time-series average of the variance of one-minute returns (Variance) has a cross-
sectional mean (median) of 0.03 (0.01). This mean corresponds to an annualized volatility
of 54%. An average annualized volatility of individual stocks of 54% may seem high, but
is consistent with other studies that compute volatility based on intraday returns measured
over very short intervals. As a comparison, Ben-David et al. (2014) report an average return
volatility of the returns of S&P500 stocks over one-second intervals of 0.022 (see their Table
2), which corresponds to 53% annually.
The mean (median) value of the Hasbrouck measure is 39 (24) basis points. These num-
bers align well with the mean pricing error of 26 basis points reported by Hasbrouck (1993)
for a representative sample of 175 NYSE stocks in 1989. We would expect pricing errors to
be lower in our more recent sample, but we report the maximum rather than the mean pricing
error.
We are able to estimate the Put-call parity measure for 1,535 of the 2,157 stocks in our
sample, for on average 1,448 days over our sample period 1996-2010. The mean absolute
put-call parity deviation (expressed in terms of implied volatility) across stock-days in the
sample is 2.58%, with an interquartile range of 1.60%. These values closely correspond to the
put-call deviation estimates provided by Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) for a similarly-sized
sample of U.S. stocks over 1996-2005. Panel A of their Table 1 shows an average put-call
parity deviation of -0.978%, but this is an aggregation of positive and negative deviations.
Taking the average of the absolute values of the percentiles of the distribution of their put-call
parity deviation estimates reported in Panel B of their Table 1 yields an approximate average
absolute deviation of 2.3% for their sample.
In sum, Table 2.3 illustrates that the degree of market efﬁciency not only varies con-
siderably over time, but also across individual stocks. In the next section, we investigate
co-movement in the time-varying efﬁciency of individual stocks.
2.4 Co-movement in efﬁciency
We now set out to accomplish one of our primary goals by examining whether there is signiﬁ-
cant co-movement in market efﬁciency across stocks. To estimate the degree of co-movement
in efﬁciency across stocks, we run time-series regressions of changes in the efﬁciency of
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individual stocks on contemporaneous, lead, and lagged changes in market-wide efﬁciency.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency each month for each stock
i in the following regression:
ΔEffi,d = αi + βiΔMktEffi,d + γiΔMktEffi,d−1 + δiΔMktEffi,d+1 + ηi,d,(2.2)
where ΔEffi,d is the change in the efﬁciency of stock i on day d, and ΔMktEffi,d is the
change in market-wide efﬁciency (deﬁned as the equally-weighted average efﬁciency change
across all stocks in our sample excluding stock i). We require at least 15 daily observations
for a given stock within the month to estimate Eq. (2.2) for that stock in that month. Inspired
by Morck et al. (2000), we use the R2 from the co-movement regressions in Eq. (2.2) as an
indicator for the degree of co-movement in market efﬁciency across stocks.
We estimate Eq. (2.2) each month for each stock based on daily changes in our ﬁve stock-
level efﬁciency measures: Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance, Hasbrouck, and Put-call
parity. Our motivation for estimating Eq. (2.2) monthly based on daily stock-level efﬁciency
estimates within the month is two-fold. First, estimating Eq. (2.2) over longer time frames
(for example, one year or even the full 15-year sample period) could lead us to underestimate
the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency, since restricting the coefﬁcients to be constant over
time while the degree of co-movement is time-varying depresses the R2. Second, the monthly
co-movement regressions yield monthly R2 estimates of the degree of co-movement in ef-
ﬁciency across stocks, which we later use to examine the determinants of time-variation in
co-movement in efﬁciency.
One issue that arises is how our stock-level efﬁciency measures are related to stock-level
liquidity. If stock-level efﬁciency and liquidity are hard to distinguish empirically, our analysis
of co-movement in efﬁciency might be perceived as a reiteration of the extensive literature on
co-movement in liquidity (Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2000; Huberman and
Halka, 2001). However, unreported results show that our ﬁve stock-level efﬁciency measures
are only weakly correlated with three common stock-level illiquidity proxies: the proportional
quoted bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the proportional effective spread (PESPR, deﬁned as two
times the absolute difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, scaled by
the quote midpoint), and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity proxy (Amihud).9
Nonetheless, to ensure that any co-movement in the efﬁciency of individual stocks we
detect is not driven by underlying co-movement in their (il)liquidity, we ﬁrst orthogonalize
9In particular, of the 15 time-series correlations (averaged across stocks) of the ﬁve efﬁciency measures with
the three illiquidity proxies, 12 are between -0.15 and 0.15. The remaining three correlations are 0.33 between
Predictability and PESPR and 0.24 and 0.49 between Variance and PQSPR and PESPR, respectively. Detailed
results are available from the authors.
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the daily changes in each of the ﬁve efﬁciency measures at the stock-level with respect to
changes in that stock’s illiquidity (PQSPR; we obtain similar results when we use PESPR or
the Amihud measure, and slightly stronger results when we do not orthogonalize at all). We
then run the co-movement regressions in Eq. (2.2) of orthogonalized changes in stock-level
efﬁciency on contemporaneous, lead, and lagged orthogonalized changes in market efﬁciency
(deﬁned as the equally-weighted average changes in efﬁciency, orthogonalized with respect to
illiquidity changes, across all stocks in our sample, excluding stock i).
Furthermore, when we subsequently analyze the determinants of time-variation in the
degree of co-movement in efﬁciency in Section 2.5 below, we make sure to account for time-
variation in co-movement in liquidity in such a way that any impact of proxies for funding
liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity on co-movement in efﬁciency that we measure
is over and above their effect on co-movement in liquidity.10
2.4.1 Monthly co-movement in efﬁciency across stocks
Table 2.4 presents the results of our regressions to estimate co-movement in each of the ﬁve
efﬁciency measures across individual stocks. The table reports the average regression co-
efﬁcients across all co-movement regressions estimated by stock-month for each efﬁciency
measure. The number of stock-month regressions varies from roughly 75,000 for the Put-call
parity measure to almost 180,000 for the Variance ratio and Variance measures.
The table reveals evidence of signiﬁcant co-movement in efﬁciency across stocks. The av-
erage coefﬁcient on contemporaneous changes in market-wide efﬁciency across the individual
stock-month regressions is positive and economically substantial for all efﬁciency measures,
ranging from 0.717 for the Put-call parity measure to 0.907 for the Variance ratio measure.
The average t-statistic of this coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcant levels
for any of the efﬁciency measures, but this is not to be expected in light of the fact that the
individual coefﬁcients are estimated based on at most about 20 observations (i.e., the number
of trading days) per month.
As in Table 2.2, we therefore also report average Newey-West t-statistics across stocks.
10We also note that, as pointed out by Chordia et al. (2008), illiquidity does not necessarily imply any return
predictability from order ﬂow or past returns. In Kyle (1985), even though markets are illiquid, prices are martin-
gales because market makers are risk-neutral. On the other hand, in inventory-based models, return predictability
from order ﬂow can arise if market makers have capital constraints or limited risk-bearing capacity that prevent
them from conducting arbitrage trades that mitigate the predictability (Stoll, 1978). So, in a sense, our measure
of predictability, or lack thereof, is a measure of the efﬁcacy of such short-horizon arbitrage. Our interpretation
of return predictability as a deviation from efﬁciency is consistent with Samuelson (1965) deﬁnition of efﬁciency
as “properly anticipated prices ﬂuctuate randomly.”
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Table 2.4 – Co-movement regressions of daily changes in stock-level efﬁciency on changes in market
efﬁciency
This table reports the average results of the efﬁciency co-movement regressions from Eq. (2), estimated
monthly based on daily data for each NYSE stock in the sample. The dependent variable ΔEffi,d is the change
in the efﬁciency of stock i on day d, orthogonalized with respect to the change in stock i’s proportional quoted
spread (PQSPR) on day d. The independent variableΔMktEffd is the (orthogonalized) change in market-wide
efﬁciency on day d, computed as the equally-weighted average change in efﬁciency (orthogonalized with respect
to the change in PQSPR) of all individual stocks on day d, excluding stock i. Each co-movement regression also
includes a one-day lead and lag of (orthogonalized) changes in market-wide efﬁciency. Each of the ﬁve columns
in the table presents the results of the co-movement regressions based on a different stock-level efﬁciency
measure: Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance, Hasbrouck, and Put-call parity. We refer to Table 2 for a
description of all ﬁve stock-level efﬁciency measures. Each column presents the average slope coefﬁcients across
all stock-month co-movement regressions. The average t-statistics (“t-stat avg”) and the average Newey-West
(1994) t-statistics (“NW t-stat avg”) are in parentheses below the coefﬁcients. “% positive” is the percentage of
positive coefﬁcients, and “% + signiﬁcant” is the percentage with t-statistics greater than 1.645 (the 5% critical
level in a one-tailed test). Intercepts have been suppressed to conserve space. The last three rows report the
average R2 and adjusted R2 across all regressions and the number of stock-month co-movement regressions.
The full sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks from 1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens
(described in the Appendix). Data are from TRTH. Data to compute Put-call parity are from OptionMetrics.
Dependent variable: ΔEffi,d
Efﬁciency measure: Predictability Variance ratio Variance Hasbrouck Put-call parity
ΔMktEffd 0.813 0.907 0.789 0.889 0.717
t-stat avg (0.288) (0.539) (1.534) (0.430) (0.592)
NW t-stat avg (2.313) (3.607) (4.937) (3.523) (3.426)
% positive 59.95 67.26 79.94 65.49 68.60
% + signiﬁcant 9.29 14.07 34.55 11.44 15.58
ΔMktEffd−1 0.025 0.002 0.013 0.019 0.014
t-stat avg (0.013) (-0.002) (0.047) (0.009) (0.017)
NW t-stat avg (0.043) (-0.021) (0.219) (0.051) (0.011)
% positive 50.05 49.40 50.28 50.18 49.97
% + signiﬁcant 6.75 6.75 7.84 6.31 6.45
ΔMktEffd+1 0.024 0.000 0.027 0.037 0.025
t-stat avg (0.012) (-0.003) (0.029) (0.020) (0.036)
NW t-stat avg (0.082) (-0.021) (0.142) (0.113) (0.146)
% positive 50.30 49.62 50.45 50.28 50.50
% + signiﬁcant 7.01 6.53 6.93 6.52 7.24
R2 20.77 22.68 30.27 20.28 22.40
adj. R2 3.86 6.01 15.19 2.99 5.18
# regressions 135,784 178,867 178,867 85,957 75,460
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These t-statistics are considerably higher, at 2.3 for Predictability, 3.6 for Variance ratio,
4.9 for Variance, 3.5 for Hasbrouck, and 3.4 for Put-call parity, which indicates statistically
signiﬁcant co-movement in efﬁciency across individual stocks for all ﬁve efﬁciency measures.
As in Table 2.2, average Newey-West t-statistics could be driven by outliers, but median
Newey-West t-statistics are also signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better for all ﬁve co-movement
regressions in Table 2.4. Furthermore, we reject the hypothesis that the average Newey-West
t-statistic is below 1.645 (the 5% critical value of a one-tailed t-test) with p-values below
0.001 for all ﬁve co-movement regressions.
For each of the ﬁve efﬁciency measures, a clear majority (at least 59% and up to 80%)
of the individual coefﬁcients on contemporaneous changes in market-wide efﬁciency are pos-
itive. At least 9% (Predictability) and up to 34% (Variance) of the coefﬁcients are positive
and signiﬁcant on an individual basis. The fraction of individual t-statistics that is signiﬁcant
is thus not overwhelming, but we note that they are based on at most around 20 observa-
tions. There is little evidence that the lead and lagged changes in market-wide efﬁciency are
important in explaining time-variation in the efﬁciency of individual stocks.
The average (adjusted) R2’s of the co-movement regressions in Table 2.4 are substan-
tial and range from 20.3% (3.0%) for Hasbrouck to 30.3% (15.2%) for Variance. The co-
movementR2’s for the ﬁve efﬁciency measures in Table 2.4 are of the same order of magnitude
as the R2’s of similar monthly regressions to estimate co-movement in liquidity as reported
by Karolyi et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that the R2 for these regressions based on NYSE stocks
averaged around 23% over the period 1995-2009. Co-movement in efﬁciency is thus roughly
an equally strong phenomenon as co-movement in liquidity across individual stocks.
Overall, Table 2.4 presents evidence of economically and statistically signiﬁcant co-movement
in efﬁciency across stocks.11
11In unreported robustness tests, we estimate the co-movement regressions in Eq. (2.2) based on efﬁciency
levels orthogonalized with respect to liquidity levels rather than based on efﬁciency changes orthogonalized
with respect to liquidity changes, and based on contemporaneous market efﬁciency as the only independent
variable (that is, no lead and lagged market-wide efﬁciency), and obtain similar results. We also obtain similar
results when we compute market-wide efﬁciency as the value-weighted (instead of the equally-weighted) average
efﬁciency across all stocks in our sample, excluding stock i. And although we lose a substantial number of
degrees of freedom when we analyze co-movement in efﬁciency at the quarterly frequency instead of the monthly
frequency, the main results in the paper also obtain when we estimate the degree of efﬁciency co-movement
quarterly based on daily data within the quarter. In all of the robustness tests reported in this footnote, we
orthogonalize (the changes in) each of the stock-level efﬁciency measures with respect to (the changes in) the
stock-level PQSPR before estimating and analyzing the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency.
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2.4.2 Monthly co-movement in efﬁciency across portfolios
In this section, we address the question whether the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency is
different for different market segments. There are at least three reasons for why such an anal-
ysis is interesting. First, it sheds light on the question which stock-level attributes affect the
degree of co-movement in efﬁciency. Second, the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency un-
covered in Table 2.4 is mitigated by both estimation noise and idiosyncratic components in
the efﬁciency of individual stocks. Looking at portfolios of stocks might alleviate estimation
noise and expose a stronger image of co-movement. Third, from the perspective of portfolio
management, analyzing the co-movement of the efﬁciency of a portfolio of stocks with the
efﬁciency of the market is relevant, since investors that manage different portfolios of securi-
ties might be concerned about the risk that multiple portfolios are simultaneously exposed to
variation in price efﬁciency.
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Table 2.5 – Co-movement regressions of daily changes in portfolio-level efﬁciency on changes in market
efﬁciency
This table reports the average results of the efﬁciency co-movement regressions from Eq. (2), estimated
monthly based on daily data for ten “liquidity portfolios” formed yearly by sorting all NYSE stocks in the
sample on the basis of their average proportional quoted spread (PQSPR) over the year. The dependent variable
ΔEffp,d is the (orthogonalized) change in the efﬁciency of liquidity portfolio p on day d, which is computed
as the equally-weighted average change in efﬁciency (orthogonalized with respect to the change in PQSPR) of
all individual stocks in the portfolio on day d. The independent variable ΔMktEffd is the (orthogonalized)
change in market-wide efﬁciency on day d, computed as the equally-weighted average change in efﬁciency
(orthogonalized with respect to the change in PQSPR) of all individual stocks not in the subject portfolio on
day d. Each co-movement regression also includes a one-day lead and lag of (orthogonalized) changes in
market-wide efﬁciency. The ﬁve columns in the table present the results of the portfolio-level co-movement
regressions for liquidity portfolios 1 (most liquid), 2, 5, 9, and 10 (least liquid). Each column presents the results
for one portfolio based on ﬁve different stock-level efﬁciency measures: Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance,
Hasbrouck, and Put-call parity. We refer to Table 2 for a description of all ﬁve stock-level efﬁciency measures.
Each column presents the average slope coefﬁcients across all portfolio-month co-movement regressions. The
average t-statistics (“t-stat avg”) and the Newey-West (1994) t-statistics (“NW t-stat”) are in parentheses below
the coefﬁcients. “% positive” is the percentage of positive coefﬁcients, and “% + signiﬁcant” is the percentage
with t-statistics greater than 1.645 (the 5% critical level in a one-tailed test). Intercepts and coefﬁcients on the
lead and lagged independent variable have been suppressed to conserve space. The table also reports the average
R2 and adjusted R2 across all regressions for each portfolio and for each efﬁciency measure. The full sample
includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks from 1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens (described in
the Appendix). Data are from TRTH. Data to compute Put-call parity are from OptionMetrics.
Dependent variable: ΔEffp,d
Liquidity portfolio: liquid 2 5 9 illiquid
Efﬁciency measure: Predictability
ΔMktEffd 0.903 0.819 0.633 0.602 0.303
t-stat avg (2.090) (2.327) (1.843) (1.164) (0.560)
NW t-stat (14.177) (15.864) (15.958) (9.596) (5.025)
% positive 93.22 94.35 87.57 81.36 70.06
% + signiﬁcant 54.80 58.76 46.89 33.90 16.38
R2 36.46 39.22 34.23 25.23 19.86
adj. R2 24.66 27.94 21.99 11.31 4.97
Efﬁciency measure: Variance ratio
ΔMktEffd 0.837 0.894 0.945 0.882 0.574
t-stat avg (3.481) (4.117) (4.822) (2.956) (1.388)
NW t-stat (19.994) (23.364) (25.082) (16.944) (9.896)
% positive 97.18 100.00 98.31 94.92 91.53
% + signiﬁcant 81.92 80.79 87.01 74.01 36.16
R2 53.65 57.23 60.80 46.61 27.30
adj. R2 44.98 49.26 53.43 36.64 13.80
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Table 2.5 – continued
Dependent variable: ΔEffp,d
Liquidity portfolio: liquid 2 5 9 illiquid
Efﬁciency measure: Variance
ΔMktEffd 0.414 0.438 0.585 1.053 1.796
t-stat avg (4.980) (5.382) (5.734) (4.359) (1.881)
NW t-stat (14.998) (11.151) (13.121) (11.931) (7.553)
% positive 97.74 98.87 98.87 93.22 85.88
% + signiﬁcant 85.31 82.49 84.18 72.88 42.94
R2 55.83 57.86 58.80 50.37 28.79
adj. R2 47.59 49.97 51.10 41.07 15.52
Efﬁciency measure: Hasbrouck
ΔMktEffd 1.052 1.009 0.818 0.572 0.471
t-stat avg (2.784) (3.050) (2.676) (2.017) (1.617)
NW t-stat (18.458) (22.721) (20.482) (15.309) (13.494)
% positive 98.31 98.31 97.74 88.14 88.70
% + signiﬁcant 70.06 73.45 63.84 49.15 39.55
R2 41.77 41.69 39.60 32.91 26.56
adj. R2 30.98 30.84 28.32 20.41 12.84
Efﬁciency measure: Put-call parity
ΔMktEffd 0.394 0.455 0.672 1.104 1.481
t-stat avg (2.682) (2.809) (3.430) (3.160) (2.359)
NW t-stat (14.112) (21.750) (23.604) (17.169) (16.398)
% positive 96.61 96.61 96.61 95.48 96.05
% + signiﬁcant 61.58 72.88 77.97 70.62 62.71
R2 37.51 39.81 46.96 43.65 34.55
adj. R2 25.83 28.52 37.03 33.11 22.31
Table 2.5 examines the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency for portfolios of stocks sorted
on their liquidity. As one of the most prominent limits to arbitrage, liquidity seems a natural
stock-level attribute based on which to distinguish different market segments. Each year, we
sort stocks into decile portfolios based on their average proportional quoted bid-ask spread
(PQSPR) over the year. We then estimate Eq. (2.2) by running monthly regressions of daily
changes in the efﬁciency of the ten liquidity-sorted portfolios on contemporaneous, lead, and
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lagged changes in market efﬁciency (computed as the equally-weighted average efﬁciency
changes across the stocks not in the subject portfolio). Just like in Table 2.4, we orthogonalize
daily changes in each of the stock-level efﬁciency measures with respect to stock-level PQSPR
changes before computing daily changes in portfolio-level efﬁciency as the equally-weighted
average orthogonalized efﬁciency changes across all stocks in the portfolio on that day and
then estimating the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency at the portfolio-level.
Table 2.5 shows strong co-movement in efﬁciency at the portfolio-level for all liquidity
decile portfolios (for space considerations, Table 2.5 only reports the results for deciles 1,
2, 5, 9, and 10) based on all ﬁve efﬁciency measures. The coefﬁcients on contemporaneous
changes in market efﬁciency are positive for all decile portfolios and for all ﬁve efﬁciency
measures and the Newey-West t-statistics are very high, indicating that the contemporane-
ous coefﬁcients are all ﬁve or more standard deviations away from zero. (We note that these
Newey-West t-statistics are not averages, since they are based on one time-series of coef-
ﬁcient estimates per portfolio for each efﬁciency measure.) The portfolio-level R2’s of the
co-movement regressions in Eq. (2.2) are considerably greater than the individual stock level
R2’s reported in Table 2.5, which suggests that estimation noise and idiosyncratic components
may dampen the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency reported in Table 2.5.
Perhaps more interestingly, the results in Table 2.5 indicate that the degree of co-movement
in efﬁciency is much greater for liquid stocks than for illiquid stocks. For example, for the
Predictability measure, the adjusted R2 is equal to 5.0% for the most illiquid decile and to
24.7% for the most liquid decile. Similarly, for the Hasbrouck measure, we obtain an adjusted
R2 of 12.8% for the most illiquid stocks and of 31.0% for the most liquid stocks. The ﬁnding
of a considerable difference in the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency of liquid and illiq-
uid stocks is remarkably consistent across the ﬁve efﬁciency measures (with the exception of
Put-call parity) and is mainly driven by the relatively low degree of co-movement of illiq-
uid stocks. This ﬁnding suggests that illiquid stocks are relatively shielded from market-wide
ﬂuctuations in the degree of pricing efﬁciency, and could thus be viewed as less exposed to
this potential form of systematic risk.12
12In addition to these results on the degree of co-movement of the efﬁciency of liquidity-sorted portfolio with
market-wide efﬁciency, in unreported analyses we also examine the degree of efﬁciency co-movement within
each of the ten liquidity-sorted portfolios and within ﬁve industry portfolios (based on the ﬁve industries deﬁned
on the website of Ken French), and ﬁnd little evidence of systematic differences in the degree of within-segment
co-movement in efﬁciency across these different market segments.
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2.5 Time-variation in co-movement in efﬁciency
We now turn to an analysis of time-variation in the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency. We
ﬁrst aggregate the ﬁve monthly, stock-level measures of co-movement in efﬁciency (the R2’s
from the ﬁve monthly co-movement regressions in Table 2.4 based on the ﬁve different stock-
level efﬁciency measures: Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance, Hasbrouck, and Put-call
parity) to the market-level by computing the equally-weighted average R2 across individual
stocks each month, separately for each efﬁciency measure. (We obtain similar results when
taking the value-weighted average.) This procedure yields ﬁve different monthly, market-wide
measures of co-movement in efﬁciency.
We then extract a single, comprehensive measure of monthly, market-wide co-movement
in efﬁciency via principal component analysis (PCA) of these ﬁve different monthly, market-
wide measures of co-movement in efﬁciency. We follow Hasbrouck and Seppi (2000) and
extract the principal components based on the correlation matrix. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst princi-
pal component explains 48% of the total variation in the ﬁve individual market-wide measures
of co-movement in efﬁciency. The proportion of the total variation that each additional compo-
nent or eigenvector represents (in other words, the component’s eigenvalue divided by the sum
of all eigenvalues) is equal to 19%, 12%, 11%, and 10% for the second to ﬁfth components,
respectively.
Importantly, the loadings of the ﬁve different co-movement in efﬁciency measures on the
ﬁrst principal component are all of the same sign, otherwise this component could not be
interpreted as representing aggregate variation in co-movement in efﬁciency. Since the load-
ings on the second principal component are not of the same sign, including this component
in our aggregate co-movement in efﬁciency measure would lead to problems in interpreting
the resulting measure as being positively associated with the degree of co-movement in each
of the ﬁve efﬁciency measures. Consequently, we use only the ﬁrst principal component as
representative of market-wide co-movement in efﬁciency. The fact that this component ex-
plains almost half of the total variation and explains almost 30% percent more variation than
the next component lends credibility to the view that this component captures the dominant
variation in market-wide co-movement in efﬁciency. The loading of the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent on the underlying co-movement in efﬁciency measures is 0.37 for co-movement in
Predictability, 0.50 for Variance ratio, 0.47 for Variance, 0.46 for Hasbrouck, and 0.43 for
Put-call parity. The ﬁrst principal component is thus representative of all ﬁve co-movement
in efﬁciency measures and is not dominated by one or more of these measures.
To get a time-series of the ﬁrst principal component, we standardize each of the ﬁve co-
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Figure 2.1 – Monthly variation in co-movement in efﬁciency, 1996 - 2010
This ﬁgure shows monthly variation in the degree of market-wide co-movement in stock-level efﬁciency (Co-
movement in efﬁciency) from 1996 to 2010. This measure of Co-movement in efﬁciency is constructed as follows.
First, each month for each NYSE stock in the sample, we estimate the degree of co-movement in that stock’s
efﬁciency with market efﬁciency using the co-movement regressions from Eq. (2), based on ﬁve different daily
stock-level efﬁciency measures: Predictability, Variance ratio, Variance, Hasbrouck, and Put-call parity. We
refer to Table 2 for a description of all ﬁve stock-level efﬁciency measures and to Table 3 for a description of
the efﬁciency co-movement regressions. We then aggregate the ﬁve resulting monthly, stock-level measures of
co-movement in efﬁciency (the R2’s from the ﬁve monthly co-movement regressions in Table 3) to the market-
level by computing the equally-weighted average R2 across individual stocks each month, separately for each
efﬁciency measure. Subsequently, we extract a single, comprehensive measure of monthly, market-wide efﬁ-
ciency co-movement (Co-movement in efﬁciency) as the ﬁrst principal component of these ﬁve different monthly,
market-wide measures of efﬁciency co-movement. To get a time-series of the ﬁrst principal component, we stan-
dardize each of the ﬁve co-movement in efﬁciency measures to have zero mean and unit standard deviation, and
multiply the matrix of standardized measures by the vector of the loadings of each measure on the component.
The full sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks from 1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens
(described in the Appendix). Data are from TRTH. Data to compute Put-call parity are from OptionMetrics.
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movement in efﬁciency measures to have zero mean and unit standard deviation, and multiply
the matrix of standardized measures by the vector of the loadings of each measure on the
component. We refer to the resulting measure as Co-movement in efﬁciency in the remainder
of the paper. Figure 2.1 presents a graph of the monthly time-variation in this comprehensive
measure of co-movement in efﬁciency. The ﬁgure shows that the degree of co-movement
is considerably greater in some periods than in others. Two features of the co-movement
dynamics stand out. First, the degree of co-movement tends to spike during periods of ﬁnancial
turmoil, such as the Asian crisis in late 1997, the LTCM / Russian debt crisis in September
1998, the burst of the internet bubble in early 2000, the quant crisis in the summer of 2007, and
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Second, Figure 2.1 shows a slight
upward trend in the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency starting around 2006. A possible
explanation for the latter feature is the advent of algorithmic and high-frequency trading over
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the last ﬁve years of our sample period (in part facilitated by the introduction of NYSE’s
Hybrid Market at the end of 2006), which has been linked to a generic improvement in price
efﬁciency (Hendershott et al., 2011; Brogaard et al., 2014a).
We proceed with a formal analysis of what economic forces explain time-variation in Co-
movement in efﬁciency. Since arbitrage plays a central role in enforcing efﬁcient pricing, and
since the efﬁcacy of arbitrage, in turn, depends on the availability of arbitrage capital, our
primary interest is in variables that proxy for variation in funding liquidity and the intensity of
arbitrage activity.
Vector autoregressions (VARs) are a natural way to analyze the dynamics of Co-movement
in efﬁciency in relation to proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity,
since all of these variables are endogenous and could inﬂuence each other both contempora-
neously and with a lag. We therefore estimate multivariate VARs in which Co-movement in
efﬁciency is included as the last and thus most endogenous variable, which can be inﬂuenced
both contemporaneously and with a lag by shocks to all of the other endogenous variables
in the VARs. We also estimate separate VARs to analyze time-variation in the degree of co-
movement in efﬁciency of liquid and illiquid stocks (deﬁned as those in the decile portfolios
of stocks with the lowest and highest proportional quoted spread or PQSPR, as in Table 2.5),
constructed in the same way as Co-movement in efﬁciency but then based on these subsets of
stocks.
Table 2.6 – Summary statistics of potential determinants of monthly co-movement in efﬁciency
This table reports the time-series mean, standard deviation (“SD”), ﬁrst quartile (“25%”), median, and
third quartile (“75%”) of four potential determinants of monthly market-wide co-movement in efﬁciency. TED
spread is the monthly difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill rate (in %),
obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED ID: USD3MTD156N minus
TB3MS). Hedge fund ﬂow is the monthly percentage money inﬂow into hedge funds, obtained from Matti
Suominen and LIPPER-TASS (see Jylha¨, Rinne, and Suominen, 2015). Quotes/Volume is the total number
of quote updates per month across all the NYSE stocks in our sample divided by the aggregate dollar trading
volume for those stocks in the same month. This variable is scaled by 102. Co-movement in liquidity is a
monthly measure of the degree of market-wide co-movement in liquidity, constructed as the equally-weighted
R2 (in %) across individual stocks each month from the equivalent co-movement regressions to Eq. (2) but then
using the proportional quoted spread (PQSPR) as stock-level liquidity measure. Data to compute Quotes/Volume
and Co-movement in liquidity are from TRTH. The full sample includes all 2,157 NYSE-listed common stocks
from 1996 to 2010 that survive our data screens (described in the Appendix).
# Obs. Mean SD 25% Median 75%
TED spread 177 0.576 0.443 0.241 0.484 0.729
Hedge fund ﬂow 177 0.618 1.817 -0.048 0.905 1.641
Quotes/Volume 177 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Co-movement in liquidity 177 22.12 3.60 19.87 21.34 23.55
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Since estimating multivariate VARs based on just 176 monthly observations is quite de-
manding, we limit the number of endogenous variables besides Co-movement in efﬁciency.13
We focus on three key proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity. First,
to the extent that ﬂuctuations in the funding liquidity of the ﬁnancial system have pervasive
effects on market making and arbitrage activity (e.g., Brunnermeier (2009); Mancini-Griffoli
and Ranaldo (2011)), the degree of co-movement in market efﬁciency can be affected by
changes in funding liquidity. As a direct proxy for funding liquidity we use the TED spread,
which is the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill rate from
the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and is a widely used indicator
of funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009).14 As per Eq.
(2.2), co-movement is measured using regressions of changes in individual stock efﬁciency on
changes in market efﬁciency. In other words, co-movement in efﬁciency arises as the result
of simultaneous changes in the efﬁciency of many stocks. Thus, our main hypothesis is that
changes in the TED spread induce changes in the intensity of arbitrage activity, which in turn
may result in changes in the degree of price efﬁciency for many stocks simultaneously, thereby
increasing the level of Co-movement in efﬁciency. A priori, we have no hypothesis on poten-
tial asymmetric effects of changes in funding liquidity, in the sense that an improvement of
funding liquidity could have a differential impact on Co-movement in efﬁciency than a wors-
ening of funding liquidity. Consequently, we include absolute changes in the TED spread (or
|ΔTED spread|) as endogenous variable in our VARs.15 Since the TED spread is arguably
the most exogenous of the funding liquidity measures we consider, we include it as the ﬁrst
variable in our VARs.
Second, we compute Hedge fund ﬂow as the monthly percentage money inﬂow into
hedge funds.16 Greater hedge fund inﬂows should spur arbitrage activity. Since Hedge fund
ﬂow is already a ﬂow variable that measures changes in the amount of capital available to
hedge funds to engage in arbitrage activity, we simply use the absolute value of this variable
(|Hedge fund flow|) as the second endogenous variable in our VARs.17
13We note that although our data extend over 178 months from March 1996 up to and including December
2010, we lose one month because of the one-month lag in the VAR and we cannot reliably estimate the degree
of co-movement in efﬁciency in September 2001 as a result of the limited number of trading days in that month
due to the “9/11” terrorist attacks.
14The notion is that the TED spread may proxy for counterparty risk, which, when elevated, can lead to funding
illiquidity.
15In unreported tests, we separate out positive and negative changes in the TED spread in the VARs and ﬁnd
little evidence of asymmetric effects.
16We thank Matti Suominen and LIPPER-TASS for data on hedge fund ﬂows. The sample includes all hedge
funds that report their returns in U.S. dollars and have a minimum of 36 monthly return observations over our
sample period. See Jylha¨ et al. (2015).
17In unreported tests, we ﬁnd little evidence of an asymmetric effect of hedge fund ﬂows when separating out
positive and negative values of Hedge fund ﬂow in the VARs.
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Third, inspired by Boehmer et al. (2014), we use a proxy for the intensity of algorithmic
trading deﬁned as the total number of quote updates per month across all the stocks in our
sample divided by the aggregate dollar trading volume for those stocks in the same month
(Quotes/Volume). We include this variable to account for the marked increase in quoting
activity over our sample period which has been related to the advent of algorithmic trading
that could affect the efﬁcacy of arbitrage and market making activity (Hendershott et al., 2011;
Brogaard et al., 2014a). Since Quotes/Volume is already a ﬂow variable that is non-negative,
we do not take changes or absolute values. And since it is arguably a more direct proxy for
actual arbitrage activity that could be inﬂuenced by variation in the availability of arbitrage
capital as picked up by the TED spread and Hedge fund ﬂow, we include it after these two
variables as the third endogenous variable in our VARs.
An important challenge for the analysis in this section is that time-variation inCo-movement
in efﬁciency could in part be driven by time-variation in the degree of co-movement in liquid-
ity, and both can be affected by funding liquidity. Indeed, prior theoretical work (e.g., Brun-
nermeier (2009)) as well as empirical evidence (Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Hameed et al.,
2010) establishes a link between funding liquidity and co-movement in liquidity. Hence, it
may be hard to distinguish between a direct effect of funding liquidity on Co-movement in
efﬁciency and an indirect effect running through co-movement in liquidity. Although this con-
cern is mitigated by the fact that we estimate Co-movement in efﬁciency based on changes
in stock-level efﬁciency that are orthogonalized with respect to changes in stock-level liquid-
ity, we further tackle this challenge by also including a measure of co-movement in liquidity
in the VARs. To that end, we construct a monthly measure of market-wide Co-movement
in liquidity based on the same methodology we use to estimate Co-movement in efﬁciency,
using the proportional quoted spread (PQSPR) as stock-level liquidity measure in equivalent
co-movement regressions to Eq. (2.2).18 We include Co-movement in liquidity as the fourth
endogenous variable in the VARs, just before Co-movement in efﬁciency, such that shocks
to the funding liquidity and arbitrage proxies can affect Co-movement in efﬁciency directly as
well as indirectly through Co-movement in liquidity. For the VARs based on liquid and illiquid
stocks, we construct Co-movement in liquidity based on the same decile portfolios of stocks
as Co-movement in efﬁciency.
Prior to usage as endogenous variables in the VARs, we detrend all ﬁve variables with
linear and quadratic trend terms (to preclude spurious results) and then standardize all de-
trended variables to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one (for ease of interpretation
18Unreported robustness tests, available from the authors, show similar results when we construct Co-
movement in liquidity based on the proportional effective spread (PESPR) or the Amihud (2002) illiquidity proxy
instead of based on PQSPR.
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of the results). We do the same for the endogenous variables in the VARs based on liquid
and on illiquid stocks.19 The number of lags in the VARs is determined using the Akaike
and Schwarz information criteria (AIC and SIC). For the VARs based on all stocks and based
on liquid stocks, the AIC indicates four lags, while the SIC indicates one lag. For the VAR
based on illiquid stocks, both AIC and SIC indicate one lag. For the sake of consistency and
parsimony, we choose to report the results of one-lag VARs (as indicated by the SIC), but
unreported results for four-lag VARs are similar. Table 2.6 presents summary statistics of the
four potential determinants of Co-movement in efﬁciency included in the VARs.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.7 present the estimates of the coefﬁcients (and their asso-
ciated t-statistics) in the VARs based on, respectively, all stocks, liquid stocks, and illiquid
stocks. Because we estimate one-lag VARs, these can be interpreted as the results of Granger
causality tests. To save space, the table only presents the estimation results of the equations
in which we are most interested, those with Co-movement in liquidity and Co-movement in
efﬁciency as the dependent variable.
For all stocks (Panel A), we ﬁnd evidence of |ΔTED spread| Granger causing both Co-
movement in liquidity and Co-movement in efﬁciency, while |Hedge fund flow| Granger
causes Co-movement in efﬁciency. Since all variables in the VARs are standardized, the coef-
ﬁcients can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the independent
variable on the dependent variable, expressed as a fraction of the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. At around 0.20 standard deviations, the economic magnitude of the effect
of these two proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity on the degree
of co-movement in liquidity and efﬁciency is considerable. We also observe that our proxy for
algorithmic trading negatively Granger causes Co-movement in liquidity, which may indicate
that algorithmic trading affects the liquidity of individual stocks (consistent with Hendershott
et al. (2011), but not across the board, thereby reducing the degree of co-movement.
The VAR results for liquid stocks (Panel B of Table 2.7) and illiquid stocks (Panel C)
separately reveal that the effects of the funding liquidity proxies (notably, the TED spread) on
the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency are concentrated in the subsample of illiquid stocks.
For liquid stocks, the VAR results further show evidence ofQuotes/Volume negatively Granger
causing Co-movement in efﬁciency.
19In unreported results, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test rejects the null-hypothesis of a unit root for all
variables included in the three VARs with p-values below 0.01.
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Table 2.7 – Vector autoregressions of co-movement in efﬁciency: Coefﬁcient estimates / Granger causality
tests
This table reports the coefﬁcient estimates from three multivariate vector autoregressions (VARs) with
the following ﬁve endogenous variables: absolute changes in the TED spread (|ΔTED spread|), absolute
hedge fund ﬂows (|Fund flow|), the total number of quote updates scaled by aggregate dollar trading volume
(Quotes/Volume), co-movement in proportional quoted spreads (Co-movement in liquidity), and Co-movement
in efﬁciency. We refer to Table 2.6 and Figure 1 for a description of these variables. In the ﬁrst VAR (Panel A),
the measures of co-movement in liquidity and efﬁciency are constructed using all NYSE stocks in the sample.
In the second and third VARs (Panels B and C), the measures of co-movement in liquidity and efﬁciency are
constructed using only the stocks in the decile portfolios of the most liquid and most illiquid stocks, respectively
(these liquidity portfolios are formed based on the stocks’ average proportional quoted spread, as in Table 2.5).
To conserve space, intercepts have been suppressed and each panel only reports the coefﬁcient estimates of
the equations with Co-movement in liquidity and Co-movement in efﬁciency as the dependent variables. We
estimate all three VARs with one lag, following the Schwarz information criterion (SIC), which implies that the
estimation results can be interpreted as Granger causality tests. All variables in the VARs have been detrended
using a linear and a quadratic time trend and then standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of
one, which implies that the coefﬁcients can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in
the independent variable on the dependent variable, expressed as a fraction of the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. The last three rows report the R2 and adjusted R2
and the number of time-series observations for each equation.
Panel A: All stocks Panel B: Liquid stocks Panel C: Illiquid stocks
Dependent variable
is co-movement in:
liquidity efﬁciency liquidity efﬁciency liquidity efﬁciency
|ΔTED spreadm−1| 0.250*** 0.192** 0.000 0.159* 0.097 0.202**
(2.66) (2.07) (0.00) (1.83) (1.09) (2.28)
|Fund flowm−1| 0.054 0.182** -0.032 0.037 -0.089 0.109
(0.63) (2.16) (-0.37) (0.43) (-1.05) (1.27)
Quotes/Volumem−1 -0.25** -0.070 0.015 -0.18* 0.150 -0.114
(-2.42) (-0.70) (0.16) (-1.90) (1.54) (-1.17)
Co-movement -0.002 0.068 0.058 0.020 0.124 0.006
in liquiditym−1 (-0.02) (0.67) (0.71) (0.24) (1.54) (0.08)
Co-movement 0.058 0.025 0.053 0.154* -0.094 0.106
in efﬁciencym−1 (0.57) (0.25) (0.65) (1.96) (-1.15) (1.30)
R2 6.01 8.85 0.89 5.52 5.45 6.62
adj. R2 3.25 6.17 -2.03 2.74 2.67 3.87
# Obs. 176 176 176 176 176 176
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Table 2.8 – Vector autoregressions of co-movement in efﬁciency: Residual correlations
This table reports the contemporaneous correlations between the innovations (residuals) in the following
ﬁve endogenous variables in three multivariate vector autoregressions (VARs): absolute changes in the TED
spread (|ΔTED spread|), absolute hedge fund ﬂows (|Fund flow|), the total number of quote updates
scaled by aggregate dollar trading volume (Quotes/Volume), co-movement in proportional quoted spreads
(Co-movement in liquidity), and Co-movement in efﬁciency. We refer to Table 2.6 and Figure 1 for a description
of these variables. In the ﬁrst VAR (Panel A), the measures of co-movement in liquidity and efﬁciency are
constructed using all NYSE stocks in the sample. In the second and third VARs (Panels B and C), the measures
of co-movement in liquidity and efﬁciency are constructed using only the stocks in the decile portfolios of the
most liquid and most illiquid stocks, respectively (these liquidity portfolios are formed based on the stocks’
average proportional quoted spread, as in Table 2.5). We estimate all three VARs with one lag, following
the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). All variables in the VARs have been detrended using a linear and a
quadratic time trend and then standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one. p-values are in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
|ΔTED spread| |Fund flow| QuotesV olume Co-movement
in liquidity
Co-movement
in efﬁciency
Panel A: Residual correlations of VAR based on all stocks
|ΔTED spread| 1
|Fund flow| 0.139* 1
(0.07)
Quotes/Volume 0.284*** 0.035 1
(0.00) (0.65)
Co-movement 0.392*** 0.151** 0.366*** 1
in liquidity (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
Co-movement 0.080 0.001 0.321*** 0.614*** 1
in efﬁciency (0.29) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Residual correlations of VAR based on liquid stocks
|ΔTED spread| 1
|Fund flow| 0.157** 1
(0.04)
Quotes/Volume 0.310*** 0.047 1
(0.00) (0.54)
Co-movement 0.237*** 0.101 0.154** 1
in liquidity (0.00) (0.18) (0.04)
Co-movement -0.022 0.028 0.149** 0.311*** 1
in efﬁciency (0.78) (0.71) (0.05) (0.00)
Panel C: Residual correlations of VAR based on illiquid stocks
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Table 2.8 – continued
|ΔTED spread| |Fund flow| QuotesV olume Co-movement
in liquidity
Co-movement
in efﬁciency
|ΔTED spread| 1
|Fund flow| 0.134* 1
(0.08)
Quotes/Volume 0.296*** 0.031 1
(0.00) (0.68)
Co-movement 0.258*** 0.032 0.201*** 1
in liquidity (0.00) (0.67) (0.01)
Co-movement 0.269*** 0.037 0.278*** 0.317*** 1
in efﬁciency (0.00) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2.8 reports contemporaneous correlations between the innovations (residuals) in the
ﬁve endogenous variables in each of the three multivariate VARs we estimate. These results
show the relation between shocks to the different endogenous variables in the VARs. Panels A,
B, and C show the residual correlations for the VARs based on, respectively, all stocks, liquid
stocks, and illiquid stocks. Panel A shows signiﬁcantly positive contemporaneous correla-
tions between shocks to the TED spread and shocks to Hedge fund ﬂow and Quotes/Volume,
which indicates a positive association between shocks to funding liquidity and shocks to more
direct proxies for the intensity of arbitrage activity. Shocks to Co-movement in liquidity are
positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with shocks to the TED spread, Hedge fund ﬂow, and
Quotes/Volume, which indicates a link between shocks to funding liquidity and liquidity co-
movement, consistent with Brunnermeier (2009) and Hameed et al. (2010). There is a strong
positive contemporaneous correlation between shocks to Co-movement in liquidity and Co-
movement in efﬁciency. Shocks to our proxy for algorithmic trading (Quotes/Volume) also
show a clear positive contemporaneous relation with shocks to Co-movement in efﬁciency.
Panels B and C of Table 2.8 by and large show similar results for liquid and illiquid stocks, re-
spectively, though the contemporaneous correlations between shocks to the funding liquidity
proxies and shocks to Co-movement in liquidity are somewhat weaker for liquid stocks, while
for illiquid stocks, we observe that shocks to the TED spread are positively correlated with
shocks to all four other endogenous variables, including Co-movement in efﬁciency. Overall,
the results in Table 2.8 indicate that shocks to several of our proxies for funding liquidity
and the intensity of arbitrage activity are positively associated with shocks to the degree of
co-movement in both liquidity and efﬁciency.
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Although Tables 2.7 and 2.8 provide some initial evidence on the relations between (shocks
to) the endogenous variables in the VARs, they do not account for the full dynamics of the
VAR systems, and for the fact that shocks to the different endogenous variables are correlated
(Table 2.8). Impulse response functions (IRFs) provide a more complete picture by tracing
the impact of a one time, unit standard deviation, orthogonalized (using the inverse Cholesky
decomposition) shock to one of the endogenous variables on current and future values of the
other endogenous variables.
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 present IRFs for the VARs estimated based on, respectively,
all stocks, liquid stocks, and illiquid stocks. All IRF graphs show the response (measured
in standard deviations) of the variable mentioned in the vertical legend to the right of the
ﬁgure to a Cholesky one standard deviation shock to the variable mentioned in the horizontal
legend at the top of the ﬁgure. Each IRF graph shows the response up to six months ahead
(solid line labeled “coef”; month 0 on the horizontal axis of each IRF graph corresponds to
the contemporaneous response), as well as the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence bands based on
1,000 runs (dashed lines labeled “lower” and “upper”). We note that these are not cumulative
IRFs, so the responses depicted in the graphs are those pertaining to each of the individual
horizons.
The main result in Figure 2.2 is that shocks to all three proxies for funding liquidity and
the intensity of arbitrage activity have a signiﬁcant direct effect on Co-movement in efﬁciency
for at least one of the horizons under consideration. First, the response of Co-movement in
efﬁciency to a shock to |ΔTED spread| (bottom left IRF in Figure 2.2) is positive and sig-
niﬁcant with a one- and two-month lag and is economically meaningful, at 0.1 to 0.2 standard
deviations for these horizons. Second, the response of Co-movement in efﬁciency to a shock
to |Hedge fund flow| (second IRF on bottom row) is signiﬁcantly positive with a one-month
lag, and non-trivial in magnitude at around 0.15 standard deviations.20 Third, the contem-
poraneous response of Co-movement in efﬁciency to a shock to Quotes/Volume (third IRF on
bottom row) is signiﬁcantly positive and economically large (at more than 0.3 standard de-
viations). In line with expectations, we also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant contemporaneous response of
Co-movement in efﬁciency to a shock to Co-movement in liquidity (fourth IRF on bottom row).
We would like to emphasize that the set-up of our VARs, with Co-movement in efﬁciency as
the most endogenous variable, implies that all three measures of funding liquidity and the
intensity of arbitrage activity have a signiﬁcant and independent effect on Co-movement in
efﬁciency that is not driven by their effect on Co-movement in liquidity.
20In some of the robustness tests reported throughout this paper, the p-value of the response of Co-movement
in efﬁciency to a shock to |Hedge fund flow| in the past month increases to just above 0.05.
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Figure 2.2 – VAR of co-movement in efﬁciency: Impulse response functions (all stocks)
This ﬁgure shows impulse response functions (IRFs) for the vector autoregression (VAR) with one lag based
on all NYSE stocks in the sample, with the following endogenous variables (in this order): |ΔTED spread|,
|Hedge fund flow|, Quotes/Volume, Co-movement in liquidity, and Co-movement in efﬁciency (see description
in Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 1). Each IRF shows the response (measured in standard deviations, “coef”) of the
variable in the vertical legend to the right of the ﬁgure to a Cholesky one standard deviation shock to the variable
in the horizontal legend at the top of the ﬁgure, and bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence bands (“lower” and “upper”).
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In the IRFs that depict the response of Co-movement in liquidity to shocks in the other
endogenous variables in the VAR (fourth row of Figure 2.2), we observe a signiﬁcantly pos-
itive and large response to a shock to the TED spread, as measured contemporaneously as
well as with a one-month lag. The effect of a shock to our proxy for algorithmic trading on
Co-movement in liquidity is more complex. An increase in algorithmic trading is associated
with an increase in Co-movement in liquidity in the same month, but a reduction in subsequent
months.
Furthermore, in the second and third rows of Figure 2.2, we ﬁnd that a shock to funding
liquidity as picked up by a shock to the TED spread has a signiﬁcantly positive effect on
both |Hedge fund flow| and Quotes/Volume, consistent with the view that funding liquidity
affects the availability of arbitrage capital and the intensity of arbitrage activity. Perhaps not
surprisingly, these effects are relatively long-lived, since it may take time for arbitrageurs to
respond to a relaxation of funding constraints.
Figure 2.3 shows the IRFs for the VAR based on the decile portfolio of the most liquid
stocks. In line with the VAR coefﬁcient estimates in Table 2.7, the evidence of a signiﬁcant
response of the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency of the most liquid stocks in our sample
to shocks to the proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity is weaker
than for all stocks in Figure 2.2. The only signiﬁcant effect is the signiﬁcant contemporaneous
response to a shock to Quotes/Volume. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive contemporaneous
response of Co-movement in efﬁciency to a shock to Co-movement in liquidity. Co-movement
in liquidity, in turn, responds signiﬁcantly to shocks to the TED spread in the same month, but
not to the other proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage activity.
Figure 2.4 shows that, just like in Table 2.7, the main difference between the VAR re-
sults for liquid and illiquid stocks is that the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency of illiquid
stocks does respond signiﬁcantly to shocks to the TED spread for illiquid stocks. This positive
response is prolonged and economically considerable, at 0.1-0.25 standard deviations contem-
poraneously and at lags of one and two months. Although the average degree of co-movement
in efﬁciency is lower for illiquid stocks (Table 2.5), the ﬁndings in Figure 2.4 indicate that
the degree of efﬁcient co-movement of illiquid stocks is more sensitive to shocks to fund-
ing liquidity. A potential interpretation is that while there is less arbitrage activity and less
pronounced common variation in price efﬁciency in stocks with greater frictions, a shock to
the availability of arbitrage capital affects these stocks to a greater extent, possibly inducing
ampliﬁed common changes in their price efﬁciency.21
21We note that the somewhat weaker results for the VARs based on liquid and illiquid stocks in Figures 2.3
and 2.4 may in part be driven by the more noisy estimates of Co-movement in liquidity and Co-movement in
efﬁciency at the portfolio-level than at the market-level.
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Figure 2.3 – VAR of co-movement in efﬁciency: Impulse response functions (liquid stocks)
This ﬁgure shows impulse response functions (IRFs) for the vector autoregression (VAR) with one lag based
on the 10% most liquid stocks in the sample, with the following endogenous variables (in this order):
|ΔTED spread|, |Hedge fund flow|, Quotes/Volume, Co-movement in liquidity, and Co-movement in efﬁ-
ciency (see description in Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 1). Each IRF show the response (measured in standard
deviations, “coef”) of the variable in the vertical legend to the right of the ﬁgure to a Cholesky one standard
deviation shock to the variable in the horizontal legend at the top of the ﬁgure, and bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence
bands (“lower” and “upper”).
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Figure 2.4 – VAR of co-movement in efﬁciency: Impulse response functions (illiquid stocks)
This ﬁgure shows impulse response functions (IRFs) for the vector autoregression (VAR) with one lag based
on the 10% most illiquid stocks in the sample, with the following endogenous variables (in this order):
|ΔTED spread|, |Hedge fund flow|, Quotes/Volume, Co-movement in liquidity, and Co-movement in efﬁ-
ciency (see description in Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 1). Each IRF show the response (measured in standard
deviations, “coef”) of the variable in the vertical legend to the right of the ﬁgure to a Cholesky one standard
deviation shock to the variable in the horizontal legend at the top of the ﬁgure, and bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence
bands (“lower” and “upper”).
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In sum, our VAR results indicate that funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage ac-
tivity are important economic forces that help to understand time-variation in the degree of
co-movement in market efﬁciency across individual stocks.
2.6 Conclusions
Market efﬁciency remains central to the study of ﬁnancial markets, but most research to date
has treated it as a static concept. In this paper, we consider variation in efﬁciency across stocks
and over time, and examine the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency across individual stocks.
We show that ﬁve different stock-level market efﬁciency measures (intraday return pre-
dictability, variance ratios, the variance of intraday returns, Hasbrouck (1993) pricing errors,
and put-call parity deviations) demonstrate considerable time-series and cross-sectional vari-
ation and also exhibit signiﬁcant co-movement across stocks.
We then study the determinants of time-variation in the degree of co-movement in market
efﬁciency. We ﬁrst extract the ﬁrst principal component across all ﬁve monthly, market-wide
co-movement in efﬁciency measures and then include this variable as the last variable in vector
autoregressions that also include proxies for funding liquidity and the intensity of arbitrage
activity and a measure of co-movement in liquidity as endogenous variables. We show that
shocks to funding liquidity (the TED spread) and to variables that more directly measure the
intensity of arbitrage activity (hedge fund ﬂows and a proxy for algorithmic trading) have a
signiﬁcant effect on the degree of co-movement in efﬁciency.
Overall, our results point to a signiﬁcant, systematic, time-varying component in the de-
gree of pricing efﬁciency of individual stocks, and to an important role of funding liquidity
and the intensity of arbitrage activity in driving ﬂuctuations in this component.
Recognizing that market efﬁciency is dynamic and co-moves across individual stocks
opens new vistas for research. First, it would be worth exploring whether there is global
co-movement in market efﬁciency across stock markets in different countries. This would
allow us to ascertain the extent to which the quality of price formation in markets across the
world has a systematic component, and whether ﬂuctuations in global funding liquidity af-
fect the degree of global co-movement in efﬁciency. Second, it would be worth investigating
whether co-movement in market efﬁciency measures extends to other asset classes such as
ﬁxed income securities, foreign exchange, and derivatives. These and other issues are left for
future research.
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Chapter 3
The impact of arbitrage on market
liquidity∗
3.1 Introduction
Arbitrage enforces the law of one price and thereby improves the informational efﬁciency of
the market, so that prices better reﬂect fundamentals. But how arbitrage affects other measures
of market quality, in particular market liquidity, is less well understood.
This is an important question because recent changes to the trading environment (such
as market fragmentation and high frequency trading) ease arbitrage, and policy choices that
impede arbitrage (such as short-sell bans) might not only negatively affect the efﬁciency of
the ﬁnancial market, but also its liquidity and the cost of capital for ﬁrms.
In a recent paper by Gromb and Vayanos (2010) surveying the theoretical limits-of-
∗ This chapter is based on Ro¨sch (2014) “The Impact of Arbitrage on Market Liquidity” available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295437. I thank Lamont Black, Ekkehart Boehmer, Dion Bongaerts, Howard Chan,
Tarun Chordia, Ruben Cox, Louis Gagnon, Nicolae Gaˆrleanu, Michael Goldstein, Amit Goyal, Allaudeen
Hameed, Shing-yang Hu, Jonathan Kalodimos, Andrew Karolyi, Albert Kyle, Su Li, Albert Menkveld, Pamela
Moulton, Maureen O’Hara, Louis Piccotti, Gideon Saar, Piet Sercu, Rene´ Stulz, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam,
Raman Uppal, Dimitrios Vagias, Mathijs van Dijk, Manuel Vasconcelos, Kumar Venkataraman, Axel Vischer,
Avi Wohl, and participants at the 2014 Financial Management Conference and Doctoral Consortium (Nashville),
the 2014 Northern Finance Conference (Ottawa), the 2014 Asian Finance Conference (Bali), 2014 Eastern Fi-
nance Conference (Pittsburgh), the 2013 Erasmus Liquidity Conference (Rotterdam), the 2013 Conference on
the Theories and Practices of Securities and Financial Markets (Kaohsiung), the 2013 World Finance and Bank-
ing Symposium (Beijing), and at seminars at Erasmus University and Cornell University for valuable comments.
This work was carried out on the National e-infrastructure with the support of SURF Foundation. I am grateful
for the hospitality of the Department of Finance at the Johnson Graduate School of Management (Cornell Uni-
versity), where some of the work on this paper was carried out, especially from my hosts, Andrew Karolyi and
Pamela Moulton. I thank SURFsara, and in particular Lykle Voort, for technical support, and OneMarket-Data
for the use of their OneTick software. I also gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Vereniging Trust-
fonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research through a
“Vidi” grant.
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arbitrage literature, the authors state that “arbitrageurs provide liquidity” (p. 258) because
arbitrage opportunities arise from non-fundamental demand shocks, such as ﬁre sales by mu-
tual funds. The idea is that if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of demand pressure,
arbitrageurs trade against market demand and thereby decrease inventory holding costs for
liquidity providers, which improves liquidity. For the examples given by Gromb and Vayanos
(2010)—large price deviations that last for months—it is difﬁcult to imagine otherwise.
But if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of differences in information (for example,
because local liquidity providers are slow to update their quotes) then “with arbitrage present,
the adverse selection costs of domestic dealers increase, so that ... liquidity falls” (Domowitz
et al., 1998), or simply: in this case arbitrage is “toxic” (Foucault et al., 2013).
In other words, whether arbitrage improves or worsens liquidity depends on the reasons
why arbitrage opportunities arise. Theory predicts that if arbitrage opportunities arise as a
result of demand shocks arbitrage improves liquidity (Holden, 1995; Gromb and Vayanos,
2010), but if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of differences in information arbitrage
worsens liquidity (Kumar and Seppi, 1994; Foucault et al., 2013).
Motivated by this observation, in this paper, I investigate why deviations from the law of
one price arise and I estimate the impact of arbitrage on market liquidity. As price deviations
can sometimes arise as a result of demand shocks and other times as a result of differences
in information, so can arbitrage sometimes improve and other times worsen liquidity. In the
extreme case where both effects are equally strong and cancel each other out, arbitrage will
not have a visible effect on liquidity. This is my null hypothesis. Alternatively, if the effect of
increased adverse selection dominates, arbitrage worsens liquidity, and if the effect of lower
inventory holding costs dominates, arbitrage improves liquidity.
To study the impact of arbitrage on liquidity, I focus on the American Depositary Re-
ceipts (ADR) market. As laid out by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b), the ADR market is partic-
ularly suitable to study arbitrage, because the ADR and the home-market share offer identical
cash-ﬂows (albeit in different currencies) and here institutions exist that facilitate arbitrage,
implying that arbitrage likely occurs often in the ADR market.1
I examine intraday bid and ask quotes and trade prices for 72 ADRs and currency adjusted
prices for the home-market share from Brazil, France, Germany, Mexico, and the U.K. over a
long time frame from 1996 till 2013.
1 Both JP Morgan and BNY Mellon (the world’s largest depositaries for ADRs) conﬁrm that arbitrage does
occur in the ADR market. Employees of BNY Mellon conﬁrmed that arbitrage is frequent in the ADR market
during a meeting with the author. JP Morgan does list arbitrageurs as one investor type in the “Ownership”
section of each ADR.
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I ﬁrst construct two intraday measures of price deviations. The ﬁrst measure is the second-
by-second difference between the highest bid and the lowest ask price across the ADR and the
currency adjusted home-market share, which I refer to as grossOpportunity-Proﬁt. The second
measure is the difference in prices of “arbitrage trades”, which I identify as trades on both the
ADR and the home-market share within two seconds and while Opportunity-Proﬁt is positive.
Because recent empirical research ﬁnds that high-frequency traders signiﬁcantly rely on limit
orders (Menkveld, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2014b), I use unsigned trades, i.e. I consider trades
regardless whether both legs are buyer or seller initiated. This way I also capture trades in
which the arbitrageur trades in one market with a limit order and in the other market with a
market order. This measure I refer to as gross Traded-Proﬁt.
From these price deviations, I construct three (inverse) proxies for daily arbitrage activity.
I assume that the market is reasonably efﬁcient so that “prices reﬂect information to the point
where the marginal beneﬁts of acting ... do not exceed the marginal costs” (Fama (1991), p.
1575). In other words, the price deviations I observe reﬂect underlying frictions impeding
arbitrage, such as risk, illiquidity, and capital constrains. Motivated by Gagnon and Karolyi
(2010b)—who show that price deviations positively correlate with holding costs—and fol-
lowing Hu et al. (2013), I interpret large price deviations as “a symptom of a market in severe
shortage of arbitrage capital” (p.2342). Consequently, I interpret the magnitude of the de-
viation as a proxy for the cost of capital the arbitrageur faces, which is inversely related to
arbitrage activity.
The ﬁrst (inverse) measure of arbitrage activity is the daily maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt.
Because Opportunity-Proﬁt can be below, but not above the cost of capital—if proﬁts would
be above, the arbitrageur would step in and the opportunity would disappear—I interpret the
daily maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt as an inverse proxy for daily arbitrage activity. The second
measure is the daily average Traded-Proﬁt. Because the returns from each arbitrage trade
should be close to the cost of capital, I interpret the daily average Traded-Proﬁt as an inverse
proxy for daily arbitrage activity. The third measure is the velocity at whichOpportunity-Proﬁt
increase before an arbitrage trade occurs.
Using the intraday measures of price deviations, I start with investigating why price de-
viations arise. In particular, I investigate whether price deviations arise as a result of non-
fundamental demand shocks or differences in information. Inspired by Schultz and Shive
(2010), I identify non-fundamental demand shocks as situations in which price deviations
arise as a result of temporary price movements, i.e. when one share moves to create the price
deviation and later moves back to eliminate it. This identiﬁcation is based on the common
understanding that demand shocks are associated with price reversals and the incorporation of
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new information should have a permanent price effect (see, e.g. Gagnon and Karolyi (2009)).
My analysis reveals that in the ADR market more than 70% of all arbitrage opportunities arise
due to a non-fundamental demand shock.
In the second part of my paper I use the daily measures to investigate the impact of arbi-
trage on market liquidity. I ﬁnd that the average daily maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt is around
0.8% (as a percentage of the home-market share price) and the average daily Traded-Proﬁt is
around 0.5%, both similar to the cost-adjusted, absolute end-of-day price deviations reported
by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) of 1.12%. The velocity at which Opportunity-Proﬁt increase
before an arbitrage trade is 4BP per minute, on average. All three measures are positively
correlated.
I then estimate vector autoregressions and impulse response functions using arbitrage ac-
tivity and liquidity as endogenous variables. Impulse response functions (from stock-speciﬁc
and panel VARs) indicate that a positive shock to arbitrage activity predicts an increase in liq-
uidity and a decrease in net market order imbalance. For the average home- and host-market
share a one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt predicts an increase of 0.25 and
0.13 standard deviations in quoted spreads over the next ﬁve days. Aggregating the stock-
speciﬁc price deviations per exchange makes this effect become even stronger, in this case
a one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt predicts an increase of 0.35 and 0.20
standard deviations for the home- and host-market quoted spread. The average impact of arbi-
trage on liquidity might be lower at the stock-level than at the exchange level, because at the
exchange level stock speciﬁc periods of higher adverse selection risks might get diversiﬁed.
To further highlight the impact of arbitrage on liquidity, I look at intraday differences in
liquidity with and without arbitrage activity. Every day I identify periods with arbitrage as the
time when both the home- and the host-market share trade, and the period when only one share
trades as the period without arbitrage. I then look at impulse response functions estimated from
VARs with arbitrage activity and intraday differences in liquidity as endogenous variables.
Consistent with the notion of arbitrageurs as “cross-sectional market makers” (Holden, 1995),
I ﬁnd that a positive shock to arbitrage activity increases liquidity in the period with arbitrage
relative to the period without arbitrage.
These results are robust to instrumental variables estimation, where I exploit the fact that
corporate actions for the ADR and the home-market stock do not occur on the same day.
For example, on days when only the ADR is cum-dividend arbitrageurs are likely less active,
because the ﬁnal dividend payment depends on the currency conversion rate at which the
depositary bank could convert the dividends received on the home-market shares, which is in
general only known weeks after the ex-date.
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So far my results are consistent with theory, which predicts that if arbitrage opportunities
arise as a result of demand shocks, arbitrage improves liquidity. In the last part of my paper
I further investigate this prediction. I investigate whether the percentage of price deviations
that arise as a result of demand shocks can explain part of the cross-sectional variation of the
impact of arbitrage activity on liquidity. I ﬁnd that the number of price deviations that arise
in the home- and in the host-market, and the percentage of price deviations that arise as a
result of demand shocks in the host-market can explain around one quarter of the variation of
the impact of arbitrage on liquidity in the home-market. The percentage of price deviations
that arise as a result of demand shocks in the home-market does not play a signiﬁcant role in
explaining the impact of arbitrage on liquidity in the home-market.
My paper relates to several different parts of the literature.
First, my paper relates to the empirical limits-of-arbitrage literature (among many other
signiﬁcant contributions: Mitchell et al. (2002); Lamont and Thaler (2003); De Jong et al.
(2009); Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b).) The limits-of-arbitrage literature explains why arbi-
trage opportunities persist and how liquidity impacts arbitrage activity. I add to this literature
by following previous literature to make an attempt to answer the questions (i) why arbitrage
opportunities arise (Schultz and Shive, 2010) and (ii) how arbitrage impacts liquidity (Roll
et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2009; Lou and Polk, 2013; Foucault et al., 2013; Ben-David et al.,
2014). In a broader view, my paper is related to the literature that investigates how changes to
the trading environment affect market quality (e.g. Chordia et al. (2005, 2008); Hendershott
et al. (2011); Menkveld (2013); Chaboud et al. (2013); Brogaard et al. (2014b)). I add to these
important contributions by empirically linking the question of why arbitrage opportunities
arise to the impact arbitrage has on liquidity.
The main contribution of my study is to provide empirical evidence that arbitrage im-
proves liquidity. I provide empirical evidence that most price deviations arise as a result of
demand shocks and that an increase in arbitrage activity predicts a decrease in net market or-
der imbalance. Both ﬁndings indicate that arbitrageurs trade against net market demand, and
thereby improve international market integration and liquidity.
Second, I build upon previous work in the ADR literature. Especially, Gagnon and Karolyi
(2010b) (who study price deviations in the ADR market) and Werner and Kleidon (1996);
Moulton and Wei (2009) (who investigate differences in liquidity during and outside overlap-
ping trading times). I add to this literature. In contrast to most previous studies I have access to
tick-by-tick data for the home market, which allows me to combine both and study the impact
of price deviations on the difference in liquidity during and outside overlapping trading times.
I provide empirical evidence that an increase in arbitrage activity decreases the gap between
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liquidity during and outside overlapping trading times, providing further evidence that arbi-
trageurs improve international market integration and liquidity. These results can also provide
an explanation for time-variation in liquidity differences during and outside overlapping trad-
ing times. Where Werner and Kleidon (1996) ﬁnd that quoted spreads of ADRs in 1991 are
higher during than outside overlapping trading times, using data from 2003 Moulton and Wei
(2009) ﬁnd the opposite. The increase in arbitrage activity provides one explanation for these
different ﬁndings.
I consider the ﬁnding that arbitrageurs improve liquidity important for at least three rea-
sons. First, the ﬁndings provide empirical justiﬁcation for the assumption underlying the
limits-of-arbitrage literature that arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of demand shocks.
Second, the ﬁndings help to understand how policy changes that could hinder arbitrage activ-
ity (e.g. short-sell bans or transaction taxes) negatively impact not only the efﬁciency of the
ﬁnancial market, but also its liquidity, and ultimately the cost of capital for ﬁrms (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986). Third, the results add to the debate about how recent changes to the
trading environment (such as fragmentation, and high frequency trading), seemingly helping
arbitrage, affect market quality (Chordia et al., 2008; Hendershott et al., 2011; O’Hara and Ye,
2011; Menkveld, 2013).
3.2 Data and variable construction
3.2.1 Data and sample
To investigate the impact of arbitrage on market liquidity I focus on the American Depositary
Receipts market (ADR), because with almost 10% of total NYSE trading value it is an im-
portant market and here institutions exist that facilitate arbitrage (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2013,
2010b). Many features are endemic to the ADR market [I refer to Karolyi (1998); Gagnon
and Karolyi (2010a, 2013) for a detailed explanation and a comprehensive introduction to the
ADR market], for example, the feature of convertibility—both ADR and home-market share
can be converted to each other—allows to interpret price deviations between bid and ask prices
at the time an arbitrageur opens the arbitrage position as (almost) risk-free proﬁts.
If the currency adjusted bid price of the home-market share is higher than the ask price of
the ADR in the host-market (and similarly, if the bid price of the host-market ADR is higher
than the ask price of the home-market share) an arbitrage opportunity exists to simultaneously
short sell the home-market share at the bid price, convert the proceeds from the short-sale
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into USD, and buy the ADR in the host-market at the ask price.2 After that the ADR can be
converted [within one business day and for less than ﬁve cents a share (Gagnon and Karolyi,
2010b)] into the home-market share either through a broker (e.g. Interactive Brokers), a cross-
ing platform (e.g. ADR Max, or ADR Navigator), or the actual depositary bank. After the
conversion the home-market share can be delivered to close down the short position, resulting
in a risk-free USD proﬁt equal to the difference between the bid of the home market and the
ask of the host-market ADR at the time the arbitrage position was opened.
To construct my sample of ADRs and their respective home-market shares I use stan-
dard sources in the DR literature: Datastream, Bank of New York Complete Depositary Re-
ceipt Directory (www.adrbnymellon.com) and Deutsche Bank Depositary Receipts Services
(adr.db.com). Details about the sample construction can be found in Appendix B.1. I fo-
cus on the NYSE as the host-market because it is the world’s leading exchange in terms of
listed Depositary Receipts (DR) and total trading in the DR market (Cole-Fontayn, 2011). I
identify matched pairs of home/host-market shares and construct my sample based on the ﬁve
home-market exchanges with the most identiﬁed pairs, and with overlapping trading times to
the NYSE. This results in 72 pairs across the following ﬁve exchanges: the London Stock
Exchange (the U.K., with 26 home-market shares), Sao Paolo Stock Exchange (Brazil, 17
shares), Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexico, 11 shares), XETRA (Germany, 9 shares), and
Euronext Paris (France, 9 shares).3 For all matched pairs of home/host-market shares I obtain
intraday data on quotes and trades (time-stamped with at least millisecond precision) as well
as their respective sizes from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database over the
sample period January, 1996, (the earliest date available in TRTH) till December, 2013. Simi-
larly, I obtain intraday quotes on the currency pairs required to convert local prices into USD,
the currency in which the ADR is quoted in, from TRTH.4
Quote and trade data is ﬁltered as described in Appendix B.2. After the ﬁltering the data
contains 8,620,877,770 updates to the best bid and ask quote, of which around 50% are on
ADRs, and 777,849,237 trades, of which 162,188,165 trades are on the ADR. I ignore stock-
days on which the NYSE or the home-market exchange is only partly open. I also ignore
stock-days in which prices of the ADR and the home-market share could not be aligned (days
with price deviations above USD 10 or above 30%, as described in Appendix B.2). Further,
2 Note that this example is for illustrative purposes only. In real markets short-selling is capital intensive, and
an initial margin requirement of the initial value of the share plus 50% is required (in the US, Regulation T),
which then also creates exchange rate risk.
3 Focusing on ADRs excludes Canada and The Netherlands as potential home-markets, because, in general,
stocks from Canada and The Netherlands do not list in the NYSE as ADRs, but as Canadian ordinaries and New
York registered shares.
4 The TRTH database is managed by the Securities Industry Research Center of Asia-Paciﬁc (SIRCA) and is
used in several recent studies, e.g. Marshall et al. (2011); Lau et al. (2012); Lai et al. (2014).
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for the main analysis I drop stock-days in which one stock is ex- and the other stock is cum-
dividend (and similar for other corporate actions). To be speciﬁc, I drop days after a corporate
action occurs on one market till a corporate action occurs on the other market, with a maximum
of six days.
Most of the analysis requires comparing prices across the ADR and the home-market
share. To have valid, tradable quotes for both the ADR and the home-market share most of
the analysis is based on overlapping trading times, i.e. when both the home- and host-market
are in their continuous trading session.
Figure 3.1 – Continuous trading sessions per exchange 2008-10-15
This ﬁgure shows the hour of the day (x-axis) in which each of the ﬁve home-market exchanges (y-axis) is in
their continuous trading session on one speciﬁc date, 2008-10-15 (horizonal lines). The vertical lines in the ﬁgure
depict the opening (left) and closing (right) time of the continuous trading session at the host-market (NYSE).
The x-axis shows the hour of the day in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
U.K.
Mexico
Germany
France
Brazil
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Figure 3.1 shows the continuous trading times for all ﬁve exchanges in the sample on
October 15, 2008.5 The opening and closing time at the NYSE is indicated by the left and
right vertical line, respectively. The area within the vertical lines, in which the home-market
is open, refers to the overlapping trading hours and is 2, 6, and 6.5 hours between Europe,
Brazil, and Mexico and the NYSE, respectively.
3.2.2 Measures of price deviations
I construct two price deviation measures, the ﬁrst one is based on quote prices and the second
one is based on trade prices. The ﬁrst measure I call Opportunity-Proﬁt (profiti,s), which
I calculate for every stock i in every second s as the difference between the highest bid and
5 Day light saving time (DST) does not follow the same rule in the USA and the other countries in the sample,
which leads to variations in the overlapping trading hours within the year.
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the lowest ask price across the home- and host-market relative to the mid price of the home
market. If this difference is not positive, I set profiti,s to zero, i.e. Opportunity-Proﬁt is
calculated as:
profiti,s = max(
bid.homei,s − ask.adri,s
mid.homei,s
,
bid.adri,s − ask.homei,s
mid.homei,s
, 0) (3.1)
wheremid.homei,s is the last mid-quote price of stock i in second s, and bid.homei,s (ask.homei,s)
is the last bid (ask) of stock i in second s converted to USD using the prevailing bid (ask) of
the respective currency pair, i.e. BRL for Brazil, GBP for the U.K., EUR for Germany and
France (after January 1, 1999, and before DEM and FRF, respectively), and MXN for Mexico.
Further bid.adri,s (ask.adri,s) is the last bid (ask) in second s of the ADR trading at the NYSE
associated to stock i, adjusted for the respective bundling ratio as described in Appendix B.2.
The second measure I call Traded-Proﬁt (trade.profiti,t), which I calculate for every
stock i and for every simultaneous trade t as the absolute difference between the trade prices
of the ADR and the home market stock, relative to the mid price of the home-market, i.e.
trade.profiti,t is calculated as:
trade.profiti,t = |trade.homei,t − trade.adri,t1
mid.homei,t
| (3.2)
where trade.homei,t is the currency adjusted trade price for trade t of the home-market stock,
and trade.adri,t1 is the bundling adjusted trade price for trade t1 of the ADR, such that t1
minimizes the distance to t and both trades occur within two seconds, i.e. |t− t1| < 2seconds.
3.2.3 Price deviations as an inverse proxy for arbitrage activity
From the two intraday, price-deviation measures introduced in the previous section, I construct
three daily proxies for arbitrage activity. Investigating the impact of arbitrage on market liq-
uidity using daily data—following Roll et al. (2007)—seems suitable to ensure that the time
is short enough to measure the effect of market order imbalance (OIB) on liquidity (as em-
pirically found by Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) using daily data), but on the same time long
enough (compared to intraday data) to capture more persistent effects.
Unfortunately, a direct measure of arbitrage activity is not available, but a possible indirect
(inverse) measure is absolute price deviation.
Previous literature measured arbitrage activity by the outcome of arbitrage activity, such as
absolute price deviations (Roll et al., 2007; Ben-David et al., 2014) or return correlations (Lou
and Polk, 2013). Alternatively, previous literature used the excess amount of short-selling to
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measure arbitrage activity (Choi et al., 2009; Hanson and Sunderam, 2014), but this measure
is not feasible for arbitrage positions that are open for less than three business days (as is the
case in the market I look at).6
I note that Roll et al. (2007) interpret end-of-day absolute price differences (the basis) as
a direct measure of arbitrage activity, so that “if the basis widens on a particular day, arbitrage
forces on subsequent days ... increase.” Because I consider the maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt
within a day, I interpret the measure as an inverse measure of arbitrage activity.
If Opportunity-Proﬁt indeed indicate capital constraints (as I conjecture following Hu
et al. (2013)) and hence indicate less arbitrage activity, one would expect price deviations to
be correlated with other measures of capital constraints. Further, one would expect that when
price deviations in the ADR market are high, arbitrage activity in other markets is low, because
capital constraints would likely affect arbitrage across all markets.
This is indeed the case. Empirically, I do ﬁnd a negative correlation between price de-
viations and bank returns and a positive correlation between price deviations and the TED
spread (the difference in one month Libor and T-Bill rates). In both cases the correlations
are statistically signiﬁcant and indicate that if funding liquidity is low (low bank returns, or a
high TED spread) price deviations are high. In both cases I also obtain statistically signiﬁcant
correlations when controlling for the general risk in the market (proxied by the VIX).7
I also ﬁnd that if price deviations in the ADR market are high, arbitrage activity in the
index market is low (as reported by the NYSE as part of “Program Trading”). A one stan-
dard deviation increase in Opportunity-Proﬁt is associated with a decrease of 0.43 standard
deviations in index arbitrage volume.8
6 Equity transaction (in the US) settle “T+3”, i.e. traders are required to settle the transaction within three
business days, if the short-position is open less than three business days it will likely not show up in any statistic.
7 The TED spread and bank returns are widely used as proxies for funding liquidity, see for example Brun-
nermeier et al. (2008); Brunnermeier (2009); Hameed et al. (2010).
8 Because price deviations can arise from both frictions in the home market as well as the USA (the host-
market), I ﬁrst extract the common component (“frictions in the USA”) across all ﬁve exchange speciﬁc daily
price deviations using principal component analysis. I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst component explains around one-half of
the joint variation, that all loadings have the same sign and are of similar magnitude. To derive a daily time-series
I then multiply the matrix of the exchange speciﬁc daily price deviations with the vector of the loadings from the
PCA. First, this time-series is positively correlated to the TED spread and daily returns are negatively correlated
to bank returns (Dow Jones U.S. Financial industry index; an inverse measure of capital constraints). Both
correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level over the whole sample, in both the ﬁrst half and for the
bank returns in the second half of the sample, and survive controlling for general risk in the market (proxied by
the US Volatility Index, VIX). Second, when explaining the monthly average of this time-series by a linear trend,
and the index arbitrage volume as a percentage of total NYSE volume in the given month, I ﬁnd that the estimated
slope coefﬁcient for arbitrage volume is -0.28951 with a t-statistic of -2.886. A one standard deviation increase
in Opportunity-Proﬁt is associated with a decrease of 0.43 standard deviations in index arbitrage volume. (The
NYSE reports the number of shares traded as part of an index arbitrage at a weekly frequency as reported by the
NYSE as part of their “Program Trading” press releases, e.g. in 2008 http://www.nyse.com/press/2 2008.html).
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Motivated by these observations I construct two daily (inverse) proxies for arbitrage ac-
tivity based on intraday absolute price deviations. First, the stock-day maximum Opportunity-
Proﬁt within the day (from Eq. 3.1). And second, the stock-day average Traded-Proﬁt across
all “arbitrage trades” (deﬁned as trades on both the home-market share and the ADR within
two seconds and which occur during positive Opportunity-Proﬁt, from Eq. 3.2). As motivated
in the introduction, the daily maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt should be a better proxy for arbi-
trage activity than its average because price deviations need to be sufﬁciently large before an
arbitrageur would trade on them.
One concern with these measures might be that arbitrage activity might vary purely be-
cause of variations in the costs associated with arbitrage (beyond the bid-ask spread). Another
concern might be that both measures of arbitrage activity do not take into account the time it
takes for an arbitrageur to become active. Despite a large Opportunity-Proﬁt, if an arbitrageur
quickly trades on it, arbitrage activity might still be considered relatively high.
To address both concerns, in the next section, I construct another (inverse) proxy for
arbitrage activity based on the speed at which arbitrageurs get active.
3.2.4 The velocity at which price deviations increase before “arbitrage
trades” as an inverse proxy for arbitrage activity
In the spirit of an event study (where the event is a simultaneous trade on both the home-market
share and the ADR) I look at Opportunity-Proﬁt before and after the event. If these trades are
partly driven by arbitrage motivations I would expect Opportunity-Proﬁt to increase before
and decrease after the trade. In this case the velocity at which Opportunity-Proﬁt increase
before the trade could be interpreted as an inverse proxy for arbitrage activity. For example, if
the velocity is small this indicates that either a small gradual rise or a sudden bigger jump in
Opportunity-Proﬁt is enough for an arbitrageur to step in and trade. On the other hand if the
velocity is large, it indicates that arbitrageurs wait for an extended time for the Opportunity-
Proﬁt to increase before they trade. The latter case indicating less arbitrage activity than the
former.
For each stock-day I average Opportunity-Proﬁt per second from one minute before till
one minute after a simultaneous trade occurs across all simultaneous trades within the day.
For each stock i and each day d I get 121 observations n with −60 <= n <= 60 denoted
The availability of this more direct measure of arbitrage activity makes the index market particular suitable
for comparison. Because index arbitrage activity is strongly inﬂuenced by the monthly expiry date of futures
contracts, I consider monthly averages. Because press releases from NYSE are not available before Jun-06, I
estimate this regression using monthly data from Jun-06 to Dec-13.
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profiti,d(n). To focus on trades potentially driven by arbitrage motivations, I only consider si-
multaneous trades within positiveOpportunity-Proﬁt, i.e. where profiti,d(0) is positive. I then
estimate regression Eq. 3.3 for each stock-day to explain the time variation of Opportunity-
Proﬁt around simultaneous trades. On days with more than one simultaneous trade, I estimate
Eq. 3.3 usingWeighted-Least-Squares regressions, with weights equal to one over the standard
deviation of the average Opportunity-Proﬁt in second n.
profiti,d(n) = αi,d+β1,i,d∗Beforen+β2,i,d∗T imen+β3,i,d∗T imen∗Beforen+i,d,n (3.3)
where, αi,d is the intercept, Beforen is a dummy variable which is set to 1 before the event,
T imen is a linear time trend, and T imen ∗Beforen is a time trend before the event.
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the results of stock-day regressions as in Eq. 3.3. I report the
pooled average estimated slope coefﬁcient (with both time trends scaled by 60), the pooled
average Newey and West (1994) t-statistic (t-stat avg) (which are capped at -100, and +100),
the percentage of coefﬁcients that are positive (% positive), and the percentage of coefﬁcients
that are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (% + signiﬁcant). Further I report the average
R2 and the number of regressions over which the averages are taken (# regressions).
The number of regressions indicates that from 1996 to 2013 for 153,157 stock-days a
simultaneous trade occurs inside positive Opportunity-Proﬁt. This is a big fraction of the total
number of stock-days of around 200,000.
The average R2 is above 66%, which indicates that the proposed functional form captures
most of the 2-minutes time variation in Opportunity-Proﬁt around simultaneous trades. Fur-
ther Opportunity-Proﬁt is higher before a simultaneous trade occurs (measured by Before >
0), and is strictly increasing (T ime + T ime ∗ Before > 0) and decreasing (T ime < 0)
before and after the event, respectively. Opportunity-Proﬁt at the time the trade occurs is on
average 53BP (0.41 + 0.06 + 1 ∗ (0.12− 0.06)), which is almost 30% higher than the average
opportunity proﬁt (the estimated intercept of 41BP).
Because Opportunity-Proﬁt rise before and fall after simultaneous trades during positive
Opportunity-Proﬁt, I interpret these trades as driven by arbitrage. Of course taking the av-
erage across all simultaneous trades with positive Opportunity-Proﬁt will wrongly classify
many trades as arbitrage trades and potentially miss out several arbitrage trades. However, the
ﬁnding of a statistically and economically signiﬁcant increase in Opportunity-Proﬁt before
and decline after these trades indicates that these trades are at least partly driven by arbitrage
motivations.
One concern might be that I use all simultaneous trades (within positive Opportunity-
Proﬁt), and not only signed simultaneous trades, i.e. simultaneous trades for which the trade
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for one market is buyer and the other market is seller initiated. However, this would not allow
arbitrageurs to use limit orders, a potentially unrealistic restriction.9
To establish a daily proxy for arbitrage activity I measure the Velocity at whichOpportunity-
Proﬁt increase before an arbitrage trade as the sum of the estimated slope coefﬁcients from
both time-trends in Table 2.1.
3.2.5 Measures of market liquidity and order imbalance
As the main liquidity measure I use the proportional quoted spread (PQSPR), deﬁned as the
daily time-weighted average of the difference in the ask and the bid price, scaled by the mid-
quote price. For robustness, I also consider proportional effective spread, quoted depth, and
the standard deviation of the pricing error as in Hasbrouck (1993) as alternative measures of
market quality. All four measures have been widely used as measures of market quality before,
for example Roll et al. (2007); Boehmer and Kelley (2009); Moulton and Wei (2009); Schultz
and Shive (2010).
I further construct a measure of buying or selling pressure. I sign every trade in both the
home market and the ADR using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.10 Second, to derive
a daily order imbalance measure for each stock I take the absolute difference between the
number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades in a given day (OIB).
3.2.6 Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 3.1 presents cross-sectional summary statistics of time-series averages for
the main measures of arbitrage activity and liquidity.
For the majority of all stock-days both Traded-Proﬁt (78%) and Opportunity-Proﬁt (92%)
are nonzero. While both Opportunity-Proﬁt and Traded-Proﬁt cannot be negative by construc-
tion, velocity can. However, Table 3.1 indicates that for most stock-days (65%) the velocity
is positive. Considering that the velocity can only be calculated on 78% of all stock-days
(days with a simultaneous trade during positive Opportunity-Proﬁt), this indicates that veloc-
9 Recent empirical research ﬁnds that both high-frequency and algorithmic traders signiﬁcantly rely on limit
orders, for example Menkveld (2013) ﬁnds that for one particular high-frequency trader “that employs a cross-
market strategy ... four out of ﬁve of its trades are passive” (also compare Brogaard et al. (2014b); Chaboud et al.
(2013)).
10 A trade is classiﬁed as buyer- (seller-) initiated if it is closer to the ask (bid) of the prevailing quote. A
trade at the midpoint of the quote is classiﬁed as buyer- (seller-) initiated if the previous price change is positive
(negative). Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Odders-White (2000) give evidence that this algorithm is quite
accurate for NYSE stocks, indicating that at least for ADRs misclassiﬁcations should be minimal.
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Table 3.1 – Summary statistics of time-series averages, 72 home/host stock pairs, 1996 - 2013
Panel A of this table reports the cross-sectional average, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum
of the time-series average by stock of the daily time-weighted average proportional quoted spread for the home
market (PQSPR Home) and the host-market (PQSPR Host), the difference in quoted spread for the home-market
share between the overlapping trading times and from 11 UTC until the host-market opens (ΔPQSPR Home),
the difference in quoted spread for the host-market share between the overlapping trading times and from the
time the home-market closes until 17 UTC (ΔPQSPR Host), the absolute order imbalance (the number of
buyer minus seller initiated trades) for the home-market (|OIB Home|) and the host-market (|OIB Host|), the
average number of price deviations per day (# of price deviations), the average time in seconds it takes till the
price deviation disappears (Seconds in deviation), the daily highestOpportunity-Proﬁt (Max. Opportunity-Proﬁt),
the daily average Traded-Proﬁt (Avg. Traded-Proﬁt), and the velocity at whichOpportunity-Proﬁt increase before
a simultaneous trade within positive Opportunity-Proﬁt (Velocity: the sum of both time-trends from Panel B of
this Table). I measureOpportunity-Proﬁt as the difference between the highest bid and the lowest ask price across
the home- and host-market relative to the mid price of the home market (as in Eq. 3.1). I measure Traded-Proﬁt
as the absolute difference in trade prices across both markets that occur within two seconds and within positive
Opportunity-Proﬁt (as in Eq. 3.2). The ﬁrst column (%Days+) indicates the percentage of stock-days in which
the statistics are positive.
Panel B of this table reports the average of the regressions results from Eq. 3.3 estimated per stock-day. For
each stock-day d I estimate the average Opportunity-Proﬁt per second (denoted nth-second Opportunity-Proﬁt)
from one-minute before till one-minute after any simultaneous trade (the event: a trade on both the home- and
the host-market share within two seconds) across all simultaneous trades within positive Opportunity-Proﬁt and
within the day. The dependent variable is the nth-second Opportunity-Proﬁt. The independent variables are,
an intercept (Intercept), a dummy variable which is set to 1 before the event (Before), a linear time trend (T),
and a time trend before the event (T*Before). Panel B reports the pooled average estimated slope coefﬁcient
(coefﬁcients for both time trends are scaled by 60), the pooled average Newey and West (1994) t-stat (t-stat avg),
the percentage of coefﬁcients that are positive (% positive), and the percentage of coefﬁcients that are positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (% + signiﬁcant). Further for each regression I report the average R2 and the
number of regressions over which the averages are taken (# regressions).
Panel A: Cross-sectional summary statistics of time-series averages
%Days+ avg stddev min median max
PQSPR Home(%) 1.00 0.45 0.80 0.05 0.16 5.01
PQSPR Host (%) 1.00 0.40 0.56 0.07 0.25 3.82
ΔPQSPR Home(%) 0.24 -0.02 0.08 -0.56 -0.00 0.01
ΔPQSPR Host (%) 0.26 -0.04 0.06 -0.26 -0.02 0.08
|OIB Home| 0.98 204.73 196.97 14.19 155.49 1231.84
|OIB Host| 0.95 78.55 83.72 4.73 50.78 474.31
# of price deviations 0.92 81 49 6 68 216
Seconds in deviations 0.92 252 234 5 160 1,043
Max. Opportunity-Proﬁt (%) 0.92 0.82 0.48 0.15 0.72 2.61
Avg. Traded-Proﬁt (%) 0.78 0.50 0.38 0.06 0.44 2.43
Velocity (%) 0.65 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.26
Panel B: Opportunity-Proﬁt around simultaneous trades
Interceptd Befored Td T ∗Befored R2d # regressions
Opportunity-Proﬁt 0.41 0.06 -0.06 0.12
t-stat avg 1.51 -1.19 1.97
% positive 70.70 24.47 79.91
% + signiﬁcant 38.61 8.51 49.69
66.10 153,157
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ity is negative for only around 15% of all stock days. Further the time-series average velocity
across all days in the sample is positive for all stocks.
I ﬁnd that cross-sectional averages for Traded-Proﬁt and Opportunity-Proﬁt are similar in
magnitude—consistent with the interpretation that both are a measure of the cost of capital
an arbitrageur faces—the average of the daily maximum Opportunity-Proﬁt is 0.82%, with a
maximum of 2.61% for one Brazilian stock (with RIC CPFE3.SA). The average of Traded-
Proﬁt is 0.5% with a maximum of 2.43%. The Velocity at which Opportunity-Proﬁt increase
before an arbitrage trade is on average 4BP per minute, which seems relatively large consid-
ering that the average Opportunity-Proﬁt around arbitrage trades is just 41BP (the intercept in
Panel B of Table 2.1).
While Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) use a different sample, and use end-of-day data from
1993 to 2004, the authors ﬁnd a cost-adjusted absolute average price deviations of 1.12%,
which is close to the average Opportunity-Proﬁt in 1996 to 2004 of 1.07% (untabulated).
3.3 Do price deviations arise as a result of demand shocks
or differences in information?
Using the intraday price deviations, I ﬁrst follow Schultz and Shive (2010) and investigate
why price deviations arise, because theory predicts that the impact of arbitrage on liquidity
depends on why arbitrage opportunities arise. If arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of
non-fundamental demand shocks arbitrageurs should act as “cross-sectional market makers”
(Holden, 1995) and improve liquidity. But if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of differ-
ences in information, arbitrageurs should increase adverse selection and deteriorate liquidity.
If for one particular stock i at time t − 1 Opportunity-Proﬁt are zero, but at time t
Opportunity-Proﬁt are positive, at least one bid or ask quote of at least one asset changed
from time t − 1 to time t (this asset is denoted the First mover, either the ADR, the home-
market share, or the respective currency pair). Similarly, if Opportunity-Proﬁt are positive till
time τ − 1 > t, but zero at time τ at least one bid or ask quote of at least one asset changed
(this asset is denoted the Last mover). In this case I say that the First mover creates a price
deviation for stock i at time t and the Last mover eliminates the price deviation at time τ .11
11 In case the day opens with a price deviation, I consider the asset which market opened last as the First mover.
On the other hand if a price deviation exists and either of the markets closes I drop this price deviation from the
analysis in this section, as I do not know which asset closes down the arbitrage. Both cases are infrequent and
do not impact the main results in this section. Further, to reduce potential noise, I ignore any price deviation that
lasts less than one second, so that τ > t.
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Table 3.2 – Number of daily price deviations and reasons for why they arise, 1996 - 2013
This table presents the total number of price deviations (# Price deviations) by the asset that moves to
create the deviation (First mover) and by the asset that moves to eliminate it (Last mover). The ﬁrst column
(#Stocks) indicates the number of home- and host-market share pairs over which the statistics are computed.
The second column indicate the asset that moves to create the price deviation: either the home-market share
(Home), the host-market share (Host), both the home- and the host-market share (Both), or the respective
currency pair (Forex). The third column (#Price deviations) indicates the total number of price deviations across
all stocks and days in this category. The fourth column (%Price pressure) indicates the percentage of all price
deviations that arise because of a temporary price movement, when one share moves to create the price deviation
and later moves back to eliminate it (if the Home-market share is the ﬁrst mover %Price pressure is deﬁned as
(Home + Both)/(Home + Host + Both), and if the Host-market share is the ﬁrst mover %Price pressure
is deﬁned as (Host + Both)/(Home + Host + Both)). A statistically signiﬁcant difference from 0.5 at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on a t-test of the per-stock estimates).
The rest of the columns Home, Host, Both, and Forex indicate the percentage of all price deviations that get
eliminated because of a movement in the respective asset.
Panel A: By exchange Last mover:
#Stocks First mover #Price
deviations
%Price
pressure
%Home %Host %Both %Forex
All
72 Home 3,735,537 0.70*** 0.46 0.26 0.17 0.10
72 Host 4,644,340 0.78*** 0.19 0.52 0.17 0.11
72 Both 2,288,232 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.08
72 Forex 1,953,310 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.43
Brazil
17 Home 1,362,010 0.77*** 0.58 0.22 0.14 0.05
17 Host 1,377,628 0.74*** 0.24 0.53 0.17 0.05
17 Both 613,740 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.04
17 Forex 235,013 0.35 0.29 0.12 0.24
France
9 Home 638,708 0.69*** 0.40 0.26 0.17 0.17
9 Host 564,650 0.75*** 0.20 0.44 0.18 0.18
9 Both 377,439 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.12
9 Forex 497,131 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.49
Germany
9 Home 580,559 0.69*** 0.39 0.26 0.20 0.14
9 Host 482,000 0.75*** 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.16
9 Both 415,813 0.20 0.29 0.42 0.10
9 Forex 328,090 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.39
Mexico
11 Home 533,859 0.64*** 0.40 0.31 0.16 0.13
11 Host 1,238,613 0.84*** 0.15 0.63 0.14 0.09
11 Both 363,548 0.23 0.36 0.33 0.08
11 Forex 351,896 0.20 0.31 0.10 0.39
U.K.
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Table 3.2 continued
Panel A: By exchange Last mover:
#Stocks First mover #Price
deviations
%Price
pressure
%Home %Host %Both %Forex
26 Home 620,401 0.65*** 0.38 0.32 0.20 0.10
26 Host 981,449 0.81*** 0.16 0.50 0.18 0.16
26 Both 517,692 0.19 0.35 0.36 0.10
26 Forex 541,180 0.13 0.26 0.12 0.50
Panel B: By subperiod
1996 to 2002
49 Home 372,583 0.76*** 0.66 0.23 0.04 0.07
49 Host 138,165 0.51* 0.46 0.44 0.04 0.06
49 Both 18,207 0.56 0.30 0.07 0.07
49 Forex 56,947 0.43 0.19 0.03 0.35
2003 to 2013
72 Home 3,362,954 0.70*** 0.44 0.27 0.18 0.11
72 Host 4,506,175 0.79*** 0.19 0.53 0.18 0.11
72 Both 2,270,025 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.08
72 Forex 1,896,363 0.20 0.26 0.12 0.43
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the total number of price deviations across all 72 home/host-
market pairs and, separately, across all ﬁve exchanges. Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the number
of price deviations across two different subperiods, namely 1996 to 2002 and 2003 to 2013.
The subperiods are chosen as in later parts I focus on data from 2003 to 2013 to mitigate issues
arising from infrequent trading and stocks entering the sample.
Following Schultz and Shive (2010) I consider a price deviation to arise as a result of price
pressure (demand shocks) if the share that moves to create the price deviation later moves back
to eliminate it.
Table 3.2 reports all statistics by the First and Last mover.12 For each First mover I
separately report the percentage of all price deviations that arise as a result of price pressure.
In total I ﬁnd 12,621,419 price deviations in my sample. Price movements in the host-
market ADR create 4,644,340 of these price deviations, of which 52% are later eliminated
because the price of the ADR moves back, and in only 19% a price movement of the home-
market share eliminate the price deviation. The percentage of all price deviations that arise
12 In the case that the currency pair moves together with any of the other two shares, the First mover is
considered to be the other share.
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as a result of price pressure in the host-market is 78%. Similarly, the percentage of all price
deviations that arise as a result of price pressure in the home-market is 70%. The percentage
of price deviations that arise as a result of price pressure in the host-market is higher than in
the home-market for all exchanges, except Brazil. In other words, price deviations that arise
as a result of price movements in the host-market are less likely than in the home-market to
arise as a result of differences in information, which is consistent with previous literature that
ﬁnds that price discovery normally occurs in the home-market (Halling et al., 2007; Gagnon
and Karolyi, 2009).
For all ﬁve exchanges the percentage of price deviations created by a price movement in
the ADR and that arise as a result of price pressure is higher than 74%. For price deviations
created by a price movement in the home-market share this percentage is somewhat lower but
also higher than 64% for all exchanges. In all cases this percentage is statistically signiﬁcantly
higher than 50%.13
Table 3.2 provides evidence that the majority of all price deviations arise as a result of
price pressure in either the ADR or the home-market share. Indicating, that arbitrageurs trade
against net market demand and act as “cross-sectional market makers” (Holden, 1995) most
of the time. Of course, the overall impact of arbitrage on liquidity might still be negative. Ta-
ble 3.2 indicates that many price deviations arise because of differences in information, which
potentially might lead to “toxic arbitrage” (Foucault et al., 2013) and hence that arbitrage
would worsen liquidity.
To study the overall effect I now turn to proxy arbitrage activity, and investigate the joint
dynamics between arbitrage activity and market liquidity in the following sections.
3.4 The impact of arbitrage on market liquidity
3.4.1 Correlations between daily arbitrage activity, liquidity and order
imbalance
To understand the joint dynamics between arbitrage activity, liquidity and order imbalance a
natural ﬁrst step is to study pairwise correlations. However, the variables might be correlated
just because of a common time trend, or because of other calendar regularities. To address
these concerns I follow Roll et al. (2007) and ﬁrst expunge each variable from their time trend
and other calendar regularities, i.e. I replace each observation of each time-series of variable
13 I also obtain similar percentages of price deviations that arise as a result of price pressure if I only consider
the one price deviation per stock-day with the highest Opportunity-Proﬁt.
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y and stock i by its residual from regression Eq. 3.4.
yi,d = α+βi,1∗T+βi,2∗T 2+
6∑
n=3
βi,n∗DOWn+
17∑
n=7
βi,n∗MONn+βi,18∗MEX+βi,19∗FRA+i,d
(3.4)
where the independent variables are a linear (T ), and a quadratic time-trend (T 2), four day-
of-the-week dummies (DOWn), and 11 month dummies (MONn). Further to address sudden
changes in USD quoted depth I include a dummy variable for stocks and their cross-listed
counterpart from France (FRA) and Mexico (MEX), which is set to 1 after 2007-02-17
(2009-09-28).14 Results of these regressions are unreported and available upon request.
Panel A and B of Table 3.3 report pairwise Pearson and Spearman rank time-series corre-
lations between these adjusted series of daily estimates of arbitrage activity, liquidity and order
imbalance. Time-series correlations are estimated over the whole sample per stock, and then
averaged across all stocks in the sample. The percentage of stocks for which the correlation is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level is given in parenthesis.
The average stock Pearson (Spearman) correlation betweenOpportunity-Proﬁt and Traded-
Proﬁt is 64% (69%) and positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all stocks. Both measures
are also positively correlated to the velocity (albeit weaker at around 10% to 14%), and signif-
icantly so for 61% to 78% of all stocks. All three (inverse) measures of arbitrage activity are
positively correlated to both PQSPR for the ADR and the home-market share with coefﬁcients
around 20%, and with around 75% of all coefﬁcients positive and signiﬁcant. Further both
Opportunity-Proﬁt and Traded-Proﬁt are positively correlated to OIB, albeit weaker (around
5%) and only around 40% of the coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcant.
The rather strong positive correlations between the difference in the highest bid and the
lowest ask price across the home- and the host-market share (i.e. Opportunity-Proﬁt) and
quoted spreads are somewhat surprising, because mechanically an increase in the spread in
either the home- or the host-market would lower Opportunity-Proﬁt. However, the ﬁnding
supports the notion of Opportunity-Proﬁt as an inverse measure of arbitrage activity, because
illiquidity hampers arbitrage one would expect less arbitrage activity when illiquidity is high.
Of course, correlations do not account for the joined dynamics between arbitrage activity,
liquidity and OIB, for this I estimate vector autoregressions in the next subsection.
14 USD depth for stocks from France, and Mexico dropped by a factor of 100 on the 27-Feb-2007 and the
28-Sep-2009, respectively.
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Table 3.3 – Whole sample correlations of daily arbitrage activity, quoted spread, and order imbalance
This table reports the average of the time-series correlations (estimated by stock over the whole sample) be-
tween the following daily measures: Opportunity-Proﬁt (Opportunity), Traded-Proﬁt(Traded), velocity at which
Opportunity-Proﬁt increase before an arbitrage trade (Velocity), home- and host-market proportional quoted
spread (PQSPR Home, and PQSPR Host), home- and host-market order imbalance (OIB Home, and OIB Host).
For a description of these variables I refer to Table 2.1. All variables are detrended, i.e. residuals of Eq. 3.4 are
used. All measures are computed during the overlapping trading times only, i.e. when both the home- and host-
market share are trading. Panel A (Panel B) reports Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation coefﬁcients averaged
across all individual stock estimates and in parenthesis the percentage of how many estimates are positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All data underlying the computations are from TRTH.
Panel A: Pearson correlations
Opportunity Traded Velocity PQSPR Home PQSPR Host OIB Home
Traded 64.16
(100.00)
Velocity 9.91 14.04
(61.11) (62.50)
PQSPR Home 21.31 20.22 16.49
(80.56) (79.17) (68.06)
PQSPR Host 20.54 24.19 18.55 47.26
(79.17) (80.56) (79.17) (95.83)
OIB Home 6.65 3.21 1.16 -0.35 3.81
(45.83) (30.56) (6.94) (19.44) (43.06)
OIB Host 6.39 4.57 1.16 2.50 0.16 14.76
(44.44) (33.33) (5.56) (33.33) (34.72) (88.89)
Panel B: Spearman correlations
Opportunity Traded Velocity PQSPR Home PQSPR Host OIB Home
Traded 68.82
(100.00)
Velocity 11.76 14.26
(63.89) (63.89)
PQSPR Home 19.88 20.36 19.72
(77.78) (77.78) (79.17)
PQSPR Host 20.32 23.41 21.87 48.89
(73.61) (69.44) (77.78) (94.44)
OIB Home 6.22 2.03 0.46 -4.01 0.23
(44.44) (29.17) (9.72) (11.11) (26.39)
OIB Host 6.77 4.66 0.40 0.04 -4.00 12.76
(50.00) (36.11) (6.94) (27.78) (22.22) (90.28)
38_Erim Rösch stand.job
The impact of arbitrage on market liquidity 63
3.4.2 Stock level: Impulse response functions of arbitrage activity and
liquidity.
Vector autoregressions (VARs) regress each variable on lagged versions of itself and on lagged
versions of all other variables in the system. As such using VARs allows addressing endogene-
ity issues from contemporaneous regressions, where all variables are likely to have a causal
impact on each other. This is likely the case between liquidity and arbitrage activity, because
ﬁrst liquidity encourages arbitrage activity, and second arbitrageurs might trade against net
order imbalance, improving liquidity.
Further the impact of arbitrage on liquidity does not need to be contemporaneous alone.
O’Hara and Oldﬁeld (1986) and Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) provide theoretical and empir-
ical evidence that overnight inventories affect future liquidity. If arbitrageurs trade against net
market demand, an increase in arbitrage activity might lead to a lower order imbalance, which
could predict an increase in liquidity.
An impulse response function (IRF) estimated from a VAR tracks the response on one
variable from an impulse to another variable and hence allows investigating longer term be-
havior from variables that are jointly determined. Using the Cholesky decomposition to calcu-
late orthogonalized impulse responses an IRF also allows estimating contemporaneous effects.
But because in the Cholesky decomposition a variable only has a contemporaneous effect on
other variables, if it enters the system of equations before the other variables, theory needs to
guide the ordering of the variables (Doan, 2010). By construction Opportunity-Proﬁt (Eq. 3.1)
is negatively correlated to quoted spread, however, Table 3.3 indicates a positive correlation
across the daily measures and as such Table 3.3 indicates only a weak contemporaneous effect
of quoted spread on Opportunity-Proﬁt. In the following I hence ﬁx the order to Opportunity-
Proﬁt, home market liquidity, and last ADR liquidity, the same order as used in Roll et al.
(2007). However, to rule out that results are driven by the ordering of the variables I also
estimate IRFs using all the other ﬁve possible permutations of the order of the input variables,
qualitatively leaving the results unchanged.
In the following I estimate a stock speciﬁc (and later a panel) VAR with ﬁve lags (moti-
vated below) and endogenous variables as Opportunity-Proﬁt (πt), proportional quoted spread
of the home-market share (Homeλt) and proportional quoted spread of the host-market ADR
38_Erim Rösch stand.job
64 Chapter 3
(Hostλt) as given in Eq 3.5.15
πt =
5∑
d=1
β1,1,d ∗ πt−d +
5∑
d=1
β1,2,d ∗Homeλt−d +
5∑
d=1
β1,3,d ∗Hostλt−d + 1,t
(3.5a)
Homeλt =
5∑
d=1
β2,1,d ∗ πt−d +
5∑
d=1
β2,2,d ∗Homeλt−d +
5∑
d=1
β2,3,d ∗Hostλt−d + 2,t
(3.5b)
Hostλt =
5∑
d=1
β3,1,d ∗ πt−d +
5∑
d=1
β3,2,d ∗Homeλt−d +
5∑
d=1
β3,3,d ∗Hostλt−d + 3,t
(3.5c)
As mentioned before, all variables are estimated during the overlapping periods only and
are ﬁrst expunged of deterministic time trends and other calendar regularities (i.e. residuals
from Eq.3.4 are used). Further these series are winsorized at the 1% level, i.e. for each stock
the lowest (highest) 1% are set to the 1st (99th) percentile.16 To estimate the responses in
standard deviations I further standardize each series, i.e. from each observation I subtract the
time series mean and divide each observation by the series standard deviation. For compara-
bility across stocks, the lag-length for each VAR is ﬁxed to ﬁve. The lag-length was chosen
by ﬁrst using the Akaike information criteria separately for each stock, which yields a lag-
length between one and ten days. A good choice seems ﬁve days, which is around the median
lag-length, and one working week.
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports Granger causality tests. I ﬁnd that for more than half of all
stocks I cannot reject the null hypothesis that Opportunity-Proﬁt Granger causes home- and
host-market quoted spread. Similarly, I ﬁnd that for the majority of both the home and host-
market shares quoted spread Granger causes Opportunity-Proﬁt. Of course, Granger causality
tests are based on a single equation and do not account for the full dynamics of the VAR,
something that impulse response functions (IRFs) do.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the contemporaneous and cumulative impulse response after
ﬁve days (i.e. the sum of the day-to-day responses) to a one standard deviation shock to the
causal variable. Because the VAR is estimated on standardized data the IRF measures the
response in standard deviations.
For the average stock a positive shock of one standard deviation to Opportunity-Proﬁt
15 I only add order imbalance in the later part when I estimate VARs at the exchange level. Adding order
imbalance to the per stock VARs only marginally changes the results.
16 Using non-winsorized data does not affect results for developed home markets (the U.K., France, and
Germany) and results for emerging markets (Brazil and Mexico) remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 3.4 – Stock impulse response functions, 1996 - 2013
This table reports results from stock-level vector autoregressions (VARs). VARs are estimated using 5-lags and
time-series of daily arbitrage activity, and home- and host-market proportional quoted spread. I use Opportunity-
Proﬁt as an inverse proxy for arbitrage activity. All time-series are detrended and expunged from other calendar
regularities (i.e. the residuals from regression Eq. 3.4 are used). For a description of these variables I refer to
Table 2.1. Panel A of this table reports Granger causality tests: the percentage of stocks for which the null hy-
pothesis that the coefﬁcients of the column variable are jointly equal to zero when explaining the row variable
is rejected at the 5% level. Panel B of this table report impulse response functions (IRFs), the contemporaneous
effect (d = 0) and the effect after ﬁve days (d = 5) of a Cholesky one standard-deviation shock to Opportunity-
Proﬁt on home- and host-market share proportional quoted spread: the cross-sectional average, minimum, max-
imum, and the 25th, 50th (median), and 75th percentile. The ﬁrst three rows of Panel B report the responses in
standard-deviations to a one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt, the next three rows to a shock to
home-market share quoted spread (PQSPR Home), and the last three rows to a shock to host-market share quoted
spread (PQSPR Host). The second column (%Sig+) gives the percentage of stocks for which the response is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (based on bootstrapped error bands from 1000 runs). Similarly, Panel C
and Panel D report IRFs using Traded-Proﬁt and Velocity as alternative proxies for arbitrage activity. Signiﬁcance
of the cross-sectional average response at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Granger causality test (% of stocks for which column variable Granger causes row variable)
Opportunity-Proﬁt PQSPR Home PQSPR Host
Opportunity-Proﬁt 52 61
PQSPR Home 45 77
PQSPR Host 56 72
Panel B: cumulative IRF responses
after shock %Sig+ avg min 25% Median 75% max
effect of one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 100 0.77*** 0.35 0.65 0.84 0.93 1.00
d = 5 100 1.53*** 0.78 1.41 1.54 1.71 1.90
PQSPR Home d = 0 81 0.09*** -0.15 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.24
d = 5 76 0.25*** -0.24 0.15 0.26 0.36 0.73
PQSPR Host d = 0 48 0.03*** -0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12
d = 5 51 0.13*** -0.27 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.45
effect of one standard deviation shock to PQSPR Home on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 37 0.07*** -0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.14 0.41
PQSPR Home d = 0 100 0.68*** 0.31 0.59 0.70 0.80 0.92
d = 5 100 1.58*** 0.88 1.46 1.63 1.70 1.87
PQSPR Host d = 0 94 0.11*** 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.23
d = 5 94 0.39*** 0.03 0.30 0.40 0.49 0.74
effect of one standard deviation shock to PQSPR Host on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 45 0.08*** -0.27 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.38
PQSPR Home d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 70 0.13*** -0.15 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.40
PQSPR Host d = 0 100 0.56*** 0.25 0.44 0.57 0.69 0.79
d = 5 100 1.41*** 0.72 1.23 1.46 1.62 1.91
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predicts a contemporaneous increase in home- and host-market quoted spreads of 0.09 and
0.03 standard deviations which increases to 0.25 and 0.13 standard deviations after ﬁve days.
Further a shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt results in a cumulative impulse response in home- and
host-market quoted spread that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for 76% and 51% of
all stocks.
In the working paper version underlying this Chapter I repeat above analysis using Traded-
Proﬁt and Velocity as alternative (inverse) proxies for arbitrage activity. In both cases I ﬁnd
that a positive shock to arbitrage activity (i.e., a negative shock to either of the two proxies)
predicts a statistically signiﬁcant increase in liquidity for most stocks. After a positive shock
to arbitrage activity, the average ADR quoted spreads increases by 0.24 standard deviations,
when using Traded-Proﬁt, and by 0.15 standard deviations, when using Velocity as the proxy
for arbitrage activity. The effect on home-market quoted spread is similar to Opportunity-
Proﬁt when using Traded-Proﬁt as a proxy for arbitrage activity (0.23 standard deviations),
but somewhat weaker when using Velocity (0.15 standard deviations).
In an unreported robustness test I control for volatility as one other important driver of
liquidity in the VAR used to construct the impulse response functions. This leaves the main
results from Table 3.4 unchanged.
Consistent with theory and with the ﬁndings that most price deviations (around 70%)
arise as a result of demand shocks, results in this subsection indicate that an increase in arbi-
trage activity predicts an increase in liquidity (lower quoted spreads). However, the question
remains if arbitrage has any causal impact on liquidity. Arbitrageurs might be able to pre-
dict general changes in liquidity and in anticipation of an increase in illiquidity or funding
constraints step out of the market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this case liquidity would
deteriorate, regardless of whether arbitrageurs step out of the market or decide to continue to
be active. Alternatively, arbitrageurs might directly inﬂuence liquidity, for example through
cross-sectional market making (Holden, 1995). In other words, one concern might be that an
omitted variable [such as funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008)] could drive
the predictive power of arbitrage activity on market liquidity. To investigate this question,
in the next subsection, I look at intraday differences in liquidity with and without arbitrage
activity.
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3.4.3 Stock level: Impulse response functions of arbitrage activity and
liquidity differences during and outside overlapping trading times.
In the Depositary Receipt market the same stock can often be observed with and without
arbitrage activity (i.e. during and outside overlapping trading hours, as depicted by Figure 3.1).
For Mexico and Brazil, however, the opening hours of the home market almost exactly overlap
with the opening hours of the host market (NYSE) and hence I do not consider both markets
in the following.
For the home market I examine differences in proportional quoted spread during the over-
lapping trading time and from 11 UTC (to avoid the general effects of the opening period)
until the host market opens. In a similar way I look at differences in proportional quoted
spread during the overlapping time and afterwards (till 17 UTC, to avoid the general effects of
the closing period) for the host market. Like in the previous section these series are ﬁrst ad-
justed for time trends and calendar regularities, i.e. residuals from individual stock regressions
Eq.3.4, are used.
By using the residuals from regressions in which the differences in illiquidity during and
outside overlapping trading hours is explained by an intercept, a time trend and other calen-
dar regularities, I especially remove any general differences in illiquidity across the same day.
Hence, if arbitrageurs would predict a general decline in liquidity and in anticipation with-
draw from the markets, differences in liquidity across the same day should be around zero.
However, if arbitrageurs provide liquidity the difference in liquidity between overlapping and
non-overlapping trading hours should decrease, on and after days arbitrageurs get less active.
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports Granger causality tests. For around 19 out of the 44 home/host-
market pairs (i.e. 43%) I ﬁnd that I cannot reject that Opportunity-Proﬁt Granger causes the
differences in quoted spread during and outside overlapping trading times in the home-market
stock (and similar for 52% for the host-market stock).
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the contemporaneous and cumulative impulse response after
ﬁve days (i.e. the sum of the day-to-day responses) to a one standard deviation shock to the
causal variable.
For example, for the average stock a positive shock of one standard deviation toOpportunity-
Proﬁt predicts a contemporaneous increase in the difference in home- and host-market quoted
spreads of 0.07 and 0.02 standard deviations which increases to 0.10 and 0.06 standard de-
viations after ﬁve days. In other words, if arbitrageurs get less active (a positive shock to
Opportunity-Proﬁt) liquidity deteriorates during the overlapping trading times relative to the
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Table 3.5 – Stock impulse response functions between and outside overlapping trading times
This table reports results from stock-level vector autoregressions (VARs) using all 44 home/host-market pairs
from France, Germany, and the U.K. VARs are estimated using 5-lags and time-series of daily arbitrage activity,
and the difference in proportional quoted spread between and outside overlapping trading times for the home- and
the host-market (ΔPQSPR Home and ΔPQSPR Host). I use Opportunity-Proﬁt as an inverse proxy for arbitrage
activity. All time-series are detrended and expunged from other calendar regularities (i.e. the residuals from
regression Eq. 3.4 are used). For a description of these variables I refer to Table 2.1. Panel A of this table reports
Granger causality tests: the percentage of stocks for which the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of the column
variable are jointly equal to zero when explaining the row variable is rejected at the 5% level. Panel B of this table
report the contemporaneous effect (d = 0) and the effect after ﬁve days (d = 5) of a Cholesky one standard-
deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt on home- and host-market share proportional quoted spread: the cross-
sectional average, minimum, maximum, and the 25th, 50th (median), and 75th percentile. The ﬁrst three rows of
Panel B report the responses in standard-deviations to a one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt, the
next three rows to a shock to the difference in home-market share quoted spread during and outside overlapping
trading times (ΔPQSPR Home), and the last three rows to a shock to the difference in host-market share quoted
spread during and outside overlapping trading times (ΔPQSPR Host). The second column (%Sig+) gives the
percentage of stocks for which the response is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (based on bootstrapped
error bands from 1000 runs). Signiﬁcance of the cross-sectional average response at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Granger causality test (% of stocks for which column variable Granger causes row variable)
cause: Opportunity-Proﬁt ΔPQSPR Home ΔPQSPR Host
Opportunity-Proﬁt 50 47
ΔPQSPR Home 43 50
ΔPQSPR Host 52 45
Panel B: cumulative IRF responses
after shock %Sig+ avg min 25% Median 75% max
effect of one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 100 0.70*** 0.35 0.54 0.71 0.88 0.98
d = 5 100 1.56*** 0.80 1.44 1.57 1.76 1.96
ΔPQSPR Home d = 0 63 0.07*** 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.17
d = 5 47 0.10*** -0.09 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.24
ΔPQSPR Host d = 0 31 0.02*** -0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10
d = 5 34 0.06** -0.25 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.36
effect of one standard deviation shock to ΔPQSPR Home on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 0 -0.05*** -0.19 -0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.09
ΔPQSPR Home d = 0 100 0.97*** 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
d = 5 100 1.25*** 0.94 1.11 1.24 1.34 1.64
ΔPQSPR Host d = 0 9 0.02*** -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08
d = 5 11 0.03** -0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.10 0.29
effect of one standard deviation shock to ΔPQSPR Host on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 9 0.00 -0.21 -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.15
ΔPQSPR Home d = 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
d = 5 18 0.01 -0.19 -0.06 0.02 0.08 0.28
ΔPQSPR Host d = 0 100 0.91*** 0.71 0.89 0.92 0.97 1.01
d = 5 100 1.54*** 1.17 1.37 1.61 1.70 1.79
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non-overlapping trading times, i.e the difference in quoted spreads during and outside over-
lapping trading times increases. While these effects are relatively small, for most of the stocks
these effects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. For example, for 47% of all stocks
I ﬁnd that the difference in home market spread statistically signiﬁcantly increases after a
positive shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt.
In the working paper version underlying this Chapter I repeat above analysis using both
alternative proxies for arbitrage activity, i.e. Traded-Proﬁt and Velocity, respectively. In both
cases impulse response functions indicate that a positive shock to either of the two proxies
predicts an increase in quoted spreads, for most stocks and for the average stock. However,
the effect is slightly smaller and varies from 0.02 to 0.09 standard deviations, for the impact
of Velocity on the host- and the home-market stock, respectively. One potential reason for the
somewhat weaker effects using the measures based on trade prices (Panel C and D), is that I
cannot construct these measures for many stock-days, because of missing simultaneous trades.
This is a problem primarily at the beginning of the sample.
Previous research investigated differences in host-market quoted spreads during and out-
side overlapping trading times. For example, Werner and Kleidon (1996) ﬁnd that quoted
spreads in 1991 are higher during than outside overlapping trading times, but Moulton and
Wei (2009) ﬁnd the opposite using data from 2003. Because illiquidity during the opening
and closing period is often elevated, and the overlapping trading time for the home- and host-
market coincides with its closing and with its opening period, in segmented markets one would
expect illiquidity of both the home as well as the host-market to be higher during the overlap
than outside. On the other hand, if both markets were integrated, differences in illiquidity dur-
ing or outside overlapping trading hours should be minimal (illustrated in Figure 2 of Werner
and Kleidon (1996)). Because an increase in arbitrage activity decreases the difference in
illiquidity during and outside overlapping trading times, above results provide support that
arbitrage improves market integration. Further the increase in arbitrage activity over the years
provide one explanation for the opposing ﬁndings in Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Moulton
and Wei (2009).
In this section I exploit the fact that every day I observe each stock with and without
arbitrage activity. This allows me to control for any omitted variables that would equally affect
liquidity throughout the day. However, this approach does not control for other variables that
speciﬁcally would affect liquidity during the overlapping trading times.
To address this concern I estimate a ﬁxed-effect panel regression in the next subsection.
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3.4.4 Fixed-effect panel VAR and impulse response functions of arbi-
trage activity and liquidity.
One way to deal with omitted variables is to use a ﬁxed-effect panel regression. For example,
if time-varying funding liquidity inﬂuences stock speciﬁc arbitrage activity and liquidity this
could cause an omitted variable bias. If, however, funding liquidity affects stocks equally
adding time-ﬁxed effects will control for the stock-invariant differences in time. Similarly, I
can control for time-invariant heterogeneity by using individual-ﬁxed effects.
In this subsection I estimate a panel VAR with individual and time ﬁxed effects. Because
I have many more (daily) observations over time than across stocks using Arellano-Bond
estimation in the dynamic panel is not necessary. As before the lag-length of the panel VAR
is ﬁve.
To reduce the impact of having an unbalanced panel I only focus on data from 2003 to
2013, this ensures that each day I observe at least 13 stocks, and on average 54 stocks per day.
This also ensures that I can construct both proxies for arbitrage activity based on simultaneous
trades for 85% of all stock-days. As before the endogenous variables are a proxy for arbitrage
activity and home- and host-market quoted spread. All variables are winsorized at the 1%
level.
In Table 3.6 I report results of these panel VARs. In contrast to stock-by-stock VARs re-
ported in Table 3.4 where the columns reported cross-sectional summary statistics, in Table 3.6
columns report results across the three different proxies for arbitrage activity. For parsimony,
in Table 3.6 I only report the results of arbitrage activity as the causal variable.
Panel A of Table 3.6 reports Granger causality tests. These tests indicate that an increase
in Opportunity-Proﬁt Granger causes an increase in quoted spreads both in the home- and
host-market (except the null-hypothesis that Velocity does not Granger cause ADR PQSPR
could not be rejected at any reasonable conﬁdence level).
Results from impulse response functions support previous ﬁndings.17 The effect of a one
standard deviation shock to any of the three different (inverse) proxies for arbitrage activity
on quoted spread is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all cases, but one. The contempora-
neous effect on quoted spread of the home-market share range from 1.45 BP when measuring
arbitrage activity by Opportunity-Proﬁt to 0.65 BP when using Traded-Proﬁt. The cumulative
effect after ﬁve days is positive, and statistically signiﬁcant, in all cases and is 5.79 BP (when
17 Estimation is done using RATS software using generalized impulse responses, which are not sensitive to
the particular order of the endogenous variables (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). For details on estimation of the
error-bands and generalized impulse responses I refer to Chapter 3.1 and 5.2 in Doan (2010).
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Table 3.6 – Panel vector autoregression of arbitrage activity, and quoted spread, 2003 - 2013
This table reports results from three panel vector autoregressions. Panel vector autoregressions are estimated
using individual and time-ﬁxed effects and “arbitrage activity”, home- and host-market share proportional quoted
spread, with a lag-length of 5-lags. The ﬁrst column reports result from a VAR where arbitrage activity is proxied
by Opportunity-Proﬁt. The next (last) column report result from a VAR where arbitrage activity is proxied by
Traded-Proﬁt (velocity). For a description of these variables I refer to Table 2.1. Panel A of this table reports
Granger causality tests: the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of “arbitrage activity” are jointly equal to zero
when explaining the row variable. The ﬁrst row reports the test statistic (χ25 (All coeffs. = 0)), whether all
coefﬁcients are jointly equal to zero and the next row the associate p-value. Panel B of this table report the
contemporaneous effect (d = 0) and the effect after ﬁve days (d = 5) of a one standard deviation shock to
“arbitrage activity” on home- and host-market share proportional quoted spread using the generalized Cholesky
decomposition. Two stars in parentheses after the coefﬁcient indicate if the estimate is more than two standard
deviations away from zero (using Montecarlo simulations based on 1000 draws). The last row indicates the
number of observations in each of the three different VARs. All data underlying the computations are from
TRTH.
Panel A: Granger causality test of arbitrage activity on:
Opportunity-Proﬁt Traded-Proﬁt Velocity
PQSPR Home χ25 (All coeffs. = 0) 29.45 46.70 32.56
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
PQSPR Host χ25 (All coeffs. = 0) 31.94 32.62 5.21
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.39
Panel B: cumulative IRF responses
Days after shock Opportunity-Proﬁt Traded-Proﬁt Velocity
effect of one standard deviation shock to arbitrage activity on:
PQSPR Home d = 0 1.45(**) 0.65(**) 0.90(**)
d = 5 5.79(**) 1.92(**) 3.12(**)
PQSPR Host d = 0 -0.18() 1.03(**) 0.64(**)
d = 5 1.64(**) 3.36(**) 2.11(**)
No. of obs. 121,939 88,619 88,619
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measuring arbitrage activity by Opportunity-Proﬁt), 1.92 BP (for Traded-Proﬁt), and 3.12 BP
(for Velocity). The effects are similar, but slightly attenuated for the host-market ADR quoted
spreads.
Table 3.6 indicates that if arbitrage activity increases (by one standard deviation) quoted
spread contemporaneously decreases by around 1 BP, and decreases by around 2 to 6 BP after
ﬁve days. Considering that, for example, for UK stocks the average quoted spread in 2013 is
just 6BP with a standard deviation of 3BP, an cumulative effect of around 2 BP after ﬁve days
seems large.
A different way to establish the contemporaneous effect of arbitrage activity and liquidity
is to use an instrument.
3.4.5 Days between corporate actions as an instrument
Because of endogeneity issues between arbitrage activity and liquidity including contempo-
raneous variables in the vector regressions of the previous subsections would lead to biased
estimates. There I used the Cholesky decomposition to estimate the contemporaneous effect
between arbitrage activity and liquidity.
An alternative approach to the Cholesky decomposition is to ﬁnd a variable that is corre-
lated with arbitrage activity, but not directly correlated with liquidity, i.e. an instrument.
While it is challenging to motivate and statistically impossible to verify that both assump-
tions hold, as a suitable candidate I propose a dummy variable that is one on days after the
ex-date of one asset, but before the ex-date of the other asset.
For example, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) paid out a stock dividend with ex-date of
May 15, 2008, and for the ADR a cash-dividend of USD 0.674089 with ex-date of May 29,
2008.18 Accordingly, price gaps between May 15 and May 28 spiked with an average of USD
0.92 of the daily maximum difference between the bid of the ADR and the currency adjusted
ask of the home-market.
While these large Opportunity-Proﬁt (of almost 20%) do not reﬂect possible arbitrage
proﬁts (and hence I drop these days for the other analyses), these days are likely characterized
by lower arbitrage activity, because of additional risk. Consider the simplest case in which
holders of the home-market share receive a cash dividend. In this case the ﬁnal dividend
18 In detail, during the annual meeting on May 14, 2008 shareholders approved a distribution of rights, which
was not registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933. As such these rights could not be passed on to
ADR holders. Instead the Depository Bank sold of these rights in the home market and passed on the proceeds
to the ADR holders as a special dividend.
43_Erim Rösch stand.job
The impact of arbitrage on market liquidity 73
payment for the ADR holder depends on the exchange rate between USD and the currency
of the home-market after the payment date of the dividend in the home-market, in general
weeks after the ex-date. Thus, the arbitrageur introduces uncertainty when adjusting prices
for the corporate action to compute their proﬁts, making arbitrage more risky (or costly if this
additional risk would be hedged away).
As such it is not surprising that during these days Opportunity-Proﬁt are especially high
even after adjusting quotes by corporate actions (with the exact adjustment factor only known
ex-post): The average Opportunity-Proﬁt on these days from 1996 to 2004 (calculated from
prices adjusted by corporate actions) is 4.8%, more than four times the cost-adjusted, absolute
price deviation reported by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b). After adjusting the quotes by the
dividend payment in the example before (i.e. subtracting USD 0.674089 from all bid and
ask quotes of the ADR), Opportunity-Proﬁt are USD 0.24, almost 5% and double and more
than three standard deviations higher than the average Opportunity-Proﬁt for RBS in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2008. It is particular interesting to note thatOpportunity-Proﬁt from adjusted quotes
monotonically declined from around USD 0.38 on May 15 (the ex-date of RBS) to USD 0.10
on May 28 (one day before the ex-date of its ADR), indicating uncertainty of the ﬁnal cash
dividend for the ADR holder.
However, it is likely that liquidity on these days is also directly inﬂuenced by the cor-
porate action, after all one reason why a stock splits is to improve liquidity (Muscarella and
Vetsuypens, 1996). To address this I do not look at the liquidity by itself but rather at the
difference in liquidity during and outside times in which arbitrage takes place (as in Subsec-
tion 3.4.3). As before I do not consider home-market stocks from Mexico or Brazil, because
their trading times overlap with those of the host-market (the NYSE).
In this section I estimate two-stage regressions as given below:
AAi,d = ζDi,d + δControlsi,d +
∑
FEi +
∑
FEd + ηi,d (3.6a)
ΔPQSPRi,d = βÂAi,d + γControlsi,d +
∑
FEi +
∑
FEd + i,d (3.6b)
where AAi,d is a proxy for arbitrage activity for stock i on day d, and Di,d is a dummy vari-
able set to one for days after a corporate action occurred on the home-market, but before the
corporate action occured on the ADR (or vice versa) (the instrument). In the second equation
ΔPQSPRi,d is the difference in quoted spreads during and outside overlapping trading times
(for the home- or the host-market), ÂAi,d is the ﬁtted value from the ﬁrst equation (the ﬁrst
stage), Controlsi,d are control variables as described below, FEi and FEd are individual- and
time-ﬁxed effects. Like in the previous section these series are winsorized at the 1% level.
Table 3.7 shows the results of panel regressions using days between corporate actions
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Table 3.7 – Instrumental variable panel regression of arbitrage activity, and quoted spread, 2003 - 2013
This table reports results from ﬁve panel regressions using daily observations from 2003 to 2013, and all 44
home/host-market pairs from France, Germany, and the U.K. The ﬁrst column reports the “ﬁrst-stage” (for regres-
sions reported in column two and three) panel regression of regressing Opportunity-Proﬁt on a dummy variable,
which is set to one on days in which the home-market stock is ex- and the host-market stock is cum-dividend, or
vice versa (Days between corporate actions). The next four column report results from (second-stage) panel re-
gressions in whichDays between corporate actions serves as an instrument for Opportunity-Proﬁt. In column two
and four the dependent variable is the difference in quoted spread of the home-market share between and outside
overlapping trading times (ΔPQSPRHome). In column three and ﬁve the dependent variable is the difference
in quoted spread of the host-market share between and outside overlapping trading times (ΔPQSPRHost). The
time outside the overlapping trading time for the home-market share is from 11:00 UTC till the NYSE opens
and for the host-market share it is from the time the European market closes till 17:00 UTC. The independent
variables are the ﬁtted value of Opportunity-Proﬁt from the ﬁrst stage (Opportunity-Proﬁt∗), a dummy variable
set to one if a stock is from France (France), and if a stock is from Germany (Germany), the percentage of trades
in the home market scaled by the total number of trades during overlapping trading times across the home- and
host-market (TradesInEurope), and the difference in the number of trades between and outside overlapping trad-
ing times for the home- and host-market share (ΔTradesHome, and ΔTradesHost) as a percentage of the total
number of trades within the day on the home- and host-market share, respectively. The third (time-ﬁxed effects)
and second (individual-ﬁxed effects) to last row indicate if ﬁxed effects are applied. The last row indicates the
number of observations. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Newey and West (1994) t-statistics are given in parentheses. All data underlying the computations are from
TRTH.
Dependent Variable [BP]: Opportunity-
Proﬁt
ΔPQSPRHomeΔPQSPRHost ΔPQSPRHomeΔPQSPRHost
instrument: Days between corporate actions for Opportunity-Proﬁt
DaysBetweenCorpActions 111.93(***)
(25.09)
Opportunity-Proﬁt∗ [%] 4.44(***) 34.98(***) 0.44(***) 2.81(***)
(4.64) (4.87) (2.98) (5.72)
France 0.96(***) 4.88(***)
(13.84) (25.97)
Germany 0.05(*) 1.55(***)
(1.78) (10.74)
TradesInEurope [%] 0.16(***) -0.37(***)
(17.45) (-81.98)
ΔTradesHome[%] -0.15(***)
(-15.51)
ΔTradesHost[%] -0.16(***)
(-30.10)
time-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
individual-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes No No
No. of obs. 93,599 93,599 93,599 93,599 93,599
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as an instrument for arbitrage activity, i.e. results from estimating Eq. 3.6. I report both
a panel regression with stock ﬁxed effects (column two and three) and a panel regression
where instead of controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity by using stock ﬁxed-effects I use
exchange ﬁxed-effects and directly control for two popular explanations for the difference in
liquidity during and outside overlapping trading times (column four and ﬁve). In both cases I
use day-ﬁxed effects to control for stock-invariant differences over time.
Moulton and Wei (2009) examine two explanations for differences in liquidity during and
outside overlapping trading times: (i) concentrated trading, and (ii) increased competition.
Similar to Moulton and Wei (2009) I proxy the former by the difference between the number
of trades during and outside the overlapping trading times as a percentage of all trades for
both the home- (ΔTradesHome) and the host-market (ΔTradesHost). I proxy the competition
from the other exchange by the percentage of trades (during the overlapping trading times)
that occur on the home-market versus at the NYSE (TradesInEurope).
In all regressions the estimated slope coefﬁcient of Opportunity-Proﬁt is positive, and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In column two and three a 1% increase in Opportunity-
Proﬁt is associated with an increase in the difference between quoted spreads during and
outside overlapping trading times of 4.44 basis points for the home-market and 34.98 BP for
the ADR. Even after controlling for alternative explanations for the difference in spreads, a
1% increase in Opportunity-Proﬁt is associated with an increase in spreads of 0.44 BP for the
home-market and 2.81 BP for the ADR. These effects seem economically signiﬁcant, as on
average the difference between quoted spreads during and outside overlapping trading times
for the home-market share (ADR) is just -2 BP (-4BP) with a standard deviation of just 8 BP (6
BP) (from Table 2.1). These results indicate that if arbitrage activity increases (Opportunity-
Proﬁt declines) liquidity improves during the time arbitrageurs are active (during overlapping
trading times the quotes spread declines) relative to when they are not active.
The estimated slope coefﬁcients for both controls have the expected signs. For example,
column ﬁve indicates that a 1% increase in trading in the home-market, an increase in com-
petition for liquidity providers in the host-market (TradesInEurope), is associated with a
decrease of 0.37 BP in the difference in quoted spreads between and outside overlapping trad-
ing times for the ADR, so that liquidity during the overlap improves (relative to outside the
overlap).
For robustness, in unreported tests I use Traded-Proﬁt as an alternative measure of arbi-
trage activity and get similar results.19 To ensure that above results are not driven by stock
19 Note that the velocity at which Opportunity-Proﬁt increase before an arbitrage trade cannot be reliably
estimated during these days, because Opportunity-Proﬁt do not reﬂect possible arbitrage proﬁts.
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splits, in an unreported robustness test I exclude days after corporate actions that are not div-
idend payments and instead of a dummy variable I use the dividend yield (dividend payment
divided by the stock price) as an alternative instrumental variable. In both cases the main
results are unchanged. Because so far the main results are consistent across all three different
proxies for arbitrage activity, for parsimony, in the following I focus on Opportunity-Proﬁt as
the main proxy for arbitrage activity. In unreported tests I used the other two measures, which
does not change the main results.
In the next subsection I estimate impulse response functions at the exchange level, i.e. by
ﬁrst averaging stock speciﬁc estimates across all stocks from the same exchange. This sheds
light on if predictability of liquidity by arbitrage activity shares a common component or is
purely idiosyncratic (i.e. stock speciﬁc).
3.4.6 Exchange level: Impulse response functions of arbitrage activity
and liquidity.
In this section I estimate vector autoregressions on the exchange level, i.e. by ﬁrst averaging
stock speciﬁc estimates across all stocks from the same exchange. Previous research pro-
vides empirical evidence that both the liquidity and the efﬁciency of single stocks improve
and deteriorate at the same time (Chordia et al., 2000; Karolyi et al., 2012; Ro¨sch et al.,
2015). Aggregating stock speciﬁc price deviations at the exchange level should reduce noise
and other stock speciﬁc variations. Especially, periods during which stock-speciﬁc arbitrage
opportunities mainly arise as a result of differences in information so that arbitrageurs would
lower liquidity, could be diversiﬁed at the exchange level (compare, e.g. Lai et al. (2014)). In
this case predictability between arbitrage activity and liquidity should be even stronger at the
market level than at the stock level.
In addition to former impulse response functions onOpportunity-Proﬁt and quoted spread,
at the market level, I include a proxy for market demand, namely order imbalance, the absolute
difference between the number of buyer and seller initiated trades.
If arbitrageurs trade against net market demand, as would be the case if price deviations
arise as a result of demand shocks, a decrease in arbitrage activity should increase net order
imbalances. The increase in order imbalances could then lead to a decline in contemporaneous
and future liquidity (O’Hara and Oldﬁeld, 1986; Chordia et al., 2002; Comerton-Forde et al.,
2010).
Instead of tabulating the contemporaneous and cumulative ﬁve-day responses to a shock
to arbitrage activity (as before), I now report graphs to highlight the day-to-day effect.
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Figure 3.2 – Responses from shocks to Opportunity-Proﬁt on home and cross-listed quoted spreads and
order imbalance, 2003- 2013
This ﬁgure shows impulse response functions (IRF) from vector autoregression (VAR) estimated on exchange
level (i.e. equally-weighted averages across all stocks in the sample from a given exchange) daily Opportunity-
Proﬁt, absolute net order imbalance in the home market (OIB Home), absolute net order imbalance in the cross-
listed market (OIB Host), and average proportional quoted spread in the home- and host-market (PQSPR Home
and PQSPR Host). For a description of these variables I refer to Table 2.1. All timeseries are detrended and
expunged from other calendar regularities (i.e. residuals of regression Eq. 3.4) The lag length of each VAR is
chosen individually (for each exchange) based on the Akaike information criterion. IRF are estimated for each
different exchange (in columns) separately. All IRF show responses in standard deviations measured to Cholesky
one standard-deviation shocks to Opportunity-Proﬁt. All variables are measured during the overlapping trading
time, i.e. when both the home market and the cross-listed market are in their continuous trading session. Each
ﬁgure shows bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence bands based on 1000 runs (lower, upper). All data underlying the
computations are from TRTH.
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Figure 3.2 shows impulse response functions (IRFs) estimated from vector autoregres-
sions onOpportunity-Proﬁt, home and ADR order imbalance and proportional quoted spreads.
These impulse response functions have been estimated by exchange (column). For parsimony
Figure 3.2 only reports IRFs from shocks toOpportunity-Proﬁt. The x-axis tracks the response
through time starting from 1 (the contemporaneous effect) till the n-th day, the lag-length of
the VAR, which was chosen by Akaike information criteria individually for each exchange
and varies from 8 for Germany to 12 for Mexico.
As before, for each individual stock all ﬁve series are ﬁrst detrended (i.e. residuals from
Eg. 3.4 are used), and winsorized at the 1% level. I then take the equal weighted average across
all stocks from a given exchange and standardize each series. These adjusted series on market
Opportunity-Proﬁt, order imbalance, and quoted spread are the input series for the VAR, and of
this order. The order is motivated by: First, Table 3.2 indicates that most price deviations arise
because of a demand shock, and hence arbitrage activity should contemporaneously affect
market order imbalance. This motivates using Opportunity-Proﬁt as the ﬁrst variable. Second,
previous literature indicates that order imbalance has a contemporaneous effect on market
liquidity (Chordia et al., 2002). This motivates the order between measures of order imbalance
and measures of market liquidity.
The ﬁrst (second) row of Figure 3.2 shows the effect (y-axis) of an orthogonalized, one-
standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt on home-market (ADR) order imbalance by
day (x-axis). Similar, the third (last) row of Figure 3.2 show the effect on home-market (ADR)
quoted spread.
In all but one case the IRF is positive and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst few days after the shock,
then decreases and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. The negative slope in the IRFs indicates
previous Dickey-Fuller tests (untabulated) that reject the existence of a unit-root in the adjusted
series at the 1% level in all cases.
A one standard deviation shock toOpportunity-Proﬁt leads to a contemporaneous increase
in order imbalance of the home-market share (from 0.10 standard deviations in the U.K. to
0.03 in France), order imbalance of the ADR (from 0.10 in Brazil to 0.03 in France), quoted
spread of the home-market (from 0.20 in Germany and the U.K. to 0.01 in Mexico), and
quoted spread of the ADR (from 0.13 in Germany to 0.03 in France). One day after the shock
the effect on order imbalance and quoted spread remains positive in all but one cases, and
statistically signiﬁcant except for order imbalance of the home-market in France and Mexico,
and for quoted spread of the home-market (ADR) in Mexico (France).
This indicates that a positive shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt (a decrease in arbitrage activ-
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ity) predicts an increase in order imbalance and quoted spread contemporaneously and over
the next few days, and provides evidence that arbitrageurs trade against market demand and
thereby improve liquidity.
The effect of arbitrage activity at the exchange-level is much stronger than at the individual
stock-level. For the average stock a positive shock of one standard deviation to Opportunity-
Proﬁt predicts an increase in home- and host-market quoted spreads of 0.25 and 0.13 standard
deviations after ﬁve days (from Table 3.4). For the average exchange the impact almost dou-
bles and increases to around 0.35 and 0.20 standard deviations for the home- and host-market
quoted spread and can be as high as 0.5 standard deviations for the home-market quoted spread
in Brazil, the U.K., and Germany. By aggregating estimations at the exchange-level noise and
other stock-speciﬁc variation is reduced, which potentially can explain the difference in mag-
nitudes.
I unreported robustness tests I use effective spread, quoted depth, and the standard devia-
tion of the pricing error (Hasbrouck, 1993) as alternative measures of market quality and both
Traded-Proﬁt and the velocity as alternative measures of arbitrage activity. In all cases the
results are similar.
The results are also robust for using a slightly different time period and a different order
of the endogeneous variables (as reported in a previous version of this paper). Using data from
2001 till 2011 with the default order the shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt results in a cumulative
signiﬁcant response (at the 5% level) after 5-days for quoted spread, effective spread, and
quoted depth in 22 out of the 30 cases (three variables times ﬁve exchanges, for both the home
market and the ADR). Estimating IRFs with the reverse order in which Opportunity-Proﬁt is
last, indicates that a positive shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt predicts an cumulative increase in
illiquidity (quoted spread, effective spread, and quoted depth) in 26 out of 30 cases and 15 of
these are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
3.5 Does arbitrage improve market liquidity the more price
deviations arise as a result of demand shocks?
Theory predicts that if arbitrage opportunities arise as a result of demand shocks arbitrageurs
act as a “cross-sectional market maker” (Holden, 1995) and thereby improve market liquid-
ity. So far the empirical results are consistent with this argumentation, I ﬁrst ﬁnd that most
price deviations arise as a result of demand shocks (around 70% from Table 3.2), and then
impulse response functions indicate that an increase in arbitrage activity improves future and
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contemporaneous market liquidity.
A natural question is thus, whether the percentage of price deviations that arise as a result
of demand shocks can explain part of the variation of the impact of arbitrage activity on market
liquidity. However, there is one other way how arbitrage might affect market liquidity. Ben-
David et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that arbitrage leads to negative spillover effects
in the ETF market, such that a demand shock in the ETF leads to a liquidity shock in the
underlying shares.
In other words, not only the percentage of price deviations that arise as a result of demand
shocks is important, but also the number of price deviations is important, and especially how
many price deviations in the opposite market arise as a result of demand shocks.
To answer these questions I look at cross-sectional regressions that explain the cumulative
impulse response in quoted spreads to a shock in arbitrage activity (as reported in Table 3.4).
I explain these responses by the stock-speciﬁc percentage of price deviations that arise as a
result of demand shocks, and by the (logarithm of the) number of price deviations (taken from
Table 3.2).
Table 3.8 reports results of these cross-sectional regressions. In column one and two I
explain the impact of arbitrage on liquidity for the home-market share. In column three I use
both the home- and host-market shares as dependent variables. In column one as independent
variables I use price deviations that arise because of a price movement in both the home- and
the host-market. In the rest of the columns I focus on the percentage of price deviations that
arise as a result of demand shocks in the opposite market, i.e. in column two, the host-market.
In all speciﬁcations I ﬁnd that the number of price deviations that arise in the opposite
market negatively affects the impact arbitrage has on market liquidity. A stock, all else equal,
but with double the number of price deviations that arise in the opposite market, is expected
to have an impact of arbitrage on liquidity which is lower by 0.2 standard deviation than
the other stock, i.e. for this stock a one standard deviation shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt would
change quoted spread by x−0.2 standard deviations, where x is the impact for the other stock.
Importantly, this is mitigated by how many price deviations arise as a result of demand shocks.
Comparing two stocks, one for which all and the other for which no price deviations arise as
a result of demand shocks, the former stock has an impact of arbitrage on market liquidity
which is higher by one standard deviation. I also ﬁnd that the number of price deviations that
arise in the same market positively affect the impact arbitrage has on market liquidity. This
is consistent with the idea of arbitrageurs as “cross-sectional market makers” (Holden, 1995),
because their services would only be required if price deviations actually occur in the ﬁrst
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Table 3.8 – Regressions to explain the impact of arbitrage on market liquidity, 1996 - 2013
This table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions to explain the impact of arbitrage on market liq-
uidity by the reason why price deviations arise. The dependent variable PQSPR Home and PQSPR is the ﬁve
day cumulative impact of a shock to Opportunity-Proﬁt on home- and host-market share quoted spread (from
Table 3.4). The independent variables are the logarithm of the number of price deviations that arise because of a
movement in the same (First mover same) or opposite market (First mover opposite) (log # price deviations), a
percentage of how many of these price deviations arise as a result of price pressure (% price pressure)(in which
the one share that moves to create the price deviation later moves back to eliminate it), and exchange dummies.
The “same” or “opposite” market refers to the same or opposite market used in the dependent variable. In the ﬁrst
two columns regression are over the 72 home-market shares (and hence the opposite market is the host-market).
The last column uses all 144 home- and host-market shares for the dependent variable. Signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level (using Newey and West (1994) standard errors) is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
effect of shock to
Opportunity-Proﬁt on:
PQSPR Home (%) PQSPR (%)
Interceptm -0.621 -0.923* -0.479*
(-0.96) (-1.86) (-1.77)
First mover opposite
log # price deviations -0.232** -0.190*** -0.039
(-2.59) (-2.79) (-1.03)
% price pressure 0.929** 0.888* 0.585**
(2.02) (1.91) (2.10)
First mover same
log # price deviations 0.282*** 0.244*** 0.076*
(2.98) (3.13) (1.84)
% price pressure -0.442
(-1.01)
Exchange dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 24.89 23.54 14.17
adj. R2 15.35 15.17 9.75
# Obs. 72 72 144
place. While the magnitude of the coefﬁcients slightly varies across the three speciﬁcations
all coefﬁcients keep the same sign and in most cases remain statistically signiﬁcant.
For robustness, in an unreported test, I repeat the above analysis using responses in home-
and host-market quoted spreads estimated from a VAR with the reverse order in variables, i.e.
with host-market quoted spreads ﬁrst, and Opportunity-Proﬁt last. The results practically stay
unchanged.
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3.6 Conclusion
Arbitrageurs enforce the law of one price by trading against mispricings, but if by doing so
arbitrageurs improve market liquidity or not depends on the reason for the arbitrage opportu-
nity to arise. In this paper I provide empirical evidence that is in line with the interpretation
of arbitrageurs as “cross-sectional market-makers” (Holden, 1995). Arbitrageurs are improv-
ing liquidity and are indeed trading against net market demand, or as Foucault et al. (2013)
put it, arbitrageurs are “leaning against the wind” (p. 336). These results conﬁrm the limits
of arbitrage literature, which in general assumes that arbitrage opportunities arise because of
non-fundamental demand shocks and hence assumes that arbitrageurs are improving liquidity
(Gromb and Vayanos, 2010).
These results shed additional light on possible consequences of frictions impeding arbi-
trage, such as short-selling bans or transaction taxes and hence might be of interest for policy
makers. To curb excessive trading eleven European member states plan to introduce a trans-
action tax in 2016,20 while liquidity providers might be exempted, arbitrageurs likely will not.
The tax will have an adverse effect on arbitrage activity and hence on liquidity.
One way to encourage arbitrage activity is to introduce portfolio margins, where the off-
setting position between the home-market stock and the associated ADR are incorporated in
the margin requirements. This is already approved by the SEC for example for index options.
20 France introduced a transaction tax on 2012-08-01. See, http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-
en/resources/faqs?frag=187982.
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Chapter 4
Cross-sectional identiﬁcation of informed
trading∗
4.1 Introduction
The notion of private information plays an important role in many theoretical models of mar-
ket microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate ﬁnance. Such models show, for example, that
ﬁrms whose securities are more subject to informed trading face greater illiquidity in these se-
curities’ secondary markets, a higher cost of capital, and reduced incentives to invest.1 How-
ever, measuring private information and informed trading empirically remains a considerable
challenge.
In this paper, we propose a new way of measuring informed trading based on a portfolio
optimization model for individual investors. Our approach has two main advantages. First,
it allows us to identify the amount of informed trading in an individual security over a given
period based on the cross-section of price impact parameters (λ) and order imbalances (OIB,
or the volume of buyer- minus seller-initiated trades). Hence, our measure can be estimated
for each security on each day, or even at higher frequencies. Second, our model also deliv-
ers a very simple and intuitive expression for the aggregate private information shock for a
given security over a given period. In other words, in addition to estimating the prevalence of
trading based on private information, we can measure the direction and magnitude of private
∗ This chapter is based on Bongaerts, Ro¨sch, and van Dijk (2014) “Cross-Sectional Identiﬁcation of Informed
Trading” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532128. Van Dijk gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from
the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc
Research through a “Vidi” grant.
1 See, among many others, Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Kyle (1985); Fishman and Hagerty (1989); Manove
(1989); Easley et al. (2002); Dow and Rahi (2003); Easley and O’Hara (2004); Goldstein and Guembel (2008);
Edmans (2009).
48_Erim Rösch stand.job
84 Chapter 4
information for each security on each day.
In the model, investors arrive at the market with an optimal portfolio of securities, but are
then hit by liquidity shocks and private information shocks that induce them to rebalance their
portfolio. Investors’ order ﬂow generates price impact that is linear in trading volume, which
implies that total transaction costs are quadratic in trading volume. Individual securities differ
in their price impact parameter for exogenous reasons. When hit by a liquidity shock, investors
optimally spread their trading over many securities, such that the marginal transaction costs
for all securities are equal. As a result, the order ﬂow in individual securities is proportional
to the inverse of their price impact parameter, which implies that most trading is done in
the most liquid securities. When hit by a private information shock about a certain security,
investors trade an amount in that security that is inversely related to its price impact parameter.
Furthermore, investors trade other securities in the opposite direction to ﬁnance the speculative
trade, where again the amount of trading in each security is inversely related to its price impact.
The aggregate order ﬂow (across all investors) in a security thus consists of three com-
ponents: (i) liquidity-motivated order ﬂow, (ii) speculative order ﬂow based on private infor-
mation about that security, and (iii) “funding” order ﬂow to ﬁnance the speculative trading
in other securities. When we introduce a benchmark security that is insulated from informed
trading to resolve underidentiﬁcation, we obtain a closed-form solution to back out the amount
of informed trading in any security, or component (ii), from its aggregate order ﬂow and the
aggregate order ﬂows and price impact parameters of other securities.
We refer to our identiﬁcation of informed trading as “cross-sectional” since it exploits
the idea that order ﬂow that is purely liquidity-motivated has the same sign for all securities,
while trading based on private information about a certain security results in opposite-sign
order ﬂow in other securities to ﬁnance the speculative trade. Crucially, the identiﬁcation of
informed trading also makes use of the notion that any order ﬂow is affected by the expected
price impact of trading.
Empirically, our model allows us to measure the dollar volume of informed trading in any
security over any time period based on the cross-section of price impact parameters and order
imbalances for a relevant set of peer securities as well as a benchmark security. We can also
compute the probability of informed trading inferred from the cross-section (or XPIN ) as
the fraction of informed trading over total trading.
Next to a measure of the volume (and probability) of informed trading, our model also
provides a very simple expression for a security’s aggregate private information shock (ag-
gregated across investors): the security’s order imbalance multiplied by its price impact pa-
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rameter (λ × OIB), minus the order imbalance of the benchmark security multiplied by the
benchmark’s price impact parameter. The intuition is that the observed order imbalance in a
security is more likely to be information-driven when the price impact of trading is high, since
investors only trade securities that are expensive to trade when they have valuable private in-
formation about these securities. Furthermore, any trading in the benchmark security is either
liquidity-motivated or funding-motivated, so the benchmark’s order imbalance (accounting
for its price impact) forms a natural reference point that can be used to isolate the aggregate
private information shock of an individual security.
We estimate our measures of the amount and probability of informed trading and of the
aggregate private information shock for all S&P 1500 stocks each day in the period 2001-
2010 based on intraday price and transaction data from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ)
database. We estimate daily price impact parameters based on intraday data by implementing
the approach of Glosten and Harris (1988). We use each stock’s moving average price impact
estimate over the past 20 days as the expected price impact on the current day. We estimate
the daily order imbalances of individual stocks by signing individual trades using the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm. Our ﬁnal sample consists of all 2,130 stocks (listed at NYSE, Nas-
daq, or Amex) that were an S&P 1500 constituent at some point during our sample period
of 2001-2010 and that survive our basic data screens. As the benchmark security, we use the
SPDR S&P500 ETF (ticker “SPY”), for which we obtain consolidated trades and quotes from
the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. We argue that the SPDR is a reasonable
benchmark security since it is highly traded, since the scope for market-wide private informa-
tion is arguably limited (Baker and Stein, 2004), and since the SPDR is unlikely to be used for
trading on private information of individual securities.2
The main purpose of our empirical analyses is to assess whether cross-sectional patterns in
stock returns are consistent with our private information measure picking up meaningful cross-
sectional variation in aggregate private information shocks. As our key predictions are cross-
sectional in nature, most of our tests are based on a further simpliﬁed version of our private
information measure: a stock’s order imbalance multiplied by its price impact parameter (λ×
OIB). Since the correction for the benchmark’s order imbalance times its price impact is the
same for all stocks on a given day, this simpliﬁcation does not affect our cross-sectional tests.
We ﬁrst show, in Fama-MacBeth regressions, that the cross-section of daily stock returns
is positively and highly signiﬁcantly related to this simpliﬁed private information measure
for individual stocks estimated on the same day. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that
2 This idea is similar to the rationale behind program trading facilities. These also allow better liquidity
because at least 15 securities need to be traded at the same time and hence the likelihood of trading on private
information on any of these securities is low.
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stocks with a more positive (negative) information shock on a given day have a more positive
(negative) realized stock return, but it does not rule out other interpretations of our private
information measure. In particular, our measure is a positive function of a stock’s order im-
balance and it is well-known that stocks with a more positive (negative) order imbalance on
a given day tend to have a more positive (negative) return, for reasons that may be distinct
from private information (e.g., price pressure). However, we show that the positive relation
between the cross-section of stock returns and our private information measure survives con-
trolling for order imbalance and expected price impact separately. In other words, λ × OIB
has explanatory power for the cross-section of returns that goes beyond that of λ and OIB
individually. We are not aware of models that provide an alternative interpretation of λ×OIB.
Furthermore, the explanatory power of λ × OIB is not subsumed by other “scaled” measures
of order imbalance, such as the product of OIB and the quoted bid-ask spread or OIB scaled
by market capitalization.
We then follow the reasoning that if our measure picks up private information, return
reversals should be weaker following stock-day observations for which our measure assumes
large negative or large positive values. After all, the price impact of informed trades should
be permanent, while the price impact of uninformed order ﬂow should be temporary (e.g.,
Kyle (1985); Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988); Glosten and Harris (1988); Sadka (2006). To test
this conjecture, we run daily Fama-MacBeth regressions of the cross-section of stock returns
on one-day lagged returns, interacted with the absolute value of λ × OIB. We reproduce the
common result in the literature that the one-day autocorrelation in returns is negative (e.g.,
Roll (1984); Cox and Peterson (1994); Nagel (2012)). The interaction effect between one-day
lagged returns and the absolute value of λ×OIB is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that returns
revert signiﬁcantly less following stock-days with large negative or large positive values of the
private information measure.
To get a better idea of the economic magnitude of the reduced return reversal for high
private information shocks, we also take a double-sorting approach to studying the relation
between return reversals and the private information measure. We ﬁrst sort stocks into quin-
tile portfolios based on their private information measure λ × OIB on a given day, in such
a way that portfolio 1 and 5 contain stocks with, respectively, large negative and large posi-
tive values for the measure. We then sorts stocks within each quintile into winner and loser
stocks based on their returns on that day. We compute the daily returns on a reversal strategy
within each quintile portfolio based on a long position in that day’s loser stocks and a short
position in that day’s winner stocks, held from the market close on that day till the market
close on the next day. The results of this double sort show that the abnormal returns (alphas)
on the reversal strategy of quintile portfolio 3 (consisting of stocks with values of the private
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information measure close to zero) are signiﬁcantly greater than the abnormal returns on the
reversal strategy in the two extreme private information portfolios (quintiles 1 and 5). The
economic magnitude of the difference in the strength of the return reversals is substantial, at
12 basis points per day. We interpret this as further evidence consistent with the view that
our measure picks up meaningful cross-sectional variation in the direction and magnitude of
private information for individual stocks.
In sum, this paper proposes new measures for the amount and probability of informed
trading in individual stocks based on a portfolio optimization model whose key predictions
concern the cross-section of order imbalances and price impact parameters. The model also
yields a simple measure of the direction and magnitude of private information for individual
stocks. We provide empirical support for this measure by showing that it is positively related to
contemporaneous stock returns in the cross-section, and that return reversals are signiﬁcantly
weaker following stock-days with high values for this measure.
We contribute to the literature on measuring informed trading by suggesting an alter-
native to the popular “probability of information-based trading” (PIN ) measure developed
by Easley et al. (1996) and Easley et al. (2002), which is based on a market microstructure
model instead of a portfolio optimization model and which has a different intuition. An ad-
vantage of our approach to measuring informed trading is that it is easy to implement and
that it does not require a long time-series of transaction data for individual securities (and can
thus be estimated even at high frequencies), since its main data requirements are of a cross-
sectional rather than a time-series nature. Our work is also related to more recent papers on the
“volume-synchronized probability of informed trading” or V PIN , see, among others, Easley
et al. (2011, 2012). A common feature of V PIN and our measure of information trading
is that order imbalances play a key role, but our measure is distinct in that it also takes into
account the price impact of trading.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to propose a way to mea-
sure the magnitude and direction of the aggregate private information shock in an individual
security contained in its trading over a given period. Our approach complements the work of,
among others, Glosten and Harris (1988); Hasbrouck (1991); Sadka (2006), who measure the
information effects of a trade through its permanent price impact, but who do not attempt to
extract a direct proxy for the private information shocks on which informed trades are based.
The paucity of sophisticated proxies for informed trading and private information is il-
lustrated by the paper of Lai et al. (2014), who benchmark PIN using crude, low-frequency
ﬁrm-level proxies for information asymmetry such as the number of analysts following the
ﬁrm, the analyst forecast dispersion, the age of the ﬁrm, and equity index membership. We
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hope that our new, high-frequency measures of informed trading and private information pro-
vide useful alternatives to existing measures and offer new opportunities to test and revise
existing private information models of market microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate
ﬁnance.
4.2 Basic model assumptions and notation
In this section, we introduce the basic setup for the theoretical portfolio optimization model
from which we deduce the market implied information per security to be incorporated in
prices.
Our model covers one period and concerns a market for N securities. These securities
are typically risky, but a riskless security can be included. The returns on the securities are
collected in the vector r and follow a multivariate lognormal distribution with means and
covariance matrix E(r) and Σ, respectively. Let us for notational convenience deﬁne σ2 as
the array that contains the diagonal elements of Σ.
There are M investors in the market, which are indexed with i. Each investor i has power
utility with CRRA parameter γi and starting wealth Wi. We assume that investors arrive to
the market with an optimal starting portfolio. Moreover, we assume that investors cannot
dislocate their portfolio so much that individual securities start to dominate portfolio such that
idiosyncratic risk is beyond concern . Investors are exposed to liquidity shocks as well as
potential private information shocks. Liquidity shocks Zi arrive randomly and are expressed
as a fraction of initial wealth Wi such that Zi >0 corresponds to money inﬂow. If no shock
arrives, Zi = 0. Information shocks are described in more detail below. Given the liquidity
and information shocks, each investor i has to determine optimal holdings xi of all securities.
His starting portfolio allocation is denoted by x∗i .
Trading demands of investors are accommodated by a ﬁnancial intermediation sector (i.e.,
market makers) for a fee. In particular, order ﬂow oi,j of investor i in security j has price
impact on security j when it is traded. This leads to a lower expected return (without affecting
risk), which increases linearly with trade size. More explicitly, we express total price impact
ψj(oi,j) as:
ψj(oi,j) = λjδi,joi,j ∀ j, (4.1)
where λj is the price impact parameter for security j expressed in percentage points lower
expected return over the average investor horizon per dollar traded and δi,j is a trade sign indi-
cator for the trade by investor i in security j. Total trading costs are then given by multiplying
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the average shortfall or excess in price with the size of the transaction:
|oi,jψj(oi,j)| = δi,joi,jλjδi,joi,j ∀ j. (4.2)
Hence, total transaction costs (execution shortfall) are quadratic in order ﬂow sent by an in-
vestor. We deﬁne the matrix Δi as a diagonal matrix with δi,j as its jth diagonal element.
Similarly, we deﬁne Λ as the matrix that contains the λjs on its diagonal. We assume that for
all j, λj > 0, also for the riskless security (if any).
4.3 Individual investor portfolio optimization
4.3.1 Liquidity shocks only
We take a somewhat unconventional approach to portfolio optimization. We assume a CAPM-
like setting in which investors may be heterogeneous (due to for example background risk) and
have an optimal portfolio allocation x∗i , given information at time 0. Moreover, we assume that
all securities are correctly priced; thus, (E(r − rf ) + 12σ2)/β = ι(E(rm = rf ) + 12σ2m) = ιζ ,
where ζ is the market risk premium. Under these assumptions, we can let investors optimize
risk-adjusted portfolio returns.3 When we do this, we need to impose a budget constraint
to avoid that the investor loads up on risk. Combined with transaction costs, the investor
would like to keep his portfolio as it is. Our motivation to use a static model with somewhat
incomplete preferences is that this will give very neat and tractable solutions under relatively
mild assumptions.
An investor only receiving a liquidity shock Zi optimizes:
max
xi
xi
′ιζ − 1
1 + Zi
(Wi(xi(1 + Zi)− x∗i )′ΔiΛΔi(xi(1 + Zi)− x∗i )), (4.3)
subject to the budget constraint
ι′xi = 1. (4.4)
We note that this way of formulating the rebalancing decision problem is intuitive and par-
simonious. As Λ and Δi are diagonal matrices, their order of multiplication in (4.3) can be
3This approach differs from the traditional mean-variance portfolio optimization problem in that the covari-
ance matrix is not explicitly taken into account. As such, it looks a bit like a risk-neutral setting, except for the
fact that we make risk-adjustments by standardizing by β. Our motivation for doing this is to keep the model
tractable and to avoid instability due to estimation error of individual elements of Σ. Otherwise, in solving for
optimal portfolio weights, we need to invert an investor-speciﬁc weighted sum of Σ and Λ, which is highly non-
linear and complex. The downside of this approach is that investors could end up with concentrated portfolios
since additional diversiﬁcation is not rewarded (but complete diversiﬁcation is assumed). However, systematic
risk is taken into account since E(r) is scaled by β.
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changed. As a result, since ΔiΔi = I, the “endogenous” parameter matrix Δi drops out from
the price impact part and we obtain a solution without any endogenous parameters.4 Another
way of seeing this is that price impact is linear in signed order ﬂow, such that total transaction
costs are quadratic in signed order ﬂow, so that taking absolute values is irrelevant.
The problem can be optimized by standard constrained optimization techniques involving
a Lagrangian multiplier.5 The optimal portfolio weights are given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The solution to optimization problem (4.3) is given by:
xi = Qi
−1ιζ +Qi−12WiΛx∗i −Qi−1ιζ +Qi−1ιf
Zi
1 + Zi
(4.5)
=
1
1 + Zi
x∗i +
Zi
1 + Zi
Λ−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1. (4.6)
Proof. See Appendix.
The new portfolio holdings are therefore equal to the portfolio holdings in case the liq-
uidity shocks could be settled with a risk and friction free savings account (ﬁrst term) plus a
transaction cost driven adjustment (second term). This second term consists of the relative size
of the shock
(
zi
1+Zi
)
times the fraction of the shock that is accommodated by every security.
This fraction always lies between 0 and 1 and is proportional to the inverse of the price-impact
of the security, such that most trading is done in the most liquid securities.
Individual order ﬂow is now given by:
oi = Wi(1 + Zi)xi −Wix∗i (4.7)
= WiZiΛ
−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1. (4.8)
One can verify that this is indeed the optimal order ﬂow. If we pre-multiply (4.8) byΛ, we see
that the solution yields order ﬂows such that the marginal transaction costs for all securities
are equal, as the RHS consists solely of scalars multiplied with a unity vector. Thus, it is
impossible to sell a bit more of one security and a bit less of another and thereby be better off.
4Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011) use a similar setting, but their model still features these endogenous
parameters since they focus on bid-ask spreads rather than on price impact.
5Note that incorporating other constraints, such as short sale constraints, in this framework is convenient,
but comes at the cost of increased complexity. The Lagrangian multiplier μ in the proof can be interpreted as
a shadow price. In this case, it is the utility loss to the investor in optimal solutions compared to the setting in
which shocks can also be accommodated with a transaction cost-free risk-free account.
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4.3.2 Adding information shocks
We now introduce an information shock that will create a Jensen’s alpha (standardized by β) of
vi on the securities. In other words, in addition to the liquidity shock, each investor i receives
an information shock vi, which is essentially a vector of the alphas gross of transaction costs
that can be generated for each security. The solution to the investor optimization problem is
then given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. With liquidity and private information shocks, optimal portfolio weights are given
by
xi =
1
1 + Zi
x∗i +
Zi
1 + Zi
Λ−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1 +
1
2Wi(1 + Zi)
Λ−1(I− (ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1)vi.
(4.9)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is worthwhile analyzing the various components of this solution. The ﬁrst two com-
ponents are identical to the case with only liquidity shocks. The third term consists of three
parts. The ﬁrst part is Λ−1vi. This is the solution to Λyi = vi , which is a ﬁrst order op-
timality condition as it equates for each security marginal beneﬁts (alpha return) of an extra
share to its marginal costs (price impact). The second part is most conveniently written as
((ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1)(viΛ−1). In this form, it can be seen as a vector of shocks (Λ−1, result-
ing from the analysis above) multiplied with a matrix that tells the investor how to allocate a
shock. Not surprisingly, this allocation matrix looks very similar to what we have seen before,
only this time multiplied with the unity vector to account for the fact that we have a vector of
shocks rather than just one funding shock. The ﬁnal part is the multiplication factor 1
2Wi(1+Zi)
,
which follows from the fact that for wealthy investors, less is to be gained in relative terms
because transaction costs quickly outweigh informational advantages.
As before, we can obtain order ﬂow by:
oi = Wi(1 + Zi)xi −Wix∗i (4.10)
= WiZiΛ
−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1 +Λ−1(I− (ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1)vi. (4.11)
The private information induced component of the order ﬂow can be interpreted as fol-
lows. First, the matrix Λ−1 dictates that the amount of trading on private information for a
given security is inversely related to the price impact of trading volume, which is intuitive.
Second, the matrix (ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1) results from the budget constraint and reﬂects the pro-
portions in which an information shock in one security is funded by each of the others. The
52_Erim Rösch stand.job
92 Chapter 4
rows of this matrix add up to one. Third, the setting is constructed such that each individual
investor trades on information shocks in such a way that the transaction costs on a marginal
dollar of trading are exactly equal to (and therefore offset by) the alpha gain. Thus, informed
trading volume is independent of wealth.6
4.3.3 Aggregating to market level and extracting consensus information
Aggregating order ﬂow across all investors gives:
om =
∑
i
oi
= Λ−1(I− (ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1)M v¯ +
∑
i
WiZiΛ
−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1, (4.12)
where v¯ is the average (equally-weighted) information shock. In (4.12), Λ−1M v¯ refers to the
aggregate speculative trading volume, −Λ−1((ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1)M v¯ refers to the aggregate
funding demand for the speculative trades and
∑
iWiZiΛ
−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1 refers to the aggregate
liquidity demand. M v¯ can be thought of as the aggregate amount of private information
(incidence rate times size) in the market.
In our attempts to obtain a measure of informed trading, we can try to invert (4.12) to
end up with an analytical expression for M v¯. However, because we allow for an information
shock for each security, the matrix Λ−1(I − (ι′Λ−1ι)−1ιι′Λ−1) is not full rank and hence
cannot be inverted. The reason for this can be seen in a two security example. Observing
positive order imbalance for security 1 and negative order imbalance for security 2, could
imply either (i) a positive information shock for security 1, which is associated with selling
of security 2 to fund the speculative trade in security 1, or (ii) a negative information shock
for security 2, leading to buying in security 1 with the funds received from selling security 2.
These two are empirically indistinguishable. To solve our under-identiﬁcation problem, we
assume that one of our securities never suffers from informed trading. This can be a treasury
bond or an information-insensitive security. In our implementation in Section 5, we use the
SPDR S&P500 ETF. We refer to this security as the “benchmark security. ”
When working out M v¯, we obtain a remarkably simple expression:
Proposition 1. The order-ﬂow implied aggregate private information shock for security j ∈
6This assumption might be unrealistic as some of the small investors would have to go short heavily in some
of their securities to fund their uninformed trading. An extra set of restrictions on non-negative holdings may
resolve this issue, but leads to less tractable results that are harder to interpret.
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{2, .., N} is given by:
Mv¯j = λjoj − λ1o1, (4.13)
where security 1 is the benchmark security.
Proof. See appendix.
Our model thus not only allows us to decompose a security’s aggregate order ﬂow into
informed trading on the one hand and liquidity-motivated and funding-induced trading on
the other hand, but also yields a very simple and intuitive expression for a security’s aggregate
private information shock: its λ×OIB, in excess of the same term for a benchmark security that
is insulated from informed trading. In the remainder of the paper, we set out to estimate and
validate these measures of informed trading and of the aggregate private information shocks
for a large sample of U.S. stocks over a prolonged time period.
4.4 Data and variable deﬁnitions
For our empirical analysis of the model introduced in Sections 2 and 3, we use a sample of
S&P 1500 stocks over 2001-2010. Our motivation for using S&P 1500 stocks is that most
institutional investors focus on stocks with a relatively large market capitalization, so that this
sample represents a reasonable set of stocks that informed traders might consider. The choice
for S&P 1500 stocks also aims to strike a balance between ensuring a sample of sufﬁcient
breadth, while at the same time excluding small and thinly traded stocks for which the esti-
mation of order imbalance and price impact parameters based on intraday data is problematic.
Our sample starts on February 1, 2001 (to prevent issues stemming from the tick size change
on January 29, 2001) and runs until the end of 2010. We refer to Appendix C.3 for a detailed
description of the sample selection and composition.
All of our analyses are done at the daily frequency, where the key parameters (order im-
balance and price impact) are estimated each day for each stock based on intraday data. We
obtain intraday price and transaction data for individual stocks from the NYSE Trade and
Quote (TAQ) database. To preclude survivorship bias, we obtain data for each stock over the
entire period for which we have data over 2001-2010, and not only for the period during which
they were an S&P 1500 constituent. We refer to Appendix C.4 for a detailed description of
the data screens and ﬁlters we apply to the TAQ data, all of which are taken from prior studies
dealing with these data.
53_Erim Rösch stand.job
94 Chapter 4
We determine the sign of each trade using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, as follows.
If a trade is executed at a price above (below) the quote midpoint, we classify it as a buy (sell).
If a trade occurs exactly at the quote mid-point, we sign it using the previous transaction price
according to the tick test. That is, we classify the trade as a buy (sell) if the sign of the last
price change is positive (negative). If the price is the same as the previous trade (a zero tick),
then the trade is a zero-uptick if the previous price change was positive. If the previous price
change was also equal to zero, we discard the trade. We do not use a delay between a trade
and its associated quote because of the decline in reporting errors (see Madhavan et al. (2002);
Chordia et al. (2005)). We are able to sign the overwhelming majority of trades in this way.
For each stock on each day, we compute its order imbalance (OIB) as the dollar volume
of buyer- minus seller-initiated trades based on the signed trades over that day. We express
order imbalance in millions of USD.
We estimate the daily price impact parameter for each stock using the approach of Glosten
and Harris (1988), based on daily regressions of the price change of a trade relative to the
previous trade on the current quantity traded and the change in the sign of the trade. The
coefﬁcient on the quantity traded represents the variable costs of trading and can be interpreted
as the stock’s price impact parameter, in the spirit of Kyle (1985) lambda. We scale the
estimate of this coefﬁcient by the squared closing price (quote midpoint) at the end of the
same trading day to make sure that, in line with the model, price impact is measured as the
percentage price change per unit of dollar trading volume.
We discard stock-days with fewer than 50 trades to ensure a minimum number of observa-
tions to estimate this price impact regression. Nonetheless, individual price impact estimates
are noisy and could lead to extreme estimates in our measures of informed trading and private
information. Furthermore, our model assumes that investors optimize the rebalancing of their
portfolio following liquidity and private information shocks based on the expected price im-
pact of trading different securities. In other words, estimating price impact parameters over
the same day as we measure the order imbalances (that within the model arise as a result of
the portfolio rebalancing by individual investors) would introduce look-ahead bias into our
analyses. To mitigate these concerns, we construct measures of the expected price impact of
trading a given stock on a given day (λ) as the moving average of the estimated daily price
impact parameters for that stock over the past 20 days, where we set negative price impact
estimates to zero. To further reduce the inﬂuence of outliers, we cross-sectionally winsorize
the resulting expected price impact estimates each day at the 95% level.
Our returns-based empirical analyses are based on midquote returns computed from the
daily midpoint of the last quote on each day, adjusted for corporate actions using CRSP data,
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and cross-sectionally winsorized each day at the 99.9% level (Return). For some of our tests,
we use a spread-based liquidity measure computed as the difference between the quoted ask
and the quoted bid price scaled by the midpoint of the quotes, averaging the spread across
all trades for the stock on that day (PQSPR). We also compute the market capitalization
(Mktcap) of each stock based on the number of shares outstanding and prices from CRSP
at the beginning of each calendar year. After estimating these variables, we drop stocks with
fewer than six months of data. In addition, when the data for a stock exhibit a gap of more
than two months, we only retain the longest uninterrupted period.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of all 2,130 stocks (listed at NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex) that
were an S&P 1500 constituent at some point during our sample period of 2001-2010 and that
survive these data screens.
We use the SPDR S&P500 ETF (ticker “SPY”) as a benchmark security that is insulated
from informed trading, which is needed to tackle underidentiﬁcation of the model. Our moti-
vations for choosing the SPDR as the benchmark security are that it is highly traded and that
it seems unlikely that informed traders exploit their private information by trading such a pas-
sive market-wide benchmark. We obtain consolidated trades and quotes for the SPDR from
the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. We estimate the order imbalance and
the price impact parameter of the benchmark security in the same way as we do for individual
stocks.
4.5 Empirical results
The main purpose of our empirical analyses is to examine whether the measures of informed
trading and private information stemming from the model developed in Sections 2 and 3 can be
applied to real-life data and yield results that are consistent with our theoretical interpretation
of these measures.
For each stock on each day, we estimate the (signed) dollar volume of informed trading
using the decomposition of the stock’s aggregated order ﬂow on that day into informed trading,
liquidity trading, and funding trading, as expressed in equation (4.12). This expression is
worked out in more detail in equation (C.21) in Appendix C.1. Solving for an individual
stock’s informed trading volume is based on our estimates of the order imbalance (OIB)
and price impact parameter (λ) of the stock of interest, of all other S&P 1500 constituents
in our sample on that day, and of the SPDR (our benchmark security for which we assume
informed trading volume to be equal to zero) on that day. For ease of interpretation, we scale
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the absolute informed trading volume by total trading volume for that stock on that day. The
resulting measure, which we label XPIN , can be interpreted as the propensity or probability
of informed trading.
We also estimate the aggregate private information shock (or Mv¯) for each stock on each
day based on equation (4.13). This measure of private information is based on just the esti-
mates of the order imbalance and price impact parameter of the stock of interest and of the
SPDR.
Table 4.1 – Cross-sectional summary statistics of time-series averages
This table reports the cross-sectional (across the 2,130 S&P1500 stocks in the sample) mean, standard deviation,
ﬁrst quartile, median, and third quartile of the time-series average by stock of the daily return from corporate
action adjusted end-of-day mid-quotes winsorized at the 0.1% level (Return), the daily average proportional
quoted spread (PQSPR), the price impact deﬁned as the percentage return in prices due to a trading volume of
$1m. (λ, each day cross-sectionally winsorized at the 95% level), the daily difference between the total dollar
volume of trades initiated by buyers and sellers (order imbalance in $m.) (OIB), the ratio of absolute, daily
aggregate informed trading over daily trading volume (XPIN ), and the daily aggregate private information
(Mv¯) from Eq. (4.13). The ﬁrst column indicates the number of stocks over which the summary statistics are
computed. The second column indicates the number of days the average stock is in the sample. The sample
includes all 2,130 stocks (listed at NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex) that were an S&P 1500 constituent at some point
during our sample period of 2001-2010. Data to compute all variables in the table are from TAQ. The factor to
adjust daily closing mid-quote data for corporate actions is from CRSP.
#Stocks Days mean stddev 25% median 75%
Return [%] 2,130 1,829 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.09
PQSPR [%] 2,130 1,829 0.37 0.79 0.12 0.20 0.39
λ 2,130 1,829 0.95 1.76 0.10 0.29 0.99
OIB 2,130 1,829 1.31 3.39 -0.01 0.18 1.21
XPIN 2,130 1,829 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.18
Mv¯ [%] 2,130 1,829 0.09 0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.15
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the daily returns, OIB, λ, PQSPR, XPIN ,
and Mv¯ across all stocks in our sample over 2001-2010. The table reports cross-sectional
summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, and 25th and 75th percentiles) of the
stock-by-stock time-series averages of these variables. The table is based on all 2,130 S&P
1500 constituents in the sample, for which we have daily observations for 1,829 days on
average.
The mean and median mid-quote returns are equal to, respectively, ﬁve and six basis points
per day. The medianOIB is slightly positive ($0.18m.) over our sample, but, not surprisingly,
exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation, with a standard deviation of $3.39m. The me-
dian λ (scaled by 106) equals 0.29%, which means that the median of the average price impact
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across all stocks in the sample is 29 basis points for a trade of $1m. The median PQSPR is
20 basis points. The mean order imbalance and price impact estimate of the SPDR benchmark
security are equal to, respectively, $17.29m. and 0.09 basis points per $1m trade (not tabu-
lated), which indicates that the SPDR experienced substantial inﬂows over our sample period
and that the average price impact of trading the SPDR is tiny, at less than one 1000th of the
cross-sectional mean of the average price impact of the S&P 1500 stocks of 0.95%.
The mean and median XPIN are equal to 0.15 and 0.16, respectively, which indicates
that our approach identiﬁes roughly 15% of the trading volume in individual stocks on a given
day as informed. This number is comparable in magnitude to the mean and median PIN
estimate of around 19% reported by Easley et al. (2002).
The mean and median Mv¯ are equal to 0.09 and 0.04, respectively, which suggests that
the aggregate private information shock was slightly positive in our sample. The magnitude of
Mv¯ is difﬁcult to interpret, since it requires an assumption about the number of investors (M).
However, the sign of Mv¯ does indicate whether the aggregate private information shock was
positive or negative for a given stock on a given day. Furthermore, the magnitude of Mv¯ can
be compared across stocks in the sense that a greater Mv¯ indicates a greater aggregate private
information shock. The cross-sectional standard deviation of the average Mv¯ of individual
stocks is substantial, at 0.18.
Figure 4.1 – Time-series of the averageMv¯ of the top 10% and the bottom 10% of all stocks sorted byMv¯.
This ﬁgure shows monthly time-variation in the equally-weighted, aggregate private information (Mv¯) of the
10% of all stocks with the highest and lowest private information on each given day. Aggregate private informa-
tion is deﬁned as in Eq. (4.13). Data to compute Mv¯ is from TAQ.
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To get a sense of the time-series variation in private information in our sample, we plot the
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average Mv¯ of the top and bottom decile portfolios of stocks sorted on Mv¯ each day in Fig-
ure 4.1. Consistent with the summary statistics in Table 4.1, the aggregate private information
shock tends to be somewhat larger in magnitude for stocks with positive private information
shocks than for stocks with negative private information. The degree of private information
is relatively high for both decile portfolios in the ﬁrst few years over our sample period, then
decreases slowly over time in 2003-2007 (both for positive and negative shocks), after which
it shows a peak again in the period surround the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008-2009, to
return to pre-crisis levels by 2010.
Figure 4.2 – Time-series of the average return of the top 10% and the bottom 10% of all stocks sorted by
Mv¯.
This ﬁgure shows monthly time-variation of the end-of-day equally-weighted, mid-quote returns of the stocks
in the top and bottom decile aggregate private information (Mv¯) portfolio. Aggregate private information is
deﬁned as in Eq. (4.13). Data to compute Mv¯ is from TAQ. The factor to adjust prices by corporate actions is
from CRSP.
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Figure 4.2 provides a ﬁrst indication of the relation between Mv¯ and contemporaneous
stock returns by plotting the time-series of the returns of the top and bottom decile portfolios
of stocks sorted onMv¯ each day (from Figure 4.1). The patterns in Figure 4.2 are a near mirror
image of those in Figure 4.2, which suggests that the contemporaneous returns of stocks with
positive (negative) private information tend to be positive (negative) and that the strength of
this relation is relatively stable over time.
In our empirical tests, we focus on our measure of the aggregate private information shock
(Mv¯) rather than on our measure of the probability of informed trading (XPIN ), for two
reasons. First, our private information shock measure is signed and thus contains more infor-
mation. Second, the predictions about the relation with the cross-section of returns are more
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clear-cut for the private informed measure than for the informed trading measure. For ex-
ample, we would expect Mv¯ to be linearly related to contemporaneous stock returns, but for
XPIN it is less clear what to expect, because XPIN is unsigned but also because XPIN
depends on the amount of liquidity-motivated trading and not only on the underlying informa-
tion signal.
Furthermore, since all of our empirical tests are cross-sectional in nature, we can use a fur-
ther simpliﬁed version of our private information measure: the product of a stock’s estimated
order imbalance and price impact (λ × OIB). Because the correction for the benchmark’s
product of order imbalance and price impact in equation (4.13) is the same for all stocks on a
given day, this simpliﬁcation does not affect the results.
Table 4.2 – Pooled correlations of daily private information, liquidity, order imbalance, and returns
This table reports pooled Pearson correlation coefﬁcients between seven daily stock-speciﬁc variables: Aggregate
private information (Mv¯), absolute private information (|Mv¯|), proportional quoted spread (PQSPR), price
impact (λ), dollar order imbalance (OIB), the product of dollar order imbalance and price impact (λ × OIB),
and returns (Return). We refer to Table 2.1 for a description of these variables. Data to compute the variables
are from TAQ and CRSP. P -values are in parentheses.
Mv¯ |Mv¯| PQSPR λ λ× OIB OIB Return
Mv¯ 1.000
|Mv¯| 0.262 1.000
( 0.00)
PQSPR -0.027 0.052 1.000
( 0.00) ( 0.00)
λ -0.002 0.003 0.187 1.000
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
λ× OIB 0.645 0.144 -0.020 0.013 1.000
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
OIB 0.253 0.093 -0.032 -0.003 0.159 1.000
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
Return 0.105 0.054 -0.005 0.003 0.100 0.050 1.000
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) (0.00)
Table 4.2 shows the pooled contemporaneous correlations betweenMv¯, the absolute value
of Mv¯, PQSPR, λ, the further simpliﬁed private information measure (λ × OIB), OIB,
and Return. As expected, a stock’s quoted spread is positively correlated to the absolute
magnitude of private information in that stock as well to the stock’s price impact. The order
imbalance is negatively correlated with both PQSPR and λ. Mv¯ is highly correlated with
its simpliﬁed version λ × OIB (at 0.645), but not perfectly, which stems from time-series
variation in the product of order imbalance and price impact of the benchmark security that
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will not inﬂuence our cross-sectional tests. We note that the correlations of both λ and OIB
with λ × OIB are relatively small (at 0.013 and 0.159, respectively), which suggests that our
simpliﬁed private information measure is distinct from its individual components and that any
results we ﬁnd for λ× OIB are unlikely to stem solely from λ or OIB. The correlations with
returns provide some further initial evidence that our measures pick up meaningful variation
in private information, since both Mv¯ and λ × OIB are positively and signiﬁcantly related to
contemporaneous stock returns. At around 0.10, these correlations are not overwhelming, but
daily returns for individual stocks are noisy and we note that both correlations are more than
double the magnitude of the correlation between OIB by itself and contemporaneous returns.
Table 4.3 – Daily Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on contemporaneous private information
This table reports the time-series averages of the estimated slope coefﬁcients from daily cross-sectional regres-
sions to explain differences in mid-quote returns across stocks. The dependent variable is the end-of-day mid-
quote price return of stock i on day d (Returni,d). The independent variables are: the return of stock i on day
d − 1 ( Returni,d−1), the order imbalance of stock i on day d (OIBi,d), the price impact parameter of stock i
on day d calculated as the stock’s average price impact estimate over the past 20 days with setting non-positive
price impact estimates to zero (λi,d), the inverse of the market capitalization of stock i at the beginning of each
year (1/Mktcapi,y−), the proportional quoted spread for stock i on day d − 1 (PQSPRi,d−1), and various
interaction terms. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are in parentheses using Newey-West corrections. Data to compute
the variables are from TAQ. Market capitalization data as well as the factor to adjust prices by corporate actions
are from CRSP. Some coefﬁcients have been scaled for ease of presentation.
Dependent variable: Returni,d
Returni,d−1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(-14.71) (-14.95) (-17.10) (-18.35) (-17.36)
OIBi,d ×104 0.96 0.97 0.14 0.01 -0.28
(9.34) (9.30) (4.03) (0.40) (-4.70)
λi,d ×102 0.99 0.98 0.20 1.25
(5.44) (6.40) (1.34) (6.72)
λi,d ×OIBi,d 0.39 0.30 0.37
(21.73) (23.18) (18.79)
1/Mktcapi,y− 164.83
(8.34)
OIBi,d × 1/Mktcapi,y− 549.36
(12.59)
PQSPRi,d−1 -0.01
(-0.84)
OIBi,d × PQSPRi,d−1 0.07
(7.76)
R2 2.43 2.86 4.95 6.13 5.70
# regressions 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,192 2,441
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In Table 4.3, we substantiate the initial evidence on the positive association between our
private information measure λ×OIB and contemporaneous returns by running daily Fama and
MacBeth (1973) regressions of the midquote returns on individual stocks on one-day lagged
returns, OIB, λ, and λ × OIB. OIB is included contemporaneously, since our approach
aims to extract informed trading from the realized order imbalance on a given day. We note,
however, that λ is not the contemporaneous price impact parameter for a stock on that day, but
rather the expected price impact based on the moving average price impact estimates over the
past 20 days (excluding the current day), since the model assumes that order ﬂow on a given
day is affected by the expected price impact of trading.
Consistent with prior studies, we ﬁnd that daily stock returns exhibit a signiﬁcantly neg-
ative autocorrelation. The coefﬁcient on lagged returns is equal to -0.07 in the ﬁrst model in
Table 4.3, with a Fama-MacBeth t-stat of 14.7 (based on the Newey and West (1994), cor-
rection for autocorrelation in the estimated coefﬁcients). Not surprisingly, daily stock returns
are signiﬁcantly higher on days with more positive OIB. However, the interpretation of this
ﬁnding is ambiguous, as both liquidity-motivated and informed trading are associated with
price impact. The coefﬁcient on λ is also positive and signiﬁcant in most regression models
in Table 4.3. This positive effect of λ on contemporaneous returns was not clear ex ante, but
may be driven by the fact that the order imbalance is positive on average in our sample.
More importantly, we ﬁnd a positive and highly signiﬁcant effect of our simpliﬁed private
information measure λ × OIB on contemporaneous returns. This result suggests that returns
are higher (lower) for stocks with a more positive (negative) value of λ × OIB on that day,
which is what we would expect if λ × OIB measures private information. The economic
magnitude of this effect is considerable. A one standard deviation increase in λ × OIB is
associated with a 0.12 standard deviation increase in contemporaneous stock returns, which
is substantial in light of the noise inherent in daily stock returns. We note that the effect of
our private information measure λ × OIB is not driven by λ or OIB itself, and that its t-stat
is considerably higher than the individual t-stats of the coefﬁcients on λ or OIB. In other
words, our new private information measure is more than the sum of its well-known parts.
In the ﬁnal two regression models of Table 4.3, we examine whether the effect of λ ×
OIB disappears when we introduce other “scaled” versions of order imbalance that may be
correlated with λ × OIB. In the fourth model in Table 4.3, we include the product of OIB
and the inverse of a stock’s market capitalization. In the ﬁfth model, we include the product
of OIB and PQSPR. Although the coefﬁcients of both λ× 1/Mktcap and λ×PQSPR are
positive and signiﬁcant, the effect of λ× OIB remains intact.
We next turn to potentially more stringent tests of our conjecture that λ × OIB mea-
57_Erim Rösch stand.job
102 Chapter 4
sures private information. For this conjecture to be validated, we should observe signiﬁcantly
weaker return reversals following stock-days with large positive or negative values of λ×OIB,
since informed trading should be associated with permanent rather than transitory price im-
pact. We test this hypothesis in two ways.
Table 4.4 – Daily Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on previous day private information
This table reports the time-series averages of the estimated slope coefﬁcients from daily predictive, cross-
sectional regressions to explain differences in mid-quote returns across stocks. The dependent variable is the
end-of-day mid-quote price return of stock i on day d (Returni,d). The independent variables are: the return
of stock i on day d − 1 ( Returni,d−1), the absolute order imbalance of stock i on day d − 1 (|OIBi,d−1|),
the price impact parameter of stock i on day d − 1 calculated as the stock’s average price impact estimate over
the past 20 days with setting non-positive price impact estimates to zero (λi,d−1), and various interaction terms.
Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are in parentheses using Newey-West corrections. Data to compute the variables are
from TAQ. The factor to adjust prices by corporate actions is from CRSP. Some coefﬁcients have been scaled for
ease of presentation.
Dependent variable: Returni,d
Returni,d−1 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10
(-11.01) (-12.34) (-11.56)
λi,d−1 × |OIBi,d−1| 0.04 0.04
(6.32) (6.46)
Returni,d−1 × λi,d−1 × |OIBi,d−1| 2.17 2.40
(10.35) (11.22)
|OIBi,d−1| ×104 -0.01
(-5.28)
Returni,d−1 × |OIBi,d−1| 0.00
(9.91)
λi,d−1 ×102 0.21
(1.15)
Returni,d−1 × λi,d−1 -0.37
(-5.51)
R2 2.60 3.45 5.05
# regressions 2,441 2,440 2,440
Table 4.4 reports the results of daily Fama-MacBeth regressions of the midquote returns on
individual stocks on one-day lagged returns, as well as one-day lagged returns interacted with
one-day lagged λ × |OIB|. If returns revert signiﬁcantly less following information shocks,
and if our measure is a meaningful proxy for these shocks, the coefﬁcient on the interaction
term should have the opposite sign as the coefﬁcient on lagged returns. We note that we take
the absolute value of our private information measure λ × OIB for these tests, since return
reversals should be weaker following large positive or negative information shocks. However,
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because λ is non-negative by construction, we only need to take the absolute value of OIB.
Consistent with Table 4.3, the ﬁrst-order autoregressive coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly nega-
tive, at -0.09 in the ﬁrst model of Table 4.4. In the second model, we add lagged λ×|OIB| as
well as lagged λ×|OIB| interacted with lagged returns. The coefﬁcient on lagged λ×|OIB|
is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that returns tend to be higher for stocks with a more
extreme private information shock on the previous day.7
The coefﬁcient on the interaction term of lagged returns and lagged λ × |OIB| is sig-
niﬁcantly positive at 2.17, with a Fama-MacBeth Newey-West t-stat of 10.35. This ﬁnding
indicates that, indeed, stock returns tend to revert signiﬁcantly less following stock-days with
high absolute values of our private information measure. We interpret this evidence as con-
sistent with the view that λ × OIB does proxy for aggregate private information shocks. The
third model of Table 4.4 shows that this result survives breaking up λ × |OIB| into its two
separate variables and including all the relevant interactions.
To assess the economic signiﬁcance of the reduced strength of return reversals following
stock-days with high absolute values of λ × OIB, we also analyze the returns on reversal
strategies separately for stock-day observations with low and high private information. To
that end, we ﬁrst sort stocks into quintile portfolios on day d − 1 based on their λ × OIB.
Quintile portfolios 1 and 5 thus contain stocks with, respectively, large negative and large
positive private information estimates on that day. Subsequently, we sort stocks within each
private information quintile into ﬁve subportfolios based on their returns on day d − 1. We
then compute the returns on a simple reversal strategy within each private information quintile
that is long in day d− 1’s loser stocks (subportfolio 1) and short in day d− 1’s winner stocks
(subportfolio 5) in that quintile. The returns of the reversal strategy are based on these stocks’
next day’s returns computed from the market close on day d − 1 till the market close on day
d. The difference between the abnormal returns on the reversal strategies within the low and
high private information quintiles can be interpreted as a measure for how large the reduction
in the strength of return reversals is following high λ× OIB stock-days.
The results of this second, 5× 5 double-sorts approach to analyzing the strength of return
reversals following low and high private information stock-days are in Panel A of Table 4.5.
The ﬁrst four columns of the panel report the estimates of time-series regressions of the daily
returns on the reversal strategy for private information quintile 3 (which contains stocks whose
aggregate private information estimate is close to zero) on various commonly used asset pric-
7 This effect may be driven by our ﬁnding in Figure 4.1 that over sample period positive information shocks
tend to be somewhat greater than negative shocks. However, we note that the lagged effect of λ × |OIB| is
much less signiﬁcant in both statistical and economic terms compared to the contemporaneous effect of λ×OIB
reported in Table 4.3, which is what we would expect.
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Table 4.5 – The returns on reversal strategies conditional on private information
This table reports the results of time-series regressions of factor models to explain proﬁts from two different
investment strategies, based on a double-sorting approach. In Panel A, we sort all stocks in our sample into ﬁve
portfolios based on λ × OIB on day d − 1. We then sort all stocks in the median λ × OIB portfolio into ﬁve
subportfolios based on their return on day d − 1. The dependent variable in Panel A is the equally-weighted
return on day d of going long the “losers” (i.e., the bottom quintile portfolio sorted by past returns) and short the
“winners” (i.e., the top quintile portfolio) within the median λ × OIB portfolio. In Panel B, we sort all stocks
in our sample into ﬁve portfolios based on their return on day d − 1. We then sort all stocks in the “winner”
and “loser” portfolio into ﬁve subportfolios based on λ × OIB on day d − 1. The dependent variable in Panel
B is the equally-weighted return on day d of going long the high λ × OIB stocks in the “loser” portfolio and
short the low λ × OIB stocks in the “winner” portfolio. Independent variables in the regressions are: the daily
market excess return (Mkt−RF ), the daily return difference between small and large stocks (SMB), the daily
return difference between high and low book-to-market stocks (HML), the daily return difference between past
medium-term winner and loser stocks (Momentum), the daily return difference between past short-term loser
and winner stocks (Reversal). The last columns in both Panel A and Panel B report the results of investing in
the above strategies and subtracting the proﬁts following a reversal strategy in the “opposite” λ× OIB portfolio,
called a “control” strategy. In Panel A, the “control” strategy is going long the “losers” and short the “winners”
in the two extreme λ × OIB portfolios. In Panel B, the “control” strategy is going long the low λ × OIB stocks
in the “loser” portfolio and short the high λ× OIB stocks in the “winner” portfolio. Newey-West t-statistics are
in parentheses. Data to compute the variables are from TAQ. The factor to adjust prices by corporate actions is
from CRSP. Daily factor portfolio returns are from the website of Ken French.
Panel A: Return reversal in median information portfolio
REV -
Control
Intercept 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.12
(5.56) (6.87) (7.61) (7.67) (4.81)
Mkt - RF 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08 -0.07
(3.98) (4.09) (6.10) (4.16) (-2.29)
SMB -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08
(-2.42) (-2.77) (-2.49) (-1.85)
HML -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.09
(-0.34) (0.05) (0.60) (2.11)
Momentum 0.08 0.08 -0.02
(3.12) (2.76) (-0.57)
Reversal 0.13 -0.06
(3.98) (-1.51)
# Obs. 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453
R2 1.02 1.50 2.03 3.32 2.12
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Table 4.5 – continued
Panel B: Return reversal in extreme return portfolios
REV -
Control
Intercept 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.11
(10.52) (11.93) (9.99) (11.34) (4.28)
Mkt - RF 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.02
(4.85) (4.99) (6.25) (5.66) (0.76)
SMB -0.21 -0.22 -0.19 -0.23
(-4.24) (-4.49) (-4.06) (-4.65)
HML -0.06 -0.04 -0.00 0.05
(-0.98) (-0.71) (-0.08) (1.01)
Momentum 0.10 0.10 0.01
(2.85) (2.56) (0.37)
Reversal 0.17 -0.05
(3.33) (-1.49)
# Obs. 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453
R2 3.23 4.42 5.09 6.96 2.00
ing factors. The columns correspond to, respectively, the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Carhart model supplemented
with a ﬁfth factor based on short-term reversals (Jegadeesh, 1990). We obtain daily returns on
these factors from the website of Ken French. All four models indicate economically large and
statistically highly signiﬁcant abnormal returns (alphas) of 46-47 basis points per day, which
indicate strong daily return reversals for stocks with low private information estimates.8
The ﬁnal column of Panel A shows the ﬁve-factor alpha of the difference between the re-
versal strategy for low private information stocks (private information quintile 3, as in columns
1-4) and the reversal strategy for high private information stocks (private information quintiles
1 and 5 combined). This alpha is signiﬁcantly positive at 0.12 (Newey-West t-stat 4.81), which
implies that the strength of return reversals is 12 basis points per day less following stock-days
with high private information when compared to stock days following low private information,
an effect that is signiﬁcant from an economic perspective.9
8 These abnormal return estimates on reversal strategies are somewhat higher than the mean reversal returns
reported by Nagel (2012) of 18 basis points per day based on midquote returns and 30 basis points per day based
on trade returns. This difference in magnitudes can likely be explained by differences in the sample, by the fact
that Nagel’s reversal strategy returns are based on all stocks rather than only the extreme winner and loser stocks,
and by the fact that the ﬁrst four models in Panel A of Table 4.5 use only stocks for which we estimate the amount
of private information to be low. We note that neither one of these reversal strategy return estimates is realistic
in the sense that they do not take into account transaction costs and short-sales constraints. We also note that we
obtain qualitatively similar results when using trade returns instead of midquote returns.
9 There are still signiﬁcant return reversals following stock-days with high private information, but we note
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In Panel B of Table 4.5, we reverse the 5×5 double sorting procedure by ﬁrst sorting stocks
into quintile portfolios based on their return on day d − 1 and then sorting winner and loser
stocks into ﬁve subportfolios based on their private information on day d− 1. We then create
an alternative reversal strategy that is long loser stocks with very positive values of λ×OIB and
short winner stocks with very negative values of λ×OIB. The idea is that stock-days with very
positive private information but very negative returns or with very negative private but very
positive returns are likely characterized by a large amount of liquidity-motivated trading in the
opposite direction of the private information signal, and should thus exhibit strong reversals on
the next day. The ﬁrst four columns of Panel B show that the one-, three-, four-, and ﬁve-factor
alphas of this strategy are economically and statistically large, at 35-37 basis points per day,
with t-stats close to 10. The ﬁnal column of Panel B compares the return on this strategy to
the return on a reversal strategy that is long loser stocks with very negative values of λ×OIB
and short winner stocks with very positive values of λ × OIB, since the reversals should be
weaker on these categories of stocks if λ×OIB is a meaningful proxy for private information.
The signiﬁcant difference in the abnormal returns on these two strategies of 12 basis points
per day indicates that return reversals are considerably weaker when the returns on loser and
winner stocks are more likely to be driven by private information.
Overall, our tests show that, consistent with our private information measure picking up
meaningful cross-sectional variation in aggregate information shocks, stocks with a more pos-
itive value of λ× OIB tend to have signiﬁcantly more positive contemporaneous returns, and
stocks with very negative or very positive private information estimates subsequently exhibit
signiﬁcantly weaker return reversals. Both of these results support the theoretical interpreta-
tion of our new private information measure.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes new measures of both the amount of informed trading in individual se-
curities and the direction and magnitude of the aggregate private information shock for these
securities. Both measures are derived from a portfolio optimization model for individual in-
vestors who are exposed to information and liquidity shocks. Our identiﬁcation of informed
trading is cross-sectional in the sense that it is based on the cross-section of price impact
parameters and order imbalances for a given day (or intraday period).
We validate our private information measure by estimating it for all S&P 1500 stocks each
that our model does not rule out non-trivial liquidity-motivated trading on those stock-days, which could explain
those return reversals.
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day over 2001-2010. In particular, we show that it is strongly related to contemporaneous re-
turns, and that return reversals are signiﬁcantly weaker following stock-days with high private
information estimates. Both pieces of evidence are consistent with the conjecture that our pri-
vate information measure is indeed associated with the aggregate private information shock of
individual securities.
An appealing feature of our private information measure is that it is intuitive and easy to
estimate, even at high frequencies. In cross-sectional applications, it simpliﬁes to a security’s
order imbalance multiplied by its price impact parameter (λ×OIB). Furthermore, in contrast
to other measures that proxy for private information, our measure also conveys the direction
of the private information signal. We hope that our measure will be useful in a host of appli-
cations in market microstructure, asset pricing, and corporate ﬁnance. In future work, we plan
to investigate the asset pricing applications of our private information measure.
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Appendix A
An Empirical Analysis of Co-Movement
in Market Efﬁciency
A.1 Data Filters
This appendix describes the data ﬁlters applied to the high-frequency data. Each day in our
sample period from March 1996 to December 2010, we include all NYSE-listed common
stocks (i.e., CRSP PERMNOs with sharecode 10 or 11) with a previous day closing price
above $5 in our sample. We collect data on all trades and quotes for these stocks from the
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database (using consolidated data across all U.S. ex-
changes). We discard trades that fall outside the continuous trading session (9:30 am till 4:00
pm U.S. EST/EDT) on the NYSE (in total 67,561,089 trades). We also discard trades with
a negative price (51,905 trades) or a price that is more than 10% different from the trade
price of the ten surrounding trades (130,930 trades). We further drop trades of more than
100,000 shares (1,750,630 trades) since large trades are often negotiated before they get re-
ported (Glosten and Harris, 1988). We discard quotes outside the continuous trading session
(252,266,477 quotes), quotes with a non-positive bid or ask price (651,568 quotes), quotes of
which the bid price exceeds the ask price (128,701,417 quotes). We also discard a number of
quotes we regard as outliers, deﬁned as those for which (i) the bid (ask) price is more than
10% different from the average bid (ask) price of the ten surrounding quotes, (ii) the ask price
is more than $5 higher than the bid price, or (iii) the proportional quoted spread is greater
than 25%. A total of 6,550,437 quotes are discarded because of these criteria. We note that
while the absolute numbers of trades and quotes excluded because of these data screens are
large, they are small relative to the total number of trades and quotes in the sample. Our data
screens lead us to discard less than 0.05% of all trades and less than 1% of all quotes. Our ﬁnal
sample consists of 2,157 stocks and 14,253,093,209 trades, of which 99.6% could be signed
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using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Because of a decrease in reporting errors since
1998 (Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans, 2002), we do not use a delay between a trade
and its associated quote.
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Appendix B
The impact of arbitrage on market
liquidity
B.1 Sample construction
This appendix describes details of the sample construction. I ﬁrst retrieve all dead and alive
American and global Depositary Receipts (DRs) from Datastream which returns (in Dec-13)
7700 different DRs of which around 10% (732) are traded at the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), the focus in this study.
The home market share, associated to any of the ADRs, can be identiﬁed using data from
adrbnymellon.com or adr.db.com. Both websites offer a list of DRs and an ISIN code for the
home market share.
As the analysis requires intraday data for which I use the Thomson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH) database, I ﬁlter out any DR for which I could not establish the RIC (the primary
identiﬁer in TRTH) for either the DR or the home-market stock. Upon request Datastream
provides a RIC ﬁeld, however this ﬁeld is empty for around 50% of all DRs. In the case of a
missing RIC ﬁeld for the ADR or for the home market shares I use the TRTH API to search
for a RIC code by ISIN.
For every ISIN the RIC from the major exchange of the home market country is chosen.
This way 199 out of the 732 stocks remain. A possible reason for this signiﬁcant drop in
identiﬁed home-market/ADR pairs is that either the ADR got delisted from the NYSE, or
that the home-market share got delisted from the home-market exchange before 1996, the
beginning of the TRTH database.
A similar setup (i.e. using intraday data from TRTH for ADRs, albeit for an event study) is
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considered by Berkman and Nguyen (2010), who are able to identify 277 ADR-home market
pairs, but of which only 44 trade at NYSE. Further Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) identiﬁes 506
ADR-home market pairs using Datastream, but the ADR can be listed on either NYSE, Amex,
or Nasdaq. The above matching results in 199 pairs where the ADR is traded at the NYSE.
I now proceed to use the top ﬁve home market exchanges, in terms of having the most
identiﬁed cross-listed ADRs trading in NYSE and having an overlapping trading time with the
NYSE (to avoid non-synchronous prices). These exchanges are the London Stock Exchange
(the U.K., with 29 stocks), Sao Paolo Stock Exchange (Brazil, 20 stocks), Bolsa Mexicana
de Valores (Mexico, 14 stocks), XETRA (Germany, 9 stocks), and Euronext Paris (France, 9
stocks). Of these 81 stocks I ﬁlter out 6, because I could not ﬁnd intraday data for either the
home market or the cross-listed ADR for at least one year. Further I exclude three stocks from
Brazil and Mexico from my sample because I could not align prices of the home market with
prices of the ADR, as described in more detail on page 115.
B.2 Data ﬁlters
This appendix describes the quote and trade data ﬁlters. I discard non-positive bid and ask
quotes (in total 5030 quotes), quotes where the ask is lower or equal to the bid quote (2,486,756
quotes), and quotes outside the continuous trading session (68,866,555 quotes). Further, I
remove outliers (25,764 quotes). An outlier is deﬁned as a bid (ask) quote that differs by
more than 10% of the average of the ten surrounding bid (ask) quotes. Despite that I discard
many quotes from the sample, as a fraction of the total 8.6 billion quotes these numbers are
marginal. In a similar way trade prices are ﬁltered. Of the in total one billion trades, I discard
trades that fall outside the continuous trading session (as depicted in Figure 3.1) on the NYSE
(in total 752,434 trades) and on the respective home-market (17,008,820). I also discard trades
with a non-positive price (65 trades) or a price that is more than 10% different from the trade
price of the ten surrounding trades in the NYSE (93 trades) and in the home-market (2,193).
Further, I discard trades of more than 100,000 shares in the NYSE (20,024 trades) and in the
home-market (3,057,514), because large trades are often negotiated before they get reported.
To make prices comparable between the home market stock and the ADR, bid and ask
quotes of the ADR are converted according to the bundling ratio which I got from either
adrbnymellon.com or adr.db.com. Unfortunately, bundling ratios can be time-varying and
both websites only report the latest bundling ratio. To adjust the bundling ratio over time, I get
all corporate actions from TRTH for both the ADR’s and the home-market share. Changes in
the bundling ratio can occur, for example because of solo stock-splits. To verify the accuracy
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of the bundling ratio I plot the daily average, currency adjusted mid-quote ratios for each stock
in the sample (unreported). If the ratio does not vary around one and does not resemble a step
function the stock is dropped from the sample. As such three stocks from Brazil and Mexico
dropped from the sample because prices of the home market could not be aligned to prices of
the ADR.
For 20 ADRs the bundling ratio changed over the sample, with a maximum of three
changes for one ADR with RIC ICA.N referring to a stock in Mexico (Empresas ICA) and
for 16 ADRs the bundling ratio changed once over the sample.
To further ensure that stocks are mapped properly and prices are adjusted correctly I drop
any stock-day if Opportunity-Proﬁt is higher than USD 10 or higher than 30% (of the mid-
quote of the home-market) in any second within the day. Such high discrepancies in the law of
one price frequently occur just after corporate actions on the home market stock, for example
when the home market stock is ex dividend, but the ADR is cum dividend. Ignoring days
after corporate actions such high price deviations occur relatively seldom, with less than ﬁve
stock-days in the U.K., Germany, and Mexico, but 47 and 68 stock-days for Brazil and France,
respectively. For 54 out of the 72 stocks the highest proﬁt on every day is below USD 10 and
below 30%.
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Appendix C
Cross-sectional identiﬁcation of informed
trading
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We solve the problem by a standard Lagrangian multiplier technique . We deﬁne
L(xi, μ) = xi
′ιζ − 1
1 + Zi
(Wi(xi(1 + Zi)− x∗i )′Λ(xi(1 + Zi)− x∗i ))− μ(ι′xi − 1).
(C.1)
The necessary FOCs for optimality are given by
∂L(xi, μ)
∂xi
= 0,
∂L(xi, μ)
∂μ
= 0. (C.2)
As L(xi, μ) contains only polynomial terms of at most second order, we can write the FOCs
as a system of linear equations and solve it as is shown below. In matrix form, the FOCs are
given by
⎡
⎣ −ai
1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ −Qi ι
ι′ 0
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ xi
μ
⎤
⎦ , (C.3)
where
Qi = 2Wi(1 + Zi)Λ (C.4)
ai = ιζ + 2WiΛx
∗
i . (C.5)
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Using the partitioned inverse (see Greene (2000), p. 34), we obtain our solution:
μ = −(ι′Qi−1ι)−1ι′Qi−1)ai + (ι′Qi−1ι)−1 (C.6)
xi = Qi
−1(I− ι(ι′Qi−1ι)−1ι′Qi−1)ai +Qi−1ι(ιQi−1ι′)−1. (C.7)
= Qi
−1a+Qi−1ιμ. (C.8)
If we deﬁne f = (ι′Qi−1ι)−1, we can work out μ:
μ = −fι′Qi−1(ιζ + 2WiΛx∗i ) + f (C.9)
= −f(ι′Qi−1ι)ζ − fι′Qi−12WiΛx∗i + f. (C.10)
Substituting back f gives
μ = −ζ − fι′Qi−12WiΛx∗i + f. (C.11)
Substituting Qi back gives
μ = −ζ − fι′ 1
1 + Zi
x∗i + f. (C.12)
Realizing that ι′x∗i = 1 and multiplying f with
1+Zi
1+Zi
gives
μ = −ζ + f Zi
1 + Zi
. (C.13)
Now working out (C.8) gives
xi = Qi
−1ιζ +Qi−12WiΛx∗i −Qi−1ιζ +Qi−1ιf
Zi
1 + Zi
(C.14)
=
1
1 + Zi
x∗i +
Zi
1 + Zi
Λ−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1. (C.15)
Proof of Lemma 2
With information shocks, (C.1) changes to⎡
⎣ −avi
1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ −Qi ι
ι′ 0
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ xi
μ
⎤
⎦ , (C.16)
where
Qi = 2Wi(1 + Zi)Λ (C.17)
avi = ιζ + 2WiΛx
∗
i + vi. (C.18)
Working through, we get the solution
xi =
1
1 + Zi
x∗i +
Zi
1 + Zi
Λ−1ι(ι′Λ−1ι)−1 +
1
2Wi(1 + Zi)
Λ−1(I− (i′Λ−1i)−1ii′Λ−1)vi.
(C.19)
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Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (4.12) writes like (using H , the harmonic average lambda):
om = Λ
−1 ×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
H
Nλ1
H
Nλ2
· · · H
NλN
H
Nλ1
H
Nλ2
H
NλN
... . . .
...
H
Nλ1
H
Nλ2
· · · H
NλN
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
×M v¯ +
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
H
∑
j oj
Nλ1
H
∑
j oj
Nλ2
...
H
∑
j oj
NλN
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (C.20)
where v¯1 = 0. We hence have:
oj =
H
∑
j oj
Nλj
+ λ−1j Mvj
(
1− H
Nλj
)
− λ−1j ×HM
∑
−j
vk
Nλk
, (C.21)
or:
Nλj
H
oj −
∑
k
ok =
NMvj
H
−M
∑
k
vk
λk
(C.22)
or (by subtracting this equation for j = 1 from the equation for any other j):
Mvj = λjoj − λ1o1. (C.23)
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C.2 Overview of notation used
Parameters
Symbol Support Description
ζ R Market price of risk
λj R
+ price impact parameter of security j
Λ RN+ × RN+ Diagonal matrix containing all λjs
Wi R
+ Starting wealth of investor i
Zi R Liquidity shock of investor i
x∗i R
N Starting portfolio of investor i
Indices
i {1, ..,M} Investors
j {1, .., N} Securities
Decision variables
xi R Portfolio allocation of investor i
δi,j {−1, 1} Trading direction of investor i in security j
Δi Z
N × ZN Diagonal matrix containing all δi,js of investor i
oi R
N Order ﬂow of investor i
C.3 Sample selection and composition
This appendix describes the selection and composition of our sample of S&P 1500 stocks.
Our starting point is a list of all 2,553 stocks that were a constituent of the S&P 1500 index at
some point in the period from January 2001 till December 2010 (including tickers, CUSIPs,
and begin and end dates of the S&P 1500 index membership) – downloaded on February 3,
2011 from Compustat Monthly Updates North America Index Constituents. There are 2,392
unique tickers in this list.1 As TAQ is organized by ticker (or symbol in TAQ terminology),
1 In most cases, multiple identical tickers occur on the list when the same stock (same name and same 8-digit
CUSIPs) is listed as an S&P 1500 index constituent multiple times. In several cases, these different entries refer
to distinct periods of S&P 1500 membership (such as Ace Ltd., which has entries for the period from January
30, 2002 till July 17, 2008 and for the period from July 15, 2010 till the end of our sample period). However,
in a substantial number of cases, the different entries refer to consecutive periods of S&P 1500 membership for
the same stock, with at most one trading day—quite often this day is Friday, August 1, 2003—in between the
periods (such as U.S. Steel, which has entries for the period from February 1, 2001 till July 31, 2003, from
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we use the TAQNAMES ﬁle downloaded on January 1, 2010 (and for later years the monthly
TAQ Master ﬁles for December 2009 and December 2010 downloaded on 27 July 2011, as
TAQNAMES is no longer available) to check whether the Compustat tickers are available in
TAQ. Of the 2,392 unique tickers, 346 cannot be found in TAQ. For the stocks with these
tickers, we check whether an adjusted ticker that refers to the same stock is available in TAQ
(based on a comparison of the 8-digit CUSIP and/or stock name on Compustat and TAQ). We
make adjustments to 331 of the tickers. We note that most of these adjustments are trivial,
such as removing “.” or “.1” at the end of the ticker. We discard 15 stocks for which we could
not ﬁnd a corresponding ticker in TAQ. As we want to analyze only stocks listed on NYSE,
AMEX, or Nasdaq, we obtain a list of all Compustat stocks and their stock exchange (data item
EXCHG – which is the most recent exchange the stock was listed on) – downloaded on May
26, 2011 from Compustat. We also need the exchange of each stock because we follow prior
studies and only download quotes for each stock from their own exchange. If the exchange in
this list does not equal NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, we manually check (primarily using internet
searches) whether the stock was listed on one of these exchanges in an earlier period. Most
stocks on our S&P 1500 constituents list for which Compustat indicates a different exchange
than these three are stocks that went into bankruptcy or went private but used to be listed. For
stocks that change from one of these three exchanges to another one of these three exchanges
during our sample period, we only use the data for the most recent exchange the stock was
listed on. After this procedure, there are 2,342 unique adjusted tickers, for which we download
and process intraday TAQ data over the period 2001-2010 to construct daily measures of order
imbalance and price impact. As the same ticker can be used on TAQ by multiple stocks in
different periods, it is important to check whether the downloaded TAQ data for each ticker
actually corresponds to the same stock in our list of S&P 1500 constituents. To that end, we
look up each ticker in our list of S&P 1500 stocks in the TAQNAMES and/or TAQ Master
ﬁles and verify that it is the same stock based the stock name, the 8-digt CUSIP, and the begin
and end dates of the presence of the stock on TAQ. This veriﬁcation has to be carried out
manually, because TAQNAMES often contains different rows for the same ticker and even
the same stock. If a stock’s ticker is not in our TAQNAMES ﬁle (which covers the period till
the end of 2008), we check whether it is in the TAQ Master ﬁles of December 2009 and/or
December 2010. If that is the case, we use the start and end of those years as the begin and
end dates on TAQ, realizing that TAQ data may not be available over those full years. If the
period during which a stock appears on TAQ does not overlap with the period during which
August 4, 2003 till August 28, 2005, and from August 29, 2005 till the end of our sample period). We treat these
consecutive periods with at most one trading day in between as one continuous index membership period. When
the different S&P 1500 membership periods for a particular stock are non-consecutive, we download the entire
data history available in TAQ for those stocks, though we later retain only the longest uninterrupted period for
stocks for which there is a gap in the data of more than two months.
67_Erim Rösch stand.job
122 Chapter C
it is an S&P 1500 constituent, we discard the stock.2 In line with the recommendation of
WRDS, we use the 8-digit CUSIP to match the TAQ data with CRSP based on the historical
CUSIP (data item “NCUSIP”) in CRSP and obtain the CRSP “PERMNO” identiﬁer for each
stock in our list. We manually check whether the names in CRSP match those of our list
of stocks, and whether different names refer to the same stock using the PERMNO and/or
internet searches. We discard one stock for which we cannot ﬁnd a match on CRSP. The
resulting dataset consists of 2,302 different stocks (with 2,282 unique adjusted tickers), of
which 1,408 are NYSE listings, 12 are AMEX listings, and 882 are Nasdaq listings. We note
that we discard some more stocks based on further data screens discussed in Section 4 and
Appendix D.
C.4 Data screens and ﬁlters applied to the TAQ data
This appendix describes the data screens and ﬁlters we apply to our sample of S&P 1500
stocks. We follow Hasbrouck (2007) and set the price of the ﬁrst trade on a day to missing to
cope with issues surrounding overnight price changes and special features of the opening. We
discard bid and ask quotes that are less than or equal to 0, bid and ask sizes that are less than
or equal to 0, and quote conditions (mode) that are not in 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 27, 28,
following WRDS recommendations. We only retain quotes from the primary listing exchange
of each stock, but we use trades from all trading venues, not just the primary listing exchange,
following Hasbrouck (2007). We discard trades that are out of sequence (as indicated by a sale
condition that is in O, Z, B, T, L, G, W, J, K, following WRDS recommendations), recorded
before the market open or after the market close (following Chordia et al. (2001), with special
settlement conditions (as indicated by a correction indicator that is not in 0,1,2), or with a
price less than or equal to 0 or a trade size less than or equal to 0, again following WRDS
recommendations. We also discard trades with (i) a quoted spread less than $0 or greater than
$5, (ii) a ratio of effective spread to quoted spread greater than 4, or (iii) a ratio of proportional
effective spread to proportional quoted spread greater than 4 (following Chordia et al. (2001).
2 In a small number of cases, the TAQ CUSIP is different from the Compustat CUSIP (usually only the
seventh digit, which identiﬁes the exact issue – where the ﬁrst six digits identify the issuer), but the stock name
and period correspond and there are no other stocks with the same symbol in TAQNAMES. In these cases, we
retain the TAQ CUSIP, as this is the historical CUSIP that corresponds to the data we downloaded from TAQ
for that stock. In some cases, TAQNAMES shows multiple lines for the same ticker with the same name and
the same 8-digit CUSIP. If the begin and end dates of those different lines are consecutive, we treat them as
representing a single stock. If not, and if TAQ only covers the period listed on one of the lines, we use that
period. If one of the lines lists a longer period on TAQ that encompasses the shorter period listed on the other
line, we use the longer period.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
De welvaart van landen wordt bepaald door de mate waarin efﬁcie¨nt gebruik wordt gemaakt
van ree¨le activa zoals land, machines en kennis. Financie¨le activa zijn slechts claims op deze
ree¨le activa.
Desalniettemin hebben ﬁnancie¨le markten verschillende belangrijke taken: ze maken het
mogelijk om de verhouding tussen rendement en risico te optimaliseren, om consumptie te
verplaatsen naar de toekomst, om belangrijke informatie van beleggers te aggregeren en om
schaarse middelen optimaal aan te wenden. Door het vervullen van deze taken kunnen ﬁ-
nancie¨le markten het efﬁcie¨nt gebruik van ree¨le activa stimuleren en daarmee een ree¨el effect
op de economie hebben en economische groei bevorderen. Bijvoorbeeld, als investeerders
geloven dat een bepaald bedrijf goede investeringsmogelijkheden heeft, dan zullen zij aande-
len in het bedrijf gaan kopen wat de aandelenprijs omhoog stuwt. De hogere aandelenprijs
maakt het voor het bedrijf makkelijker om extra kapitaal op te halen; het opgehaalde kapitaal
kan dan door bedrijf ingezet worden om de investeringsmogelijkheden te benutten. Op deze
wijze spelen ﬁnancie¨le markten een belangrijke rol in het toewijzen van schaars kapitaal aan
bedrijven.
De efﬁcie¨ntie waarmee deze rollen worden vervuld hangt af van de mate waarin de prijzen
van ﬁnancie¨le activa de echte waarde van deze activa weerspiegelen en de mate waarin mark-
ten het handelen in deze activa faciliteren. Met andere woorden, de voortvarendheid waarmee
deze rollen worden vervuld hangt af van de mate waarin ﬁnancie¨le markten efﬁcie¨nt en liquide
zijn.
Academici hebben grote variatie in liquiditeit over tijd en tussen markten gedocumen-
teerd, maar hebben tegelijkertijd marktefﬁcie¨ntie als een statisch concept behandeld. Dit lijkt
vreemd, aangezien liquiditeit en efﬁcie¨ntie nauw verwant zijn aan elkaar. Er valt wat voor te
zeggen dat markten niet efﬁcie¨nt zijn per se, maar dat efﬁcie¨ntie handel van geı¨nformeerde
investeerders tegen mogelijke inefﬁcie¨nties vereist, waarbij het bereiken van efﬁcie¨ntie af-
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hangt van het gemak waarmee de investeerders kunnen handelen (marktliquiditeit) en van de
hoeveelheid kapitaal die zij voor het handelen voor handen hebben (ﬁnancieringsliquiditeit).
For example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that markets cannot always be perfectly ef-
ﬁcient. Prices cannot always reﬂect all possible information, as in such a market informed
traders would “make no (private) return from their (privately) costly activity” (p. 393) and
hence would pursue other activities, leaving prices less informative.
Het hoofdthema van deze thesis is het onderzoeken van de interactie tussen marktef-
ﬁcie¨ntie en marktliquiditeit. Speciﬁek het documenteren van variatie in marktefﬁcie¨ntie over
tijd en tussen markten en of de efﬁcie¨ntie van individuele aandelen meebeweegt met mark-
tefﬁcie¨ntie; het onderzoeken waarom inefﬁcie¨nties ontstaan en hoe het handelen tegen deze
inefﬁcie¨nties marktliquiditeit beı¨nvloedt; en het aandragen van een nieuwe maatstaf voor de
waarschijnlijkheid van geı¨nformeerd handelen.
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The wealth of nations is determined by the efficient usage of real assets, such as its land,
machinery, and knowledge. Financial assets merely represent claims on these real assets.
Nevertheless, financial markets serve many important roles: they allow to optimize the
reward to risk ratio, to shift consumption over time, can contain important information of
aggregate investor beliefs, and can help to shift scarce resources to its optimal usage.
But the efficacy of all of these roles depends on prices of financial assets reflecting the
true value of these assets and how well the market facilitates trading these assets. In other
words, the efficacy of these roles depend on the financial market being efficient and liquid.
Finance academics documented large time- and cross-sectional variation in market
liquidity, but at the same time, in general, treated market efficiency as a static concept. This
seems at odds, because both efficiency and liquidity are intimately related. Arguably markets
are not efficient per se, but require trading against potential inefficiencies by informed
investors, who’s success depends on the ease at which they can trade (market liquidity) and
on their available capital (funding liquidity).
The main theme of this thesis is to investigate the interaction between market effi -
ciency and liquidity. In particular to document time- and cross-sectional variation in market
efficiency, and whether individual stock efficiency co-moves with aggregate market effi -
ciency; to investigate why inefficiencies arise and how trading against these ineffi ciencies
affects market liquidity; and to provide a new measure for the probability of inform ed
trading.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by
ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
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united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
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